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The IPCC is unequivocal that climate change is happening, and its consequences will 
continue to be devastating for the earth and humanity. The inadequacy of 
international climate law to mitigate the threat, makes it essential that we search for 
ways to galvanise the international community into action. The UN Security Council 
offers a way to inject some much-needed momentum into the international climate 
response. However, progress on this front has been limited. To address this problem 
and attempt to find a way to bring climate change within the meaning of Article 39, 
there is scope to employ the theory of securitisation to understand how the 
permanent members justify intervention. The narratives and underpinning 
thresholds and triggers that lead to the securitisation of a subject within the meaning 
of Article 39 must be understood. This knowledge can then be applied to climate 
change, creating a suitable frame to argue this contemporary peril as a Security 
Council matter that might better get the attention of the permanent members than 
past efforts at securitisation. Analysis reveals the Council could play a 
complementary function to support the climate framework, offering an option under 
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‘If the appropriate steps are not taken now, the manifestly unsatisfactory situation 
we have will limp along toward crisis.’1 
 
I. Thesis Context 
 
Be under no illusion, the threat facing humanity from climate change surpasses any 
that has come before it. We stand on the brink of a catastrophe that has the 
potential to decimate not just the human world, but the entire global environment. 
Flora and fauna will be faced with conditions in which they are ill equipped to survive 
in. Eco-systems will begin to collapse, having far-reaching repercussions across the 
entire biosphere. The time to act was yesterday, but instead we let this threat 
intensify and now we are in the final years before we lose the ability to respond 
effectively. The general apathy that exists towards this threat will sleepwalk 
humanity over the climatic cliff edge. If we are to have any chance of altering our 
fate the next decade must become characterised by a focus on climate security. 
Ways must be found to achieve the securitisation of climate change before the earth 
is made inhospitable for all life.  
 
Climate change is defined as alterations in the condition of the global climate that 
can be identified over an extended period of time.2 Climatic alterations take the form 
of average temperature increases; rising or falling levels of precipitation; and rapidly 
fluctuating weather patterns. As the balance of the global climate alters, changes to 
regional climates have become increasingly visible. Where regions were once subject 
to fairly consistent levels of temperature, precipitation and weather across a 
seasonal cycle, they may now experience entirely new patterns that do not reflect 
 
1 G Palmer, ‘New Ways to Make International Environmental Law’ (1992) 86 (2) The 
American Journal of International Law 259, 259. 
2 IPCC, ‘Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5 °C: Glossary’ (IPCC, 2018) 
<https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/chapter/glossary/> accessed 26th September 2019. 
 2 
typical periodic variation. Climatic alterations are taking place around the world, 
connected invariably to changes taking place in the global climate. 
 
Climate change is a natural process and history reveals the earth’s atmosphere has 
been hotter and colder than its present condition.3 However, it is irrefutable that 
anthropogenic activities have caused alterations to the composition of the global 
atmosphere, creating an unnatural heating effect and triggering human-induced 
climate change.4 The introduction of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere was first 
understood to be causing a warming effect as early as 1896 when Svante Arrhenius 
first looked at the warming properties of carbon dioxide (CO2).5 In 1960 Charles 
Keeling carried out empirical research into the concentration of CO2 in the 
atmosphere, discovering that an increase was taking place.6 Later studies revealed 
that a number of other gases possess this warming capacity, many of which are 
subject to mass industrial usage, generating ever-increasing concentrations in the 
global atmosphere.7 Data from NASA displays the average earth temperature 
between 1880 and 2017 has increased by 0.9 degrees.8 There is no scientific doubt: 
the temperature of the earth’s atmosphere is on the rise in response to escalating 
concentrations of greenhouse gases, the consequence of which is climate change.9  
 
 
3 Anonymous, ‘What is Climate Change?’ (NASA, 7th August 2017) 
<https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/k-4/stories/nasa-knows/what-is-
climate-change-k4.html> accessed 2nd September 2019. 
4 UNEP, ‘GEO6: Healthy Planet Healthy People’ (2019). 
5 S Arrhenius, ‘On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air Upon the Temperature of 
the Ground’ (1896) 41 Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science 237. 
6 C Keeling, ‘The Concentration and Isotopic Abundances of Carbon Dioxide in the 
Atmosphere’ (1960) 12 (2) Tellus Series A 199. 
7 V Ramanathan, ‘Climate Change and Protection of the Habitat: Empirical Evidence 
for the Greenhouse Effect and Global Warming’ (2014) 22 Complexity and Analogy in 
Science 230. 
8 Anonymous, ‘Global Temperature’ (NASA, 13th February 2018) 
<https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-signs/global-temperature/> accessed 15th February 
2018. 
9 IPCC, ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C: Summary for Policymakers’ (2018). 
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This heating effect is triggering the global climate to undergo significant alterations 
that humanity is ill equipped to cope with. For instance, rising temperatures in the 
atmosphere cause icecaps to melt.10 As a result some regions of the world are 
beginning to experience unprecedented flooding and changes to their local hydro 
systems.11 The melting of the polar icecaps triggers vast quantities of fresh water to 
be deposited into the oceans causing sea levels to rise, which produces greater levels 
of coastal erosion, but is also causing some states to be submerged one centimetre 
at a time.12 The vast depositing of fresh water into the oceans also has an effect on 
thermohaline currents, causing shifts that may have colossal repercussions.13 
Droughts and flooding cause food and water insecurity around the world, which has 
dramatic implications for the stability of entire regions.14 Extreme weather events 
like hurricanes are becoming more destructive and increasingly frequent as 
temperatures rise in both the atmosphere and oceans.15 Climate change is not simply 
a matter of increasing atmospheric temperatures. It instead comprises a number of 
climatic impacts that have devastating consequences for humanity and the wider 
ecology of flora and fauna around the world. 
 
Despite now understanding this phenomenon and its central cause as being an 
increased concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, global heating and 
its anthropogenic triggers show no sign of deceleration. The continued emission of 
 
10 B Wouters et al., ‘Early 21st Century Mass Loss of the North-Atlantic Glaciers and 
Ice Caps’ (2016) 18 Geophysical Research 1579. 
11 K Morton, ‘Climate Change and Security at the Third Pole’ (2011) 53 Survival 121. 
12 Tuvalu and Funafuti are experiencing sea-level rises at three times the pace of the 
global average, resulting in 2.8 to 3.6 millimetres a year. UNEP, ‘GEO Small Island 
Developing States Outlook’ (2014). 
13 UNEP, ‘GEO6: Healthy Planet Healthy People’ (2019). 
14 Anonymous, ‘UN Warns Climate Change is Driving Global Hunger’ (UN Climate 
Change, 12th September 2018) <https://unfccc.int/news/un-warns-climate-change-is-
driving-global-hunger> accessed 15th October 2019. 
15 UNEP, ‘GEO 6: Healthy Planet Healthy People’ (2019). 
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CO2 equates to an atmospheric concentration consistently exceeding 400PPM.16 
Looking at CO2 another way, there is approximately 36,153 megatons currently in the 
atmosphere.17 Further exacerbating the problem, deforestation reduces natural CO2 
absorption and it is estimated that 15 billion trees are lost annually.18 The 
combination of these factors meant June 2017 was the fourth-warmest June on 
record with all those surpassing it coming after 1998.19 The last five years have been 
the hottest ever recorded, demonstrating the escalating intensity of global heating.20 
Its cause, through the emission of greenhouse gases, is intricately woven into the 
fabric of human existence, presenting acute challenges that demand equally acute 
responses through international governance.  
 
Although scientific evidence began to appear as early as 1896, it was not until 1992 
that the international community took the first steps towards addressing climate 
change. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
and subsequent Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement represent the primary 
mechanisms designed to address the root causes of climate change, predominantly 
through the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. However, these efforts have 
long been criticised for their lack of impression on the problem. Sunstein highlighted 
the Kyoto Protocol was a failure in part because of the prevailing self-interest of 
 
16 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, ‘Global Monthly Mean CO2’ 
(Earth System Research Laboratory, 5th August 2019) 
<https://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/> accessed 2nd September 2019. 
17 Global Carbon Atlas, ‘CO2 Emissions 2017’ (Global Carbon Project, 2019) 
<http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org/en/CO2-emissions> accessed 15th October 2019. 
18 UNEP, ‘Towards a Land Degradation Neutral World: A Sustainable Development 
Priority’ (2015). 
19 H Shaftel (ed), ‘June 2017 was the fourth warmest June on record’ (NASA Goddard 
Institute for Space Studies, 14th June 2017). 
<https://climate.nasa.gov/news/2607/june-2017-was-fourth-warmest-june-on-
record/> accessed 30th November 2017. 
20 A Borunda, ‘The last five years were the hottest ever recorded’ (National 
Geographic, 6th February 2019) 
<https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2019/02/2018-fourth-
warmest-year-ever-noaa-nasa-reports/> accessed 18th November 2019. 
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states that did not comply with their obligations.21 Clemencon says the Paris 
Agreement may put us on the road to decarbonisation but it may also ‘have been 
another missed opportunity where international leaders made vague promises they 
were in no position or unwilling to fulfil’.22 The Tyndall Centre for Climate Change 
reveals the extent that these legal efforts have failed, finding that emissions have 
consistently increased since 1992.23 This has forced those with a mind to confront 
climate change to look towards additional response options, within which the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) has emerged as one avenue meriting exploration.  
 
The UNSC has long been understood as the executive of the international 
community.24 Compounded by its renaissance in the 1990s and early 2000s it 
became clear to some that the UNSC had the capacity to take climate governance in 
new directions.25 The UNSC has advanced its role to the point of legislature, meaning 
 
21 C Sunstein, ‘Montreal Versus Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols’ (2006) Harvard 
Environmental Law Review Working Paper 06-17, 1 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=913395 > accessed 4th July 
2019.   
22 R Clemencon, ‘The Two Sides of the Paris Climate Agreement: Dismal Failure or 
Historic Breakthrough?’ (2016) 25 Journal of Environment and Development 3, 20. 
23 Anonymous, ‘Global Carbon Budget 2018’ (Tyndall Centre for Climate Change 
Research, 2018) <https://www.tyndall.ac.uk/carbonbudget2018> accessed 18th 
November 2019. 
24 C Henderson, ‘The Centrality of the United Nations Security Council in the Legal 
Regime Governing the Use of Force’ in N White, C Henderson (eds), Research 
Handbook on International Conflict and Security Law (1st edition, Elgar Publishing 
2013) 120; J Alvarez, ‘Judging the Security Council’ (1996) 90 The American Journal of 
International Law 1; B Fassbender, ‘Quis Judicabit? The Security Council, its Powers 
and its Legal Control’ (2000) 11 EJIL 219; D Lee, ‘The Genesis of the Veto’ (1947) 1 
International Organization 33. 
25 C Penny, ‘Greening the Security Council: Climate Change as an Emerging Threat to 
International Peace and Security’ (2007) 7 International Environmental Agreements 
35; S Scott, ‘Climate Change and Peak Oil as Threats to International Peace and 
Security: Is it Time for the Security Council to Legislate?’ (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal 
of International Law 495. 
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it has the facility to introduce resolutions that have long-term, binding legal effect.26 
This and other qualities have attracted those who wish to see a more robust 
response to climate change. Arguments follow that a climate resolution with a 
binding character is precisely the type of action that is required, and the 
enforcement arm of the UNSC would provide a means to implement its mandate in a 
way that is precluded in the usual sovereignty-orientated forum of international 
climate law.27 
 
The UNSC has not embarked upon this course of action. Despite hosting a series of 
debates on climate change since 2007 there has yet to be any substantive progress 
made. This is partly a reflection of the general hesitance about bringing climate 
change onto the UNSC’s agenda. Further obstructing this move, the permanent 
members are yet to find any unity on the subject. In all cases of UNSC intervention 
they must either agree or be indifferent and so withhold their veto. The expanding 
mandate of the UNSC into terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) 
proliferation and health was rendered possible by agreement among the permanent 
members. Furthermore, in all three instances one or more of them adopted a leading 
role that proved crucial in the securitisation of those subjects.28 The permanent 
members must be convinced of the necessity and benefit of introducing climate 
change within the scope of collective security. It is also important that those viewing 
 
26 P Szasz, ‘The Security Council Starts Legislating’ (2002) 96 (4) The American Journal 
of International Law 901; for an example see, UNSC Res 1540 (28th April 2004) UN 
Doc/S/Res/1540; E Rosand, ‘The Security Council as Global Legislator: Ultra Vires or 
Ultra Innovative?’ (2004) 28 Fordham International Law Review 542; S Talmon, ‘The 
Security Council as World Legislature’ (2005) 99 The American Journal of 
International Law 175. 
27 A Boyle, J Hartman, A Savaresi, ‘The United Nations Security Council’s Legislative 
and Enforcement Powers and Climate Change’ in S Scott, C Ku (eds) Climate Change 
and the UN Security Council (1st edition, EE 2018) 101. 
28 The term securitisation will be explained fully in Chapter One. 
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such progression as problematic have their concerns assuaged if global momentum is 
to be cultivated.29  
 
II. Thesis Purpose and Structure 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore a way to bring climate change onto the 
agenda of the UNSC, specifically, through the activation of Article 39 of the UN 
Charter. Past instances exist where the link between climate change and the UNSC 
has been made, but to date none of these arguments has seen the activation of 
Article 39.30 It might be argued the security apparatus is inappropriate to deal with 
this threat because of the link to military solutions and the move away from 
multilateralism.31 In 1992 these assertions would have been more credible, but 
despite being aware of the danger we have continued to march towards it and now 
stand ten years from the point at which humanity will lose control of the situation 
and the ability to respond effectively to the cascading consequences.32 On this 
precipice the UNSC offers a last bastion of hope to generate an immediate response 
to climate change, and so it is imperative to explore a pathway towards the 
activation of Article 39. 
 
To this end several arguments will be made. First, this thesis will introduce the theory 
of securitisation as a way to rethink how we interpret Article 39 of the UN Charter, 
moving the scope of analysis from what it might mean to how its activation is 
 
29 States like the G77 view climate change as a development issue, arguing the UNSC 
lacks the expertise to make a positive intervention, see UNSC Verbatim Record (17th 
April 2007) UN Doc S/PV/5663. 
30 S Scott, R Andrade, ‘The Global Response to Climate Change: Can the Security 
Council Assume a Lead Role?’ (2012) 18 (2) Brown Journal of World Affairs 215. 
31 C Tinker, ‘Environmental Security in the United Nations: Not a Matter for the 
Security Council’ (1992) 59 Tennessee Law Review 787; C Penny, ‘Greening the 
Security Council: Climate Change as an Emerging Threat to International Peace and 
Security’ (2007) 7 International Environmental Agreements 35. 
32 This is the timeline set by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. IPCC, 
‘Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5°C: Glossary’ (2018). 
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justified. Second, it will be argued that the primary mechanisms for tackling climate 
change are for the most part ineffective. Third, analysing the past practice of the 
UNSC this thesis will demonstrate that consistent narratives exist across different 
Article 39 activations, within which, thresholds and triggers are present that, when 
crossed, generate the requisite unity among the permanent members to take 
collective action. This understanding of how threats are framed, and the thresholds 
present will then be applied to climate change, with the intention of providing a 
novel argument for use by those seeking its securitisation before the UNSC. 
Additionally, the progression of climate change before the UNSC comes with 
practical problems and so any argument seeking its securitisation must take account 
of these. There must be clarity as to how the UNSC can be expected to intervene in a 
positive manner, something that is often lacking in the wider literature.33  
 
Concisely stated, this thesis intends to make six main arguments: securitisation 
theory provides a novel and useful lens of analysis; international climate law is 
failing; the UNSC’s remit has evolved to now include international security threats; 
there are consistent narratives and underpinning thresholds and triggers that lead to 
the securitisation of international security threats; by centralising extreme weather 
events climate change can be framed according to the same narratives; the adoption 
of a complementary stance means the UNSC can be a positive force in the 
international climate framework.  
 
Chapter One will begin by introducing the theoretical frame that has been employed 
to guide this thesis. The theory of securitisation will be explained, with emphasis on 
how it moves the lens of analysis from what Article 39 might constitute to how it is 
activated. The research methods employed will then be set out to inform the reader 
of the roadmap that was used to conduct this thesis. Finally, the sources selected for 
analysis and the mode of interpretation will be established.   
 
 
33 K Conca, J Thwaites, G Lee, ‘Climate Change and the UN Security Council: Bully 
Pulpit or Bull in a China Shop?’ (2017) 17 (2) Global Environmental Politics 1. 
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Chapter Two will analyse the traditional mechanisms of international law intended to 
tackle climate change. This examination will emphasise that we must move away 
from the position that some climate law is better than no climate law, and recognise 
the current mechanisms are failing catastrophically. Relying on these instruments will 
sleepwalk humanity into a disaster of our own making, thus providing justification for 
the securitisation of climate change away from these ordinary responses and onto 
the security agenda.  
 
Chapter Three is concerned with identifying a referent object for the purposes of 
securitisation theory and narrowing down the subjects to be analysed. It begins by 
establishing how to interpret the term international peace and security. It then 
provides a brief history of this concept, through the evolution of threats engaged, 
showcasing that peace and security manifest as distinct issues. Centralising those 
threats with a security character provides a more precise referent object for the 
purposes of securitisation theory. The links between climate change and security will 
then be made, providing a rationale for the examination of these international 
security threats in the following chapter.  
 
Chapter Four dissects how the international security subjects of terrorism, WMD 
proliferation and the 2014 Ebola crisis came to be recognised as threats to peace and 
security from the perspective of the permanent members. It explores the narratives 
consistently present and what tangible thresholds and triggers existed that, when 
crossed, generated the required political unity to allow the activation of Article 39. 
The chapter will analyse the narratives that were consistently prominent, including: 
magnitude; transnational scale; collective interest; insufficient response; and 
urgency. These narratives will be analysed to expose patterns of behaviour from the 
permanent members that could be applicable to other pending threats. 
 
Chapter Five will take the findings from the previous chapter and apply them to 
climate change. It will be exhibited that climate change crosses all the required 
thresholds and triggers within the narratives identified to prompt the permanent 
members to unify their agenda in the pursuit of collective security and activate 
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Article 39. However, more than simply making this connection this chapter will seek 
out those climatic impacts that best fit the narratives used by the permanent 
members in past instances of securitisation. This will allow climate change to be 
framed in the way most likely to encourage the activation of Article 39, providing an 
element of practical value to the findings here that those in the climate security field 
may employ to argue for its securitisation.  
 
Chapter Six proceeds by illustrating the main arguments against involving the UNSC, 
not with the intention of dispelling such positions, but to understand them. The 
perspectives of the permanent members will also be quantified at this point to 
comprehend their interpretation of climate change before the UNSC, and why they 
have not yet securitised it. The chapter will advocate for a complementary response 
to climate change, which takes account of the reasons for needing UNSC 
intervention, but also recognises that certain objections and obstacles have to be 
overcome. It will be argued a complementary response is within the UNSC’s reach, as 
it is currently constituted, and could offer greater effectiveness than is currently 
exhibited by the climate regime.  
 
III. Contribution to the Literature 
 
There is little scientific doubt that climate change is a global threat.34 The question is 
how do we handle it? Involving the UNSC in climate change has been discussed for 
approximately twelve years now,35 although the link between environmental harm 
and the UNSC goes back to at least 1992.36 The stimulus for greater legal discourse 
on the nexus between climate and security was the 2007 UNSC debate on climate 
 
34 IPCC, ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C: Summary for Policymakers’ (2018). 
35 F Sindico, ‘Climate Change: A Security (Council) Issue?’ (2007) 1 (1) The Carbon and 
Climate Law Review 29. 
36 C Tinker, ‘Environmental Security in the United Nations: Not a Matter for the 
Security Council’ (1992) 59 Tennessee Law Review 787; L Malone, ‘Green Helmets: A 
Conceptual Framework for Security Council Authority in Environmental Emergencies’ 
(1996) 17 Michigan Journal of International Law 515. 
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change.37 The first of its kind, this debate was critical in beginning the movement of 
climate change onto the agenda of the UNSC and, despite some protestations, the 
discourse has steadily advanced both internal to the UNSC and within academic 
circles.38  
 
The 2007 debate sparked questions on whether or not there was a role for the UNSC 
on climate change. Taking a balanced approach, Sindico put forward the possibility 
that elevation of climate change to the level of the UNSC could generate global 
awareness that might help to encourage state engagement with the traditional 
conduits of international climate law.39 This helped to create early momentum 
behind the climate and security nexus. Arguments quickly advanced to determine 
whether or not climate change was able to fall within the remit of Article 39.40 
Relying on the evolving scope of the UNSC through the widening of Article 39 Penny 
argued that climate change could fall within its mandate and be subjected to its 
enforcement capabilities. Penny qualified this with reference to the need for the 
UNSC members to support such a move. This created the first gap in the literature: 
even if arguments came to the conclusion that climate change was a threat to 
international peace and security, they were unable to get around the problem of 
state interest, specifically the interest of those veto-possessing members of the 




37 UNSC Verbatim Record (17th April 2007) UN Doc S/PV/5663. 
38 See Chapter Five, where an analysis of those arguments for and against climate 
change before the UNSC is provided according to the statements of the permanent 
members. 
39 F Sindico, ‘Climate Change: A Security (Council) Issue?’ (2007) 1 (1) The Carbon and 
Climate Law Review 29. 
40 C Penny, ‘Greening the Security Council: Climate Change as an Emerging Threat to 
International Peace and Security’ (2007) 7 International Environmental Agreements 
35. 
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In 2008 Scott surveyed the competing arguments for and against UNSC intervention, 
finding momentum from the 2007 debate had slowed.41 Scott argued given the 
severity of the threat it was too early to discount a role for the UNSC that would see 
it support the international climate framework,42 which was experiencing compliance 
problems.43 Scott and Andrade later discussed the possibility of a UNSC resolution 
containing hard obligations, concluding this prospect was unlikely because of the 
continued opposition from some corners.44 They did point out the prominence of the 
permanent members, particularly the USA and China, and indicated their support for 
intervention may see a decisive role for the UNSC become more realistic.45 
Inadvertently this indicated the securitisation of climate change would be dependent 
on the perspective of the permanent members and their leadership capacity.46 
Another gap had appeared, and understanding how the permanent members 
securitise a matter is an area that could be explored to further advance the 
literature, something that this project will undertake through application of 
securitisation theory.47 
 
41 S Scott, ‘Securitising Climate Change: International Legal Implications and 
Obstacles’ (2008) 21 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 603. 
42 Ibid. 
43 L Susskind, ‘Strengthening the Global Environmental Treaty System’ (2008) 25 (1) 
Issues in Science and Technology 60; D Matisoff, ‘Are international environmental 
agreements enforceable? Implications for institutional design’ (2010) 10 (3) 
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 165. 
44 S Scott, R Andrade, ‘The Global Response to Climate Change: Can the Security 
Council Assume a Lead Role?’ (2012) 18 (2) Brown Journal of World Affairs 215. 
45 Ibid. 
46 In 2018 Scott researched the history of the permanent members and climate 
change, detailing their individual stances from 2007 to 2018. This was something also 
carried out in this project with similar results albeit with the benefit of running to 
2019. S Scott, ‘The Attitude of the P5 Towards a Climate Change Role for the Council’ 
in S Scott, C Ku (eds), Climate Change and the UN Security Council (1st edition, EE 
2018) 209. 
47 Ku in 2018 noted that there was not yet, but needed to be a consensus of the 
permanent members on the threat of climate change, which opens up the possibility 
that by understanding their securitisation motivations this project might help to 
generate some unity. C Ku, ‘The UN Security Council’s Role in Developing a 
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In the years since 2012 a number of questions have been discussed in the literature 
concerning what precisely the UNSC might be able to achieve in the climate change 
arena. Cousins discussed the possible roles that were available to the UNSC given the 
political constraints that it would have to operate under.48 Accepting there was only 
so much manoeuvrability within the current character of the UNSC, Cousins 
concluded that any role would have to centre on early-warning systems and dispute 
resolution. Conca et al. took a similar line in 2017 by advocating for a number of 
adaptive roles for the UNSC.49 Using empirical evidence from UN interviews they 
advanced various adaptive roles that might be within the UNSC’s grasp and skill set.50 
In both these arguments the intent to find a way forward for the UNSC is promising, 
but they are limited in that adaptation and not mitigation becomes the central 
response of the UNSC.  
 
The most recent collection of work includes discussion on what role the UNSC might 
be able to play to support the Paris Agreement.51 This is progress; however, these 
discussions continue to avoid asking how the UNSC could be involved in mitigation in 
a way that the permanent members can support. Other research details the 
perspective of the permanent members on climate change before the UNSC but this 
does not advance a route forward that might be able to subvert negative attitudes.52 
Another gap in the literature had appeared because no one seemed to be searching 
 
Responsibility to Respond to the Climate Change Challenge’ in S Scott, C Ku (eds) 
Climate Change and the UN Security Council (1st edition, EE 2018) 162. 
48 S Cousins, ‘UN Security Council: Playing a Role in the International Climate Change 
Regime’ (2013) 25 Global Change, Peace and Security 191. 
49 K Conca, J Thwaites, G Lee, ‘Climate Change and the UN Security Council: Bully 
Pulpit or Bull in a China Shop?’ (2017) 17 (2) Global Environmental Politics 1. 
50 Ibid. 
51 A Boyle, J Hartmann, A Savaresi, ‘The United Nations Security Council’s legislative 
and enforcement powers and climate change’ in S Scott, C Ku (eds) Climate Change 
and the UN Security Council (1st edition, EE 2018) 101. 
52 S Scott, ‘The Attitude of the P5 Towards a Climate Change Role for the Council’ in 
Scott S, Ku C (eds), Climate Change and the UN Security Council (1st edition, EE 2018) 
209. 
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for ways around the UNSC’s problematic character in the context of a mitigation 
intervention.53 This thesis will attempt to provide a response to this shortcoming by 
centralising mitigation before the UNSC.  
 
To summarise, when this project began a number of avenues of exploration had 
appeared from within the literature. First, the UNSC might have the scope to engage 
climate change but this would remain irrelevant if its members did not support or 
drive securitisation. The hegemony of the permanent members and their dominant 
role in the securitisation of other subjects led the focus to them and the possibility 
that they would need to be examined in detail to understand the activation of Article 
39. There was space for this project to expand the literature’s understanding of how 
a threat to peace is argued from the perspective of the permanent members, and 
then determine if climate change could be framed within the same lines of 
reasoning. In addition to this, it was clear that mitigation responses had to be 
centralised, and a way found to sensibly advocate UNSC involvement that would be 
grounded in its working reality by acknowledging the perspectives of the permanent 
members. This thesis is seeking to plug these gaps and advance the pragmatic 
securitisation of climate change within the meaning of Article 39, in order to provide 
a complementary function to the inadequate climate framework. 
 
53 Scott in 2015 did discuss a number of options for the UNSC, some of which would 
fall under mitigation, but this was more a canvassing of the territory as opposed to 
arguing for a specific mitigation role. S Scott, ‘Implications of Climate Change for the 
UN Security Council: Mapping the Range of Potential Policy Responses’ (2015) 91 
International Affairs 1317. Scott’s 2015 argument is precisely what Conca, Thwaites 
and Lee were referring to when they said there is often a lack of clarity concerning a 
UNSC climate response. K Conca, J Thwaites, G Lee, ‘Climate Change and the UN 
Security Council: Bully Pulpit or Bull in a China Shop?’ (2017) 17 (2) Global 
Environmental Politics 1. 
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Chapter One 
Theory, Method, Sources 
 
‘Indeed, the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitisation provides a number of 
avenues for exploring aspects of the Council’s work that have historically been under-




First, this chapter intends to explain the theoretical lens used to frame this research, 
with focus placed on the theory of securitisation. Second, the research methods 
employed will be outlined to exhibit how this thesis was constructed. Third, the 
selection of sources and the mode of interpretation will be set out. As a point of 
clarification,2 the term theory is used to refer to an idea or set of ideas that have 
informed the research.3 The term methodology, on the other hand, refers to the set 
of methods used to collect and analyse data.  
 
II. Theory of Securitisation 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to consider the extent to which climate change can 
be interpreted as a security object falling within the remit of the UNSC. As such, it is 
concerned with the so-called securitisation of climate change.4 Securitisation is a 
concept developed in the field of international relations to understand the process 
 
1 A Hood, ‘Ebola: A Threat to the Parameters of a Threat to the Peace?’ (2015) 16 (1) 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 29, 48. 
2 Flood argues that confusion exists in the legal research setting, highlighting 
terminology as a source of this problem, see: J A Flood, ‘Socio-Legal Ethnography’ in 
R Banakar, M Travers (eds), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal Research (1st edition, 
Hart Publishing 2005). 
3 R Cryer, T Hervery, B Sokhi-Bulley, A Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and 
International Law (1st edition, Hart Publishing 2013). 
4 J Warner, I Boas, ‘Securitization of climate change: How invoking the global dangers 
for instrumental ends can backfire’ (2019) 37 (8) EPC Politics and Space 1471. 
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through which certain issues are constructed as security matters, enabling 
extraordinary means to be implemented to confront them. Securitisation challenges 
the traditional understandings of security in that it refutes the idea that security 
issues are naturally or objectively existential. Instead it claims that they are 
constituted as security matters by certain actors that have the power to move them 
from the normal realm of politics to the exceptional realm of security. In other 
words, issues do not intrinsically or essentially possess an identifiable security 
characteristic. It is by being referred to as ‘security’ matters that they become 
security problems, thus receiving disproportionate amounts of attention and 
resources compared to non-security matters. Securitisation theory offers no attempt 
to define security, instead shifting the focus to the process through which an issue 
becomes part of the security agenda and the motivations for constructing objects as 
threats to security.  
 
According to its architects, the process of securitisation is comprised of two-stages.5 
The first is termed the ‘speech act’ and involves the presentation of a referent object 
(something that has a legitimate right to survival) as at risk from an existential threat. 
A securitising actor carries out the speech act, typically through a statement.6 The 
second stage involves the acceptance of this speech act by an audience 
acknowledging that the referent object and or the threat to it should be moved from 
the ordinary realm of politics to the extraordinary realm of security. As part of this 
transfer, the usual rules of the political realm are set aside or expanded upon by the 
exceptional rules of the security agenda. Attention to the problem is heightened and 
additional resources are deployed against it. Once an audience has accepted a 
 
5 B Buzan, O Waever, J de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1st edition, 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 1998). 
6 President Bush’s speech on the ‘axis of evil’ is an example of a speech act: see B 
Buzan, O Waever, ‘Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: reconsidering 
scale in securitisation theory’ (2009) 35 Review of International Studies 253. 
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securitising act and transferred rule or policy making to the security agenda, the 
object in question is judged to be successfully securitised.7  
 
This thesis has been constructed according to the view that the concept of 
international peace and security and threats to it under Article 39 of the UN Charter 
are flexible in nature, absent an objective meaning. There exists no strict definition 
that can be used to identify matters that have fallen or will fall within the meaning of 
Article 39. The UNSC activates this power according to the circumstances unique to 
each situation, thus allowing some matters to become part of its peace and security 
remit.8 The question of whether or not climate change can come within the meaning 
of Article 39 is therefore less about finding that it reflects some pre-established 
notion of international peace and security, but whether or not it can be securitised 
by the UNSC. In this thesis, focus is removed from defining Article 39 to 
understanding how those involved in its activation justified this course of action. The 
central object of inquiry is the discourses of the UNSC that surround the 
securitisation of threats, and specifically those speech acts that have been successful 
in conceiving certain issues as within the scope of Article 39. Securitisation theory 
will be utilised to generate knowledge to further understand how speech acts are 
constructed within the UNSC to justify the activation of Article 39.9     
 
Defining the exact parameters of the speech act can pose difficulties. Bourbeau 
identified two logics within the wider literature, both of which consider securitisation 
through the speech act in different ways.10 The first is the logic of exception that 
designates the speech act as a singular event that takes place in response to an 
 
7 All of the information within this section has been acquired from B Buzan, O 
Waever, J de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1st edition, Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner 1998). 
8 M Koskenniemi, ‘The Police in the Temple Order, Justice and the UN: A Dialectical 
View’ (1995) 6 EJIL 325. 
9 A Hood, ‘Ebola: A Threat to the Parameters of a Threat to the Peace?’ (2015) 16 (1) 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 29. 
10 P Bourbeau, ‘Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process’ 
(2014) 43 (1) Millennium Journal of International Studies 187. 
 18 
existential threat.11 This logic places emphasis on a single securitisation move, 
narrowing the scope of inquiry to a very limited set of circumstances. It fails to 
consider that there exist security institutions and mechanisms that do not cease to 
operate outside exceptional events and instead develop long-standing narratives on 
matters within their purview. Opposing this, the logic of routine proffers that context 
is vital, and the final speech act is simply the latest in a long-developed narrative.12 
This competing logic places greater focus on the established practices of securitising 
actors. Neither logic is more valid than the other, but their distinctions must be 
recognised in the application of securitisation theory. This is a point of great 
importance here, because the UNSC acts on both the logic of exception and the logic 
of routine, meaning it will have to be carefully addressed in the following section on 
research methods.  
 
In terms of identifying a referent object, we know the UNSC is charged with 
maintaining or restoring international peace and security.13 However, the Charter 
contains no clear delineation of what this term means, nor is it made explicitly clear 
how it may be threatened.14 The justification for this is that the Charter was intended 
to act as a living treaty capable of interpretation according to changing global 
conditions.15 International peace and security as a referent object, then, is difficult to 
identify, because over time it has evolved according to the changing nature of 
threats. These evolutions vary noticeably, and not every aspect of international 
 
11 The Copenhagen School falls into this logic, alongside others works such as: T 
Balzacq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitisation: Political Agency, Audience, and Context’ 
(2005) 11 (2) European Journal of International Relations 176; L Hansen, ‘Theorizing 
the Image for Security Studies: visual securitization and the Muhammed cartoon 
crisis’ (2011) 17 European Journal of International Relations 51. 
12 For an example see: D Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration: Towards a Critique of 
Governmentality of Unease’ (2002) 27 Alternatives 63. 
13 Charter of the United Nations (24th October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Article 24(1). 
14 M Selkirk, ‘Judge, Jury and Executioner? Analysing the Nature of the Security 
Council’s Authority Under Article 39 of the UN Charter’ (2003) 9 Auckland University 
Law Review 1101. 
15 At the San Francisco Conference President Truman of the USA argued in favour of 
making the Charter ‘a living thing’, UNCIO Volume One, p 683. 
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peace and security would be comparable or relevant to climate change and the 
purpose of this thesis to argue for its securitisation. Thus, although the referent 
object of this thesis could be identified as international peace and security, Chapter 
Three will provide a brief discussion of the evolution of this concept. By doing this a 
more precise referent object will be identified and a rationale for the examination of 
some threats and not others will be provided. 
 
Lastly, it is important to establish what is meant here by ordinary and exceptional 
security rules. By reference to ordinary rules, attention is being directed to those 
mechanisms that already exist in relation to a given subject. For instance, the World 
Health Organisation and its International Health Regulations represent the ordinary 
means through which responses to health crises are coordinated.16 Transferring an 
issue from these established mechanisms means it is being removed from the 
ordinary sphere intended to combat it.17 Within this thesis, Article 39 will comprise 
the exceptional security rules. It is the pre-eminent power of the UNSC historically 
applied to exceptional peace and security threats. Once an issue has been cast within 
the meaning of Article 39, the transfer from the ordinary to the exceptional will have 
taken place. To exemplify this, the adoption of Resolution 2177 on the 2014 Ebola 
outbreak represents the creation of an exceptional security rule.18 This thesis will be 
focussing on the exceptional security rules and little attention will be paid to the 
ordinary rules that relate to those issues examined. Chapter Two offers the only 
exception to this, where the ordinary rules of international climate law will be 
examined to provide a justification for this thesis’ search for a way to move climate 
change onto the security agenda. 
 
 
16 C Enemark, ‘Ebola, Disease-Control, and the Security Council: From Securitisation 
to Securing Circulation’ (2017) 2 Journal of Global Security Studies 137. 
17 C McInnes, S Rushton, ‘HIV/AIDS and Securitisation theory’ (2011) 19 (1) European 
Journal of International Relations 115. 
18 UNSC Res 2177 (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/Res/2177. 
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There are a number of critiques levelled at securitisation theory, with some 
suggesting that it focusses too heavily on specific actors,19 and fails to address the 
power imbalance they might have over the audience.20 Moreover, some claim that it 
is too Eurocentric and struggles to find relevance in wider circumstances.21 However, 
these concerns are beyond the remit of this thesis. For the purposes here, the central 
premise of securitisation theory will be employed. Specifically, that security is not an 
objective entity that can be identified, but that actors with sufficient capacity can 
undertake to transfer objects from the ordinary realm of politics to the extraordinary 
apparatus of the security agenda. In the context of the UNSC, this is a particularly 
useful frame of reference because it will allow the discourse to move away from 
seeking to establish the objective meaning of Article 39, to instead looking at how its 
use is justified. From this angle of inquiry, we can learn how actors justify the 
securitisation of threats and then apply this knowledge to climate change.  
 
III. Research Methods 
 
Hood suggested in 2015 that securitisation theory ‘appears to go some way to 
explaining how and why some issues become threats to the peace’.22 Asking how an 
issue becomes a threat to peace allows the justifications and arguments of the actors 
involved to be examined. Once identified these justifications could be marshalled in 
the climate change context. Taking this approach has the advantage of flexibility and, 
by asking how an issue comes to be understood as a threat to peace, useful lines of 
understanding may be drawn that can be paralleled to climate change. This thesis 
 
19 P Bourbeau, ‘Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process’ 
(2014) 43 (1) Millennium Journal of International Studies 187. 
20 T Balzacq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitisation: Political Agency, Audience, and 
Context’ (2005) 11 (2) European Journal of International Relations 176. 
21 C Wilkinson, ‘The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitisation 
Theory Useable Outside Europe?’ (2007) 38 (1) Security Dialogue 5. 
22 A Hood, ‘Ebola: A Threat to the Parameters of a Threat to the Peace?’ (2015) 16 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 29, 48. 
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intends to apply securitisation theory to the UNSC to better understand how certain 
threats were justified as within the remit of Article 39.23 
 
Hood identified two questions that securitisation theory could usefully answer: how 
are threats framed by states on the UNSC; and which narratives continually 
reappear? This thesis intends to spotlight these questions and cultivate knowledge 
on the narratives that continually reappear in the securitisation process of the UNSC, 
analysing them to identify broad patterns of justificatory arguments across a number 
of issues characterised as threats to peace.24 If a consistent set of narratives can be 
identified it will further understanding of what drives securitisation on the UNSC. 
This will then help to predict whether climate change may constitute a threat to the 
peace, and whether or not it could be framed according to the same pattern of 
arguments. The following paragraphs will detail the research methods employed to 
construct this thesis, with the theory of securitisation in mind. 
 
This thesis will divide the UNSC according to its institutional structure, examining the 
permanent members as the primary securitising actors. The authority granted to 
them through permanency and their veto power means they occupy a more 
influential role than their non-permanent counterparts.25 This places the UNSC 
within the original dynamic identified by Buzan et al. in terms of examining those 
actors with substantial influence in a society.26 It does invoke the concern of those 
that believe securitisation theory focusses too heavily on elite actors in positions of 
influence.27 However, it is quite possible that it is precisely because of this imbalance 
of power that securitisation is able to take place. As Eroukhmanoff reminds us, 
 
23 The selection of threats for analysis will take place in Chapter Three.  
24 For reasons of feasibility not all of Hood’s questions could be addressed here. But 
they could easily be used in future work to continue the expansion of knowledge in 
this area. 
25 Charter of the United Nations (24th October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Article 23(1). 
26 B Buzan, O Waever, J de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1st 
edition, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 1998). 
27 T Balzacq, ‘The Three Faces of Securitisation: Political Agency, Audience, and 
Context’ (2005) 11 (2) European Journal of International Relations 176. 
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securitisation is not a neutral act but a political one driven by particular interests.28 
Affording the permanent members exclusive powers will inevitably mean they utilise 
them according to their own political perspectives. As such, they are elite actors that 
occupy an influential role in the society of the UNSC, reflecting the original premise 
of securitisation theory. 
 
Rychnovska disagrees with this, arguing that the UNSC is less akin to the typical 
actor-audience relationship because of the way in which different states can interact 
on the UNSC to find a shared narrative.29 Even though a narrative may be shared the 
existence of the veto allows the permanent members to act as the gatekeepers of 
securitisation.30 They can pick and choose what to securitise and so the narrative is 
only shared if they assent to it. Although resolutions represent the UNSC as a whole, 
they are overwhelmingly influenced, and sanctioned by the permanent members. 
Situating them as the main securitising actors therefore reflects their position of 
authority. Moreover, the rotating membership of the non-permanent members 
means that an examination of threats over a time period greater than two years 
would produce inconsistencies in the states examined.31 It is more coherent in terms 
of data collection to focus on the permanent members that are always present in the 
securitisation process.  
 
 
28 C Eroukhmanoff, ‘Securitisation Theory’ in S McGlinchey, R Walters, Scheinpflug C 
(eds), International Relations Theory (1st edition, E-International Relations Publishing 
2019) 104. 
29 D Rychnovska, ‘Securitisation and the Power of Threat Framing’ (2014) 22 (2) 
Perspectives 9. 
30 This was evident in the adoption of Resolution 1540, which was negotiated by the 
permanent members and then presented to the non-permanent members for 
limited discussion: Burroughs J, ‘The Role of the UN Security Council’ in J Burroughs, 
et al., Nuclear Disorder or Cooperative Security? The Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Commission <http://wmdreport.org/ndcs/online/NuclearDisorderPart1Section3.pdf> 
accessed 24th April 2019. 
31 Charter of the United Nations (24th October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Article 23(2). 
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The next task is to decide how to interpret the speech act and determine if this 
project will view securitisation theory through the logic of exception or routine. The 
UNSC falls into both logics. On the one hand it could be viewed that resolutions 
passed at precise points in time are based on exceptional events, with the 
statements of the permanent members reflecting a speech act. An example of this 
would be Resolution 1368, which followed the exceptional events of September 11th 
2001.32 On the other hand, the UNSC is a permanently sitting institution designed to 
address issues on a continuous basis. As the UNSC discusses threats these may form 
early iterations of the securitisation process, even if it takes many years to be 
considered successful via the activation of Article 39. For instance, the UNSC 
discussed the question of WMD proliferation as early as 1992,33 and then again in 
Resolution 825,34 before it recognised it as a potential Article 39 threat through 
Resolution 1441,35 and a firm threat to peace through Resolution 1540.36 In this 
illustration, the cumulative statements of the permanent members could constitute 
a developing narrative, with the final securitising move culminating in Resolution 
1540.37  
 
Bourbeau argues that exception and routine are not mutually exclusive logics but are 
instead interrelated.38 In the context of the UNSC the above does seem to reflect 
this, and it could be contended that both exception and routine form equally 
significant logics. However, it is important to understand that in the context of the 
UNSC the logic of exception takes on a more dominant role because, as its history 
 
32 UNSC Res 1368 (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/Res/1368. 
33 UNSC Verbatim Record (31st January 1992) UN Doc/S/PV/3046. 
34 UNSC Res 825 (11th May 1993) UN Doc/S/Res/825. 
35 UNSC Res 1441 (8th November 2002) UN Doc S/Res/1441. 
36 UNSC Res 1540 (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/Res/1540. 
37 This type of argument can be found in the wider literature on securitisation, where 
it has been argued that it is best viewed as a continuum absent a binary nature. See: 
C McInnes, S Rushton, ‘HIV/AIDS and Securitisation Theory’ (2011) 19 (1) European 
Journal of International Relations 115. 
38 P Bourbeau, ‘Moving Forward Together: Logics of the Securitisation Process’ 
(2014) 43 (1) Millennium Journal of International Studies 187. 
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identifies, there are points when a situation becomes untenable for the permanent 
members.39 Prior to this they may have been developing a narrative on a subject but 
were unconvinced of the need to activate Article 39. It is therefore the case that at 
the point of the Article 39 intervention something had occurred to alter their 
perspective on the matter. In the case of climate change, we can already see the 
semblance of a narrative developing but we must look for ways to predict, and 
therefore argue before the fact, when the permanent members may be convinced to 
intervene through Article 39.40 For this reason, the logic of exception will be 
centralised here, although the context in which the UNSC intervenes will not be 
relegated to obscurity and may be included where relevant to demonstrate 
comparative changes in the UNSC’s engagement with a threat.  
 
This thesis is concerned with finding a way to argue the securitisation of climate 
change, which entails moving it from the ordinary realm of international law to the 
extraordinary apparatus of the UNSC. To do this an examination of why certain issues 
have been securitised within the meaning of Article 39 will take place, allowing the 
presentation of a comparative argument to be made in regard to climate change. The 
permanent members of the UNSC are going to be cast as the securitising actors 
because of their principal status, allowing them to dictate and control the UNSC’s 
agenda. Their justifications for uniting behind the activation of Article 39 and the 
subsequent statements made in the UNSC reflect the process of an elite group of 
actors undertaking a speech act to achieve the securitisation of a threat. The logic of 
exception will be employed, and those statements made prior to the first activation 
of Article 39 on any given threat will feature as the primary sources selected for 
analysis. 
 
IV. Sources and Interpretation  
 
 
39 This is particularly evident in regard to international terrorism and the 2014 Ebola 
outbreak. 
40 A number of debates have taken place on climate change, and some resolutions 
even include reference to it. See Chapter Five for a full discussion on this.  
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The last step is to outline the sources that will be used to collect data and the mode 
of interpretation employed to analyse them. Resolutions are the main legal output of 
the UNSC. They are expressions of its will, and in some instances may be considered 
examples of legislation.41 Even if not considered legislative in nature, the Charter 
finds they are binding on UN members,42 which has been confirmed by the ICJ.43 It is 
to resolutions that some have turned to analyse the different situations that have 
been brought within the scope of Article 39.44 However, resolutions only provide the 
end result of UNSC discussions. They do not deliver information on how individual 
members of the UNSC acted to support or oppose involvement. For this information, 
the verbatim records are of much greater use. Each formal meeting undertaken by 
the UNSC is recorded verbatim and archived by the UN. The acknowledgement at the 
start of each resolution as to the meeting where it was adopted and recorded, lends 
authority to these records, pointing the reader to an additional resource to help 
contextualise the intervention.45 Verbatim records can be analysed to develop an 
understanding of how the activation of Article 39 has been justified. In other words, 
they contain the speech act of securitising actors, and so will feature as the primary 




41 For instance: UNSC Res 1373 (28th September 2001) UN Doc S/Res/137; S Talmon, 
‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (2005) 99 The American Journal of 
International Law 175. 
42 Charter of the United Nations (24th October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Article 25. 
43 The Namibia case finds the ‘language of a resolution of the Security Council should 
be carefully analysed before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect’, Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16, paras 113–114. 
44 F Kirgis, ‘The Security Council’s First Fifty Years’ (1995) 89 (3) The American Journal 
of International Law 506. 
45 This follows the advice of the ICJ where it was held the ‘interpretation of Security 
Council resolutions also require that other factors be taken into account’, 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 
Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 423 (2010), para 94. 
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Using verbatim records to identify and analyse a speech act is not out of line with 
other studies found in the broader securitisation literature. For instance, Bright 
applied securitisation theory to the UK’s introduction of anti-terror control orders by 
looking at a range of textual resources to identify the arguments forwarded by the 
government.46 Similarly, Jin and Karackattu examined the narratives put forward by 
the WHO in regard to the securitisation of infectious diseases, providing a precedent 
within the wider literature to treat the statements of an institution as evidence of a 
speech act.47 The verbatim records will make up the primary resource used to 
identify and analyse the speech acts of the permanent members. They will be 
examined to determine the lines of reasoning and thematic narratives continually 
used across all relevant issues to justify the activation of Article 39. Resolutions may 
also be considered where relevant. Presidential statements of the UNSC may feature 
in the discussion to showcase the UNSC’s position on a subject, but they are far less 
prevalent than resolutions and this is reflected in their limited presence here.  
 
The question now becomes which verbatim records and resolutions should be 
examined. Given the quantity in existence, which currently numbers 2540, it would 
be impractical to work through each pair.48 Moreover, not all of these texts would be 
relevant to what this thesis seeks to discover. Many of these resolutions do not 
include Article 39. The Repertoire of the UNSC generates periodic reports that 
spotlight Article 39 resolutions, and so it can be used to narrow down relevant 
materials.49 Within this reduced number there still exist resolutions that would have 
 
46 J Bright, ‘Securitisation, Terror, and Control: Towards a Theory of the Breaking 
Point’ (2012) 38 Review of International Studies 861. 
47 J Jin, T KaracKattu, ‘Infectious Diseases and Securitization: WHO’s Dilemma’ (2011) 
9 (2) Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 181. 
48 Anon, ‘Resolutions Adopted by the Security Council in 2020’ United Nations 
Security Council (15th July 2020) 
<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-
2020> accessed 15th July 2020. 
49 Anon, ‘Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council’ United Nations Security 
Council (14th August 2020) 
<https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/structure> accessed 14th 
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no relevant connection to climate change. To solve this problem, it was decided to 
examine interventions that focus more clearly on the provision of security as 
opposed to the restoration of peace.50 The rationale behind this narrowing process is 
that climate change reflects most clearly a security threat, and its links to peace 
remain a point of debate.51 Making this distinction means those threats that share a 
security characteristic can be examined, providing a suitable link between 
comparable securitisation arguments and climate change. The threats that prioritise 
security include terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs and the 2014 Ebola outbreak. 
Chapter Three will justify in much greater detail the selection of these threats based 
on their security characteristics. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide understanding of how the activation of Article 
39 is justified and then apply this to climate change. To do this, specific instances of 
when Article 39 has been activated are going to be examined to determine if 
consistencies of reasoning exist across them. This reflects an inductive reasoning 
exercise,52 analysing specific examples of Article 39’s activation to develop a general 
understanding of its use.53 Taking this inductive approach will help to identify the 
presence of narrative structures and patterns of justification.54 This will allow a 
 
August 2020; however, the findings from the Repertoire should be handled carefully 
because some resolutions identified as new Article 39 interventions may in fact be 
continuing ones which fall outside the exceptional lens applied here, see for 
example: Resolutions 1037 (situation in Croatia), 1137 (situation between Iraq and 
Kuwait) and 1305 (situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
50 The beginning of Chapter Three will make it clear how this was achieved, through 
an examination of the history of Article 39.  
51 J Selby et al., ‘Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War Revisited’ (2017) Political 
Geography 232; K Conca, ‘Is There a Role for the UN Security Council on Climate 
Change’ (2019) 61 Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 4. 
52 D Hunter, ‘No Wilderness of Single Instances: Inductive Inference in Law’ (1998) 48 
(3) Journal of Legal Education 365. 
53 P Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’ in A Knight, L Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research 
Methods in the Built Environment (1st edition, Blackwell Publishing LTD 2008) 28. 
54 T Hutchinson, N Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research’ (2012) 17 Deakin Law Review 83. 
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determination of whether climate change can reasonably be matched against the 
justifications that lead to Article 39’s activation. This thesis will only present in 
Chapter Four those narratives that can be consistently identified across each threat 
subject examined. It will be ‘pragmatic, fact-bound, and past-orientated’, meaning 
the inclusion of some narratives and not others is rooted in the past practice of the 
UNSC and the sources available to evidence this.55 These texts will be interpreted 
according to the ordinary meaning of the language used.56 As Hunter argues, 
inductive reasoning ‘is the most useful model of legal learning we have’, lending 
credibility to its use here as a means to learn how the activation of Article 39 is 
justified.57  
 
In terms of how this inductive method links to securitisation theory, it allows what 
Buzan et al. call the grammar of security to be identified.58 The grammar of security 
relates to how threats are constructed, effectively creating a logic that is used by 
securitising actors to frame a threat. The inductive reasoning method allows the 
identification of consistently present logics across a number of different threats that 
have been securitised by the UNSC.59 Trombetta says securitisation is open to a 
‘process of social construction’, which implies that across a number of different 
 
55 M Siems, ‘A World without Law Professors’ in M Van Hoecke (ed) Methodologies of 
Legal Research: What Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline (1st edition, Hart 
Publishing 2011) 71. 
56 Wood suggests Articles 31–33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
provides the basis for interpreting UNSC texts in the absence of clear rules from the 
UN Charter, M Wood, ‘The Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions’ (1998) 2 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 73. Not all agree with this position, see E 
Papastavridis, ‘Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII in the 
Aftermath of the Iraqi Crisis’ (2007) 56 (1) The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 83. 
57 D Hunter, ‘No Wilderness of Single Instances: Inductive Inference in Law’ (1998) 48 
(3) Journal of Legal Education 365, 401. 
58 B Buzan, O Waever, J de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1st 
edition, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 1998). 
59 Studies in securitisation theory have looked at how threats are framed over a 
period of time, see for example: J Jin, T KaracKattu, ‘Infectious Diseases and 
Securitization: WHO’s Dilemma’ (2011) 9 (2) Biosecurity and Bioterrorism 181. 
 29 
threats the logics employed might vary.60 Taking an inductive approach factors in this 
variation and allows for the identification of consistently present narratives.61  
 
Corry argues that taking this constructivist approach still relies on some abstract 
notion of security in order to identify the subjects for consideration.62 This is true to 
an extent, and in Chapter Three a discussion will take place on the historical 
identification of threats by the UNSC in order to narrow down those subjects for 
examination. Nonetheless, simply because it is possible to identify the issues that fall 
within the broad remit of security does not reduce the value of employing an 
inductive reasoning method to identify the narratives consistently used by the 
permanent members to justify securitisation. While those threats brought within the 
scope of Article 39 will be considered part of the security agenda broadly, the 
inductive method will allow an original contribution to be made in terms of providing 
a detailed understanding of how securitisation and the construction of threats takes 
place on the UNSC. The acquisition of this knowledge may then be used to argue for 
the securitisation of climate change.  
 
V. Concluding Remarks  
 
This thesis is seeking to test the argument that climate change can be brought within 
the scope of the UNSC, and specifically within the meaning of Article 39. Employing 
the theory of securitisation as a frame, this research is premised on the idea that 
security is less an identifiable object and more a process in which certain actors 
transfer an issue from the ordinary realm of politics to the extraordinary realm of 
security. Analysis is not centred on developing a stable and objective definition of 
security, but on understanding the process of an object coming to be understood as 
 
60 M J Trombetta, ‘Environmental Security and Climate Change: Analysing the 
Discourse’ (2008) 21 (4) Cambridge Review of International Affairs 585. 
61 F Ciuta, ‘Security and the Problem of Context: A Hermeneutical Critique of 
Securitisation Theory’ (2009) 35 Review of International Studies 301. 
62 O Corry, ‘Securitisation and Riskification: Second-order Security and the Politics of 
Climate Change’ (2012) 40 (2) Millennium: Journal of International Relations 235. 
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part of the security agenda. Applying this here, Article 39 is not interpreted as having 
a clearly identifiable meaning. Instead, it is understood as being applicable to ranging 
situations, dependent on the ability of the UNSC to agree on its activation.  
 
The permanent members are going to be cast as securitising actors because of their 
position of authority, and the power they have to control the agenda of the UNSC. 
Their speech acts found within the verbatim records preceding the adoption of a 
resolution will be the primary materials analysed. The logic of exception is employed 
here in order to understand what prompted the permanent members to activate 
Article 39 on a subject. Using an inductive reasoning mode of analysis, the primary 
materials will be examined to identify consistently present narratives that show how 
the permanent members justify the securitisation of threats.  
 
Once knowledge on how threats are framed as within the remit of Article 39 is 
acquired, climate change will be compared against this to determine if it can 
plausibly be securitised, providing a novel argument for those who wish to pursue 
this objective. In short, this thesis is concerned with three research questions: what 
narratives continually manifest within the speech acts of the permanent members; 
within these narratives can thresholds and triggers be identified; can climate change 
be framed according to these same justifications? Chapter Two will provide 
justification for needing to securitise climate change. Chapter Three will identify a 
referent object for the purposes of securitisation theory. Chapter Four will analyse 
the primary materials of the UNSC that relate to the securitisation of international 
security threats. Chapter Five will compare the findings from the preceding chapter 
to climate change to find a way to argue it is in fact capable of being framed as within 
the remit of Article 39. Chapter Six will argue for a particular response from the UNSC 








International Climate Law 
 
‘Further critiques of the Paris Agreement include the catastrophic gap between its 





The central focus of this chapter is the existing international law on climate change. It 
will be shown that this framework is fundamentally ineffective. It suffers systemic 
failings that have persistently inhibited its ability to grasp the problem and there is 
no sign that this will or can change within the ten-year timeframe set by the IPCC.2 As 
such, the ordinary rules intended to address climate change are proving vastly 
inadequate, justifying its securitisation. To make this argument the chapter will 
consider: what is international climate law? How should international climate law be 
evaluated? And is international climate law failing? Following these questions, it will 
be introduced that we must move beyond international climate law to consider a 
more exceptional response to this problem through securitisation.  
 
II. Identifying International Climate Law  
 
International climate law (ICL) is the system of state obligations designed to tackle 
climate change.3 This definition is broad enough to include all the traditional sources 
of international law under Article 38(1) of the International Court of Justice Statute, 
 
1 J Dehm, ‘Post Paris Reflections: Fossil Fuels, Human Rights and the Need to 
Excavate New Ideas for Climate Justice’ (2017) 8 Journal of Human Rights and the 
Environment 280, 283. 
2 IPCC Report, ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C: Summary for Policy Makers’ (IPCC, 6th 
October 2018). 
3 B Mayer, The International Law on Climate Change (1st edition, Cambridge 
University Press 2018). 
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including: customary law; conventions; and general principles.4 However, while 
general principles and customary laws do exist implicitly in regard to climate change, 
they have been relegated to a secondary role, largely because of the specificity 
required to tackle the problem that these sources cannot provide.5 It is also the case 
that despite the existence of broadly related norms, such as the no-harm principle, 
the focus of the climate agenda rests nearly exclusively on conventions.6  
 
Bodansky asserts that ‘the growing importance of treaties suggests a diminished role 
for customary international environmental law’.7 Time has proven this point 
accurate, and where ICL is concerned conventions are the principal manner in which 
states seek to develop international frameworks.8 The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 1992 was the first platform to situate 
climate change at its centre. It remains today, underpinning the agreements and 
protocols intended to address climate change.9 The objective of the UNFCCC and 
subsequent instruments is to achieve the ‘stabilisation of greenhouse gas 
 
4 United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice, (24th October 1945 
entered into force 18th April 1946) 33 UNTS 993, Article 38(1). 
5 Aurescu and Zaharia assert that international environmental law ‘cannot be 
conceived outside scientific concepts’ rendering the practice-based and often generic 
customary law unsuitable in the development of environmental principles. B 
Aurescu, F Zaharia, ‘Science, Technology and International Environmental Law’ 
(2011) 3 Acta Universitatis Lucian Blaga 203. See also: J Rawls, The Law of Peoples (1st 
edition, Harvard University Press 2001) for a discussion on how the general principles 
of law have lost further relevance because of their out-dated focus.  
6 For a detailed discussion on the wider principles that may relate to climate change 
see: B Mayer, The International Law on Climate Change (1st edition, Cambridge 
University Press 2018) Ch.5. 
7 D Bodansky, ‘Customary (And Not so Customary) International Environmental Law 
(1995) 3 (1) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 105. 
8 R Keohane, D Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2010) 10 (33) The 
Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements 1. 
9 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9th May 1992, 
entered into force 21st March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107. 
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concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system’.10  
 
The UNFCCC was not intended to be the definitive framework in which climate 
change would be tackled. It was expected to provide a platform that would facilitate 
more in-depth responses as ‘scientific understanding of the problem’ evolved.11 
Through Article 7 the Conference of the Parties (COP) was established as the 
supreme body of the convention with a range of powers and responsibilities 
designed to ‘promote the effective implementation of the Convention’.12 One of the 
COP’s functions is to act as a forum for the creation of further ICL.13 The Kyoto 
Protocol 1997 and the Paris Agreement 2015 represent the two instances of 
international law created by the COP and within the jurisdiction of the UNFCCC.14 
Together these three conventions embody the principal iterations of international 
law intended to address climate change. Within them are housed the primary norms 
of international climate law that are failing to mitigate rising emissions. For this 
reason these conventions will be centralised later in this chapter and throughout this 
thesis.  
 
III. Measuring the Effectiveness of International Climate Law 
 
 
10 Ibid., Article 2. 
11 P-M Dupuy, J Vinuales, International Environmental Law (2nd edition, Cambridge 
University Press 2018) 177. 
12 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9th May 1992, 
entered into force 21st March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107, Article 7(2). 
13 Ibid., Article 17. 
14 Kyoto Protocol to The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(adopted 11th December 1997, entered into force 16th February 2005) UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add 1; Paris Agreement to The United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (adopted 12th December 2015, entered into force 4th 
November 2016) UN Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1. 
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The question of effectiveness exists beyond a binary paradigm, conceived in a range 
of modes each capable of exhibiting different results using the same data set.15 The 
typical standards of evaluating effectiveness identified by Oran Young include: legal; 
behavioural; and problem-solving,16 sometimes referred to as: output; outcome; and 
impact.17 These standards are granted a level of continuity throughout the literature 
that indicates their importance.18 Moreover, some actors deliberately rely on certain 
standards to validate their own actions on climate change, allowing the dangerous 
claim that ICL is effective.19 It is therefore important to understand these three 
standards and how they allow the effectiveness of ICL to be misrepresented. 
 
Legal effectiveness refers to the extent that a problem can be transferred into a legal 
regime with normative character. Adoption of the legal standard implies an element 
of belief that the law matters. As noted in the literature the law does matter, but not 
necessarily in the sense that its creation invokes immediate results.20 Assuming the 
creation of a legal regime guarantees the achievement of the purpose for which that 
regime was intended is short sighted. This is supported by compliance rates that in 
the environmental context do not always reflect this assumption.21 Also, where 
compliance rates are high this can reflect low levels of legal obligation that states 
 
15 A Underdal, ‘The Concept of Regime Effectiveness’ (1992) 27 (3) Cooperation and 
Conflict 227. 
16 Young actually identifies six standards but it is these three that have been utilised 
in the literature. O Young, ‘International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a 
Stateless Society’ (1st edition, Cornell University Press, 1994) Ch.6. 
17 H Breitmeier, A Underdal, O Young, ‘The Effectiveness of International 
Environmental Regimes: Comparing and Contrasting Findings from Quantitative 
Research’ (2011) 13 International Studies Review 579. 
18 D Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law (1st edition, 
Harvard University Press 2011). 
19 Evidence of this will be provided in the next section. 
20 Some argue that law matters because of its influence on regime evolution, as 
opposed solely to its legal nature. J Brunnee, S Toope, ‘The Changing Nile Basin 
Regime: Does Law Matter?’ (2002) 43 (1) Harvard International Law Journal 105.  
21 J Brunnee, ‘Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the Compliance 
Continuum’ in G Winter (ed), Multilevel Governance of Global Environmental Change 
(1st edition, Cambridge University Press 2006) 387. 
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deliberately negotiated knowing they could easily achieve the regime’s intended 
outcome.22 
 
Judging the effectiveness of ICL by its existence in a convention would allow the 
conclusion that it is a success due to the current number of signatories to the Paris 
Agreement and UNFCCC.23 Identifying the effectiveness of a regime by the creation 
of a convention and the number of signatures it can acquire is a limitation endemic 
to the legal standard. In addition, reputational theory suggests that states may 
engage with a convention to be seen in a positive light.24 They might attend 
conferences and sign agreements but have little intention to allow intrusive 
obligations to be negotiated. In such cases they may simply wish to be seen to have 
participated,25 allowing for the later claim that they are taking the necessary steps to 
solve the problem.26 In such cases a convention’s substance is often reduced to 
shallow levels of cooperation. Therefore, when assessing the effectiveness of ICL it is 
restrictive to adopt a purely legal standard of evaluation because it may 
misrepresent the character of climate regulation.  
 
 
22 D Victor, K Raustiala, E Skolnikoff, The Implementation and Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice (1st edition, MIT 
Press 1998). 
23 French opens with the point that if we look only to international law’s existence 
the environment appears secure. H French, ‘Making Environmental Treaties Work’ 
(1994) 271 (6) Scientific American 94.  
24 A Guzman, ‘A Compliance Based Theory of International Law’ (2002) 90 (6) 
California Law Review 1823. 
25 UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson uses the UK’s participation in the Paris 
Agreement as a point to accentuate the state’s green credentials but his record 
shows that he has very little interest in pursuing robust climate policy. N Gronewold, 
‘Boris Johnson’s Stance on Climate Change has Flip-flopped’ (Science, 25th July 2019) 
<https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/07/boris-johnson-s-stance-climate-
change-has-flip-flopped> accessed 1st November 2019. 
26 The Paris Agreement reflects this problem precisely and many states were keen to 
be involved. R Falkner, ‘The Paris Agreement and the new logic of international 
climate politics’ (2016) 92 International Affairs 1107. 
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The behavioural standard examines the ability of a regime to alter the behaviour of 
those subjected to it, in the context of achieving its stated objective. It looks to 
identify behavioural alterations that are taken to meet the regime’s intended 
outcome. This provides a more comprehensive measure than the legal standard 
because it focusses on a deeper level of influence beyond simple legal recognition.27 
It is premised on the notion that the behaviour mandated by the regime is significant 
in its connection to the regime’s objective, which is not a consistent reality. For 
instance, under the Kyoto Protocol Russia agreed a 5% reduction in its emissions by 
2015, but this was not based on a motivation to alter behaviour towards this target 
but on the presence of an industrial decline that produced the reduction 
incidentally.28 States may agree to apparent behavioural alterations but this does not 
necessarily mean they are legitimately motivated or linked to the regime’s objective. 
 
In the context of ICL this is a significant concern because states often refuse to agree 
to intrusive obligations that will demand significant behavioural alterations, as was 
the case with the Paris Agreement.29 Even international environmental law success 
models like the Montreal Protocol are criticised because the behavioural obligations 
were already attainable by the parties and demanded little actual alteration.30 Using 
the behavioural standard to determine the effectiveness of ICL will provide answers 
only to the extent that states were prepared to obligate themselves during 
 
27 For a study focussing on the behavioural standard, see J Wettestad, ‘Designing 
Effective Environmental Regimes: The Conditional Keys’ (2001) 7 (3) Global 
Governance 371. 
28 B Chambers, ‘Towards an Improved Understanding of Legal Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Treaties’ (2004) 16 (1) The George Town International 
Environmental Law Review 501. 
29 A-M Slaughter, ‘The Paris Approach to Global Governance’ (Project Syndicate, 28th 
December 2015) <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/paris-agreement-
model-for-global-governance-by-anne-marie-slaughter-2015-12> accessed 13th 
September 2016. 
30 J Murdoch, T Sandler, ‘The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: The Case of 
Reduced CFC Emissions and the Montreal Protocol’ (1997) 63 Journal of Public 
Economics 331. 
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negotiations, which may be a reflection of already attainable behaviour and/or a lack 
of ambition.31 
 
The problem-solving standard scrutinises the extent to ‘to which regimes contribute 
to solving or mitigating the problems that motivated those people who create the 
regimes’.32 This standard situates the problem as the central object and asks whether 
or not it has been mitigated by the regime enacted in response to it. It is the most 
comprehensive measure of effectiveness as it sidesteps the limitations noted with 
the legal and behavioural standards by precluding misleading arguments based on 
the creation of law or the adoption of limited action plans. Adopting the problem-
solving standard shows the inadequacy of ICL in the context of actual emissions 
reduction and global warming, both of which have exacerbated despite the existence 
of ICL. Taking this problem-centric approach has become the predominant standard 
of evaluation in recent studies because it offers the most accurate reflection of the 
climate catastrophe now facing humanity.33  
 
This standard is open to criticism in terms of how a problem is identified, which may 
be very narrow and not reflective of the true extent of the harm, allowing results to 
be manipulated. Instead of looking for the overall motivations of a regime, studies 
can look to the stated objectives as identification of the problem, which may not 
directly link to the harm and can be a reflection of recalcitrant attitudes at the 
 
31 Raustiala makes this point in regard to international whaling conventions that have 
achieved high compliance rates but little in terms of behavioural effectiveness. K 
Raustiala, ‘Compliance and Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation’ 
(2000) 32 (3) Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 387. 
32 O Young, ‘Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: Existing 
Knowledge, Cutting Edge Themes, and Research Strategies’ (2011) 108 (50) PNAS 
19853, 19854. 
33 Ibid. See also D Bodansky, The Art and Craft of International Environmental Law 
(1st edition, Harvard University Press 2011). 
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political level.34 A regime may reflect the lowest common denominator that could be 
agreed by participants, which might differ from the full extent of the problem 
acknowledged by scientists.35 A comprehensive problem-solving standard will seek to 
identify the motivations underpinning the creation of the entire regime, connecting 
directly to the actual problem and not necessarily to the stated objectives within 
conventions.36 Using this method would create a strong comparison between the 
problem and the response of a regime, but it has been criticised on the grounds of 
relying on imprecise notions of harm as opposed to precisely identified objectives.37  
 
This thesis will apply all three standards to the Paris Agreement, showing how they 
reflect varying levels of effectiveness, but the problem-solving standard will lead the 
conclusion that the current framework is fundamentally ineffective. To 
operationalize this standard two methods are found in the literature. The first 
revolves around comparisons between the impact the regime has had compared 
with the inexistence of the regime.38 A criticism of this method is generating reliable 
models of the no regime variable and collective optimum.39 This has led to 
refinement through the Oslo-Potsdam Solution that seeks to create a scale from zero 
to one with the collective optimum representing one and the no regime representing 
 
34 B Chambers, ‘Towards an Improved Understanding of Legal Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Treaties’ (2004) 16 (1) The George Town International 
Environmental Law Review 501. 
35 Dupuy and Vinuales talk about the two pillars of science and policy which may not 
always reflect one another, P-M Dupuy, J Vinuales, International Environmental Law 
(2nd edition, Cambridge University Press 2018). 
36 T Bernauer, ‘The Effect of International Environmental Institutions: How We Might 
Learn More’ (1995) 49 (2) International Organisation 351. 
37 C Helm, D Sprinz, ‘Measuring the Effectiveness of International Environmental 
Regimes’ (2000) 44 (5) Journal of Conflict Resolution 630. 
38 D Sprinz, C Helm, ‘The Effect of Global Environmental Regimes: A Measurement 
Concept’ (1999) 20 (4) International Political Science Review 359. 
39 Sprinz and Helm generate the no-regime parameter by collecting expert opinions 
and then drawing a consensus by removing the extreme views. The potential 
variation in such views is huge and makes it difficult to produce results that exhibit 
any consistency across different studies. 
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zero.40 Using the Oslo-Potsdam scale investigators are able to consider what a regime 
has accomplished, often termed the actual performance.41 This is a very technical 
means of applying the problem-solving standard. It has great utility to the specific 
literature on effectiveness, but its value to this work is limited by the technical 
application required and the need for a broad understanding of the effectiveness of 
ICL as opposed to a very discrete one.42 
 
The second approach is less prevalent in the effectiveness literature and more suited 
to general and doctrinal critiques of ICL. It focusses on the condition of the climate 
and links deteriorating global circumstances to the ineptitude of ICL.43 This method 
sidesteps the technical problems of outlining and employing measurement tools, 
instead providing an actual account of the situation. If the problem persists and/or 
worsens the value of the regime designed to combat it must be questioned, 
irrespective of whether it has a positive score based on counterfactual reasoning. 
Focussing on the essence of the problem and not the objectives of ICL, the findings 
will not be skewed by the potentially limited ambition of negotiations. This method 
provides a suitably reflective and critical lens for arguing that stronger responses are 
needed. It fits well with the problem-solving standard of effectiveness, and critiques 
 
40 D Sprinz, C Helm, ‘The Effect of Global Environmental Regimes: A Measurement 
Concept’ (1999) 20 (4) International Political Science Review 359; J Hovi, D Sprinz, A 
Underdal, ‘The Oslo-Potsdam Solution to Measuring Regime Effectiveness: Critique, 
Response and the Road Ahead’ (2003) 3 (3) Global Environmental Politics 74. 
41 Helm and Sprinz are able to attribute scores between 0 and 1 for two regimes in 
Europe. One that targeted sulphur, which scored 0.39, and one that targeted 
nitrogen, which scored 0.31. C Helm, D Sprinz, ‘Measuring the Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Regimes’ (2000) 44 (5) Journal of Conflict Resolution 
630.  
42 O Young, ‘Determining Regime Effectiveness: A Commentary on the Oslo-Potsdam 
Solution’ (2003) 3 (3) Global Environmental Politics 97. 
43 For a discussion exemplifying the significance of the problem-solving standard and 
the ineptitude of the regime in light of the continuing climate problem, see S Scott, 
‘Climate Change and Peak Oil as Threats to International Peace and Security: Is it 
Time for the Security Council to Legislate?’ (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 495. 
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of environmental law often tread this path by beginning with reference to the 
exacerbation of harm.44 
 
To recap, the object of study here is ICL. Focus will centre on the UNFCCC, Kyoto 
Protocol and Paris Agreement as the principle iterations of international law 
intended to reduce emissions. In order to determine the utility of ICL it will be 
measured against the three standards of effectiveness, but the problem-solving 
gauge will be centralised to draw accurate conclusions on the utility of the climate 
framework. To operationalize this standard the continued existence of emissions and 
the exacerbation of global warming will be used to highlight that ICL is failing. By the 
end of the following section it will be clear that we must look for ways to improve 
the international response to climate change.  
 
IV. Analysing International Climate Law  
 
This section will provide a two-part analysis of ICL. The first part will begin with a 
brief introduction to the UNFCCC and COP system, showcasing how the foundations 
of the climate framework inhibit its effectiveness. The Kyoto Protocol and Paris 
Agreement will be analysed, looking at their design and content to show how this 
translates to poor levels of effectiveness. Secondly, given that the Paris Agreement is 
the current and primary response to climate change, attention will turn to its system 
of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). Looking at several states 
through the effectiveness lens identified in the previous section, it will be revealed 
that the INDC system is failing to mitigate climate change.  
 
A. The UNFCCC, COPs, Kyoto and Paris 
 
 
44 For example: ‘Anthropogenic climate change is heating up the atmosphere, raising 
sea levels, increasing ocean acidification, increasing the frequency and intensity of 
storms and other extreme weather events that will make life seriously endangered’. 
G Palmer, ‘New Zealand’s Defective Law on Climate Change’ (2015) 12 New Zealand 
Journal of Public International Law 115, 115. 
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The creation of the UNFCCC appeared to represent a new enthusiasm for climate 
regulation at the international level. An unprecedented 143 state parties participated 
in the final negotiations in 1992,45 and 166 signatures were received by 19th June 
1993.46 This visage of enthusiasm was quickly revealed to be misleading.47 The broad 
objective of the convention is to stabilise ‘greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere’.48 An inherently vague provision, it is hard to say precisely what should 
be achieved, and more so, it is difficult to quantify a connection between steps taken 
and the achievement of this objective. Adding further ambiguity, a timeline to 
achieve this vague objective was absent. Bodansky submits that this inability to set 
‘strict targets and timetables was, for many, the greatest disappointment’ of the 
conference.49 Others point out that the UNFCCC was a starting point, seeking to 
balance the interests of many parties and as such its content reflects a reasonable 
compromise.50 However, this focus on compromise, although perhaps necessary to 
encourage participation, meant that the climate response was from the very 
beginning restricted to the lowest common denominator, an attribute that has been 
maintained right up to the present day, engulfing all climate agreements despite the 
ever growing presence of climatic harm.  
 
The content of the convention leans too much towards ambiguity and non-
obligation. The word ‘should’ appears often, as opposed to more commanding 
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ratification/status-of-ratification-of-the-convention> accessed 1st December 2019. 
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48 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9th May 1992, 
entered into force 21st March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107, Article 3(1). 
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directives like ‘must’.51 The commitments found within Article 4(2)(a) are the most 
ambitious, asking developed states to limit their emissions and protect carbon 
sinks.52 The language, ambiguity and confusing content of this provision does ‘not 
reflect a clear commitment to stabilise carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas 
emissions’.53 Article 4 offers enough scope for states to avoid taking action, for 
instance, by referring to ‘strong and sustainable economic growth’ and ‘equitable 
and appropriate contributions’, allowing them to defend their weak efforts at 
mitigation with reference to UNFCCC caveats.54 This continues throughout the 
UNFCCC and states are not obligated to take concrete steps towards the reduction of 
emissions and are instead provided a wide scope in which to avoid taking direct 
action. However, some leeway might be warranted because the UNFCCC was 
intended to be the beginning of the process. It provided for the future creation of 
protocols, and the COP system in which to carry out this function.55 
 
Since the UNFCCC entered into force there have been 25 COPs.56 The COP is 
responsible for the general governance of the framework, monitoring state 
compliance and taking decisions to further climate action.57 This section is not 
concerned with the day-to-day operation of the COP and its monitoring and support 
functions; focus instead rests on the manner in which climate law is developed 
through the adoption of protocols. For a decision to be taken the rules of procedure 
 
51 For example: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 
9th May 1992, entered into force 21st March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107, Article 3(1)(3). 
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dictate that consensus is preferable, but failing this a two-thirds majority of those in 
attendance will suffice.58 Where the adoption of protocols is concerned a consensus 
is again preferable, but failing this a three-quarters majority of those attending is 
sufficient.59 It is here that the real limit of the COP is exposed. While the intention 
behind this large majority is to reflect equality among nations, the reality is that this 
threshold of support might be hard to come by. If a protocol were proposed with 
significant climate provisions its chance of reaching the three-quarters threshold 
would be slim. Further, recalcitrant states turn up to negotiate and negatively 
influence proceedings to ensure that no obligations are agreed in their absence.60 As 
a result, the COP process is nearly always limited to lowest common denominator 
agreements,61 or worse the entire process can become gridlocked, as was the case at 
the 15th COP in Copenhagen.62  
 
The COP system is not immune from the power relations that engulf the 
international scene. States with influence may attempt to cajole other states to 
follow their lead in the negotiations.63 Backdoor discussions often take place and can 
transfer into more formal diplomatic settings, where small pockets of unity can 
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manifest.64 Like-minded states with similar priorities band together in an effort to 
generate momentum behind a shared position.65 States do not necessarily sit down 
with the good of the global commons as their central priority. This makes it hard for 
the COP system to operate for the protection of the climate and has reinforced the 
supremacy of the lowest common denominator, which is arguably why the Kyoto 
Protocol and Paris Agreement lacked the character required to halt emissions. 
Employing the standards of effectiveness above, this means that the output from 
COPs is often restricted to achieving a level of legal effectiveness and unable to 
provide behavioural or problem-solving successes.66 Norms originating from this 
atmosphere of recalcitrant compromise have rarely been able to produce positive 
results.  
 
The Kyoto Protocol 1997 attempted to introduce hard law to the climate problem.67 
The states listed in Annex I were required to individually or jointly reduce their 
emissions by 5% below 1990 levels.68 The Protocol also made it law that by 2005 
each Annex I state was to have made ‘demonstrable progress in achieving its 
commitments’.69 It provided that these states must introduce monitoring systems 
and communicate their results periodically.70 It even specified the methodologies to 
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Anonymous, ‘COP25: Key outcomes agreed at the UN climate talks in Madrid’ 
(Carbon Brief, 1st December 2019) <https://www.carbonbrief.org/cop25-key-
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be used to calculate emissions.71 There remains some doubt over the consistency 
and accuracy of recording methods, but this was a step in the right direction to 
ensure action was taken.72 These commitments were far more specific than those 
found in the UNFCCC and acted to further the climate response agenda by creating 
targets and conditions for Annex I states. The Kyoto Protocol at first glance appears 
comprehensive in its intent to address the problem. 
 
The Protocol attempted to tackle the problem of global heating by reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. The gap between this objective and the 5% reduction 
target is problematic. Early scientific analysis indicated that the Protocol’s 
commitments were likely to generate a reduction in global heating between 0.08°C 
and 0.28°C.73 If the Protocol generated results closer to the top end of this spectrum 
it was still unlikely to reduce global heating by the levels required to stop climate 
change.74 Others examined the Protocol from the perspective of global CO2 
concentrations and found that an increase to 382 PPM would still occur by 2010, of 
which Annex I states would contribute 43%.75 Even if Annex I states fulfilled their 
commitments they would still be responsible for nearly half of the increase in CO2 
concentration, seriously bringing the 5% target into question. While some consider 
that the benefits of Kyoto reside in its foundation and symbolic attempt to address 
the problem,76 the fact remains that from the beginning it was relatively 
unambitious, unable to inspire confidence that the necessary level of reductions 
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72 J Gupta, X Olsthoorn, E Rotenberg, ‘The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in 
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would take place. As Wigley said, the ‘Protocol, therefore…can be considered as only 
a first and relatively small step towards stabilizing the climate’.77  
 
A second problem related to the ambition of the Kyoto Protocol was the inclusion of 
Article 17 that allowed emissions trading to take place.78 The purpose behind this 
norm is to allow states with spare emissions units to swap these with states that 
have exceeded their allocation.79 This creates a system whereby the actual 
reductions a state makes might be significantly less than their posted results. It 
allows states with the capacity to respond to climate change to take less actual 
action and use emissions trading to meet their targets.80 Some suggest that the 
trading mechanism is useful,81 and perhaps it might be if used properly and in 
conjunction with capacity-building initiatives.82 Still, its inclusion was too vague to 
prevent use by those states that should make tangible reductions. Global emissions 
would likely have decreased by a much greater margin if this facility had not been 
available to all Annex I states. 
 
Moving to specific objectives, Annex I states were able to set a reduction target 
applicable to their individual circumstances.83 In some cases states were able to 
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Climate Change, 2019) <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-kyoto-
 47 
negotiate a capped increase in their emissions, which was deemed to be better than 
if they were going to proceed without joining the Protocol. Australia, for instance, 
was able to negotiate an emissions target of 108% of pre-1990 levels,84 and Iceland 
agreed an increase to 110%.85 The utility in allowing developed states like Australia 
and Iceland to negotiate an increase is highly problematic, but these compromises 
did bring emitters to the Protocol and under Article 3 still meant the 5% target was 
achievable jointly. The Protocol appears to represent a positive compromise that was 
able to demand actual action on the part of Annex I states, while providing the 
flexibility to recognise their individual circumstances. Yet, it was unsustainable for 
highly developed economies to increase their emissions, seriously limiting the 
Protocol’s effectiveness and enabling the obstructive attitude of some states to 
prevail. 
 
The success of the Protocol was further undermined by the reception from the wider 
international community. Many developing nations declined to sign up to binding 
targets because of perceived interference with their economic advancement (non-
Annex I states).86 This created a significant detraction because some of the greatest 
emitters of CO2 came from the developing world, including, for example, India and 
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China.87 As a consequence, those that had signed up to set reduction targets began 
to question the utility of the agreement, as well as its fairness. The USA signed the 
Protocol as an Annex I state but did not ratify it, arguing observed inequity when 
compared to its global counterparts.88 With the utility of the Protocol in question 
other states lost faith and did not sign up for a second round of commitments.89 For 
example, Canada left the Protocol on 15th December 2012,90 claiming that its inability 
to regulate the USA and China undermined its chance of success, and that it would 
save $14 billion dollars a year in fines by leaving.91 The second round of 
commitments was only able to attract 37 parties.92 
 
Although the Protocol was able to attribute greater responsibility for climate change 
with the developed world, this created contemporary disagreement that frustrated 
its chance of success. The limited ambition attached to the Protocol was still too high 
in comparison to the muted level of commitment states were prepared to provide. 
By taking this hard and targeted approach towards solving the problem the Protocol 
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inadvertently precluded any significant measure of success, creating an atmosphere 
of disagreement and defeat, leading Dupuy and Vinuales to describe it as ‘largely 
obsolete’.93 This diminished the level of problem-solving effectiveness accorded to 
the Protocol but also damaged the extent that it could be considered legally effective 
because of the relatively small number of states in Annex I and the reduction of this 
figure further still at the second round of commitments. The hard law of Kyoto failed 
to generate a global consensus at creation stage, and this fractured its foundations 
beyond repair.94 
 
These problems, combined with the lack of ambition, are part of the reason that the 
Protocol has failed to have any real impact on the problem of emissions. Within the 
period 1990 to 2013 global output of CO2 rose by 60%, seriously undermining any 
level of effectiveness that might be attributed to the Protocol.95 Looking at 
greenhouse gases more broadly, between 1990 and 2014 the world’s total emissions 
have increased by 31%.96 Data from NASA indicates that global mean temperatures 
continued to rise in the period 1997 to 2012.97 The Kyoto Protocol cannot be 
considered an effective response to rising emissions or global heating. 
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This claim contrasts some of the achievements posted by Annex I states that have 
recorded various reductions.98 Yet, the targets achieved by these states are 
misleading. The economic crash in 2008 meant many states and industries went into 
decline, lowering their emissions inadvertently.99 Whether or not this should be used 
as a means to critique the Protocol is debatable, but it should be clear that many 
reductions recorded were not necessarily the result of deliberate state action in 
response to legal commitments. A significant portion of reductions were also 
attributed to emissions trading schemes and do not reflect true cuts.100 Taking a 
discrete view of certain aspects of the Kyoto Protocol might reveal some level of 
success, but compared to the continual rise in greenhouse gases these successes are 
negligible and so it must be characterised as largely ineffective.  
 
Learning from the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement was premised on the 
avoidance of the same inherent defects. The Paris Climate Conference 2015 was one 
of the most publicised conferences to date, with unrivalled participation and 197 
signatories.101 Many state officials made public overtures of international 
cooperation towards meeting the threat of climate change.102 Great emphasis was 
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placed on participation, but the subsequent content of the Paris Agreement fails to 
reflect the commitment and hype espoused publicly by political leaders.103  
 
If the Kyoto Protocol is to be considered hard law then the Paris Agreement must be 
considered soft law by comparison. That is not to say that the instrument is soft 
because as a convention it is hard law. However, its content is soft. The language is 
very much advisory as opposed to authoritative, a response to the failings of the 
Kyoto Protocol and a desire to keep state parties in the negotiations.104 The priority 
was to generate a high level of legal effectiveness. Article 2 of the Agreement sets 
out the broad objective to prevent a temperature increase of 2°C, yet Article 3 
provides only reference to ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions to achieve 
this.105 The word ambitious is highly subjective and inherently ambiguous and so 
immediately the aspiration and subsequent actions that will underpin the Paris 
Agreement are cast into doubt.  
 
The provisions of the Paris Agreement make no mention of specific reduction targets. 
It is unclear from the convention if the Nationally Determined Contributions will 
when considered cumulatively be able to give effect to the 2°C objective of the 
agreement.106 Additionally, the text of the Agreement fails to include any reference 
to fossil fuels, a core source of the emissions problem, highlighting a further 
deficiency and a likely indication that its overall objective will not be achieved.107 It 
appears there was no appreciation of solving the problem in the minds of those 
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negotiating the agreement, but instead they were intent on avoiding a culture of 
division and frustration. Hence there is no link between the already questionable 
ambition of the Agreement and the means to achieve its objectives. 
 
Taking a look at the 2°C objective in more detail, it will be unable to have a globally 
positive impact and will instead result in serious climatic changes. Under this 
ambition, by 2100: sea levels will rise by 56CM; there will be 23 times the number of 
annual ocean heat waves causing drastic consequences for marine life; there is an 
80% chance of the Arctic becoming ice free in at least one summer; a 37% increase in 
severe heat waves will occur; 388 million people will be exposed to water scarcity; 
and the average global crop yield will decrease by 9%.108 These impacts undermine 
how much hope we should place in the achievement of the 2°C objective and 
devalue the vigour that can be attached to the Paris Agreement’s ambition. 
Furthermore, many of these impacts will be felt to varying degrees but will likely be 
much worse in the developing world.109 It could be argued that the Paris Agreement 
reflects an attempt to safeguard some and not others. 
 
The hype of political leaders when the cameras were rolling far exceeded their 
enthusiasm for binding provisions and the legality of the agreement has been 
questioned with some labelling it ‘voluntary’.110 Bodansky challenges this, asserting a 
distinction between legality and enforcement, finding an absence of the latter does 
not affect the former.111 This position is a pillar of international law, but it does 
 
108 Anonymous, ‘The Impacts of Climate Change at 1.5C, 2C and Beyond’ (Carbon 
Brief, 2019) <https://www.carbonbrief.org/the-impacts-of-climate-change-at-1-
point-5-2c-and-beyond> accessed 1st December 2019. 
109 S Seneviratne et al., ‘The Many Possible Climates from the Paris Agreement’s Aim 
of 1.5°C Warming’ (2018) 558 Nature 41. 
110 R Falk, ‘”Voluntary” International Law and the Paris Agreement’ (Global Justice in 
the 21st Century, 16th January 2016) 
<https://richardfalk.wordpress.com/2016/01/16/voluntary-international-law-and-
the-paris-agreement/> accessed 10th October 2018. 
111 D Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’ (2016) Review of 
European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 1. 
 53 
nothing to address the reality that the Paris Agreement is voluntary in nature, albeit 
legally voluntary, and likely to encourage only minimal input from many states. The 
bottom-up approach that was deemed necessary to stimulate a high participation 
rate has created a system where states have too much control over their own 
commitments to tackle climate change. This high participation rate is precisely why 
the previous section detailed the different modes of effectiveness. Some will argue 
using the legal standard of effectiveness that the Paris Agreement is successful,112 
which of course is factually correct but completely ignores the reality that the 
agreement cannot grasp the scale of the problem. As George Monbiot commented, 
‘By comparison to what it could have been, it’s a miracle. By comparison to what it 
should have been, it’s a disaster.’113 
 
The discretionary nature of the Paris Agreement means it is better viewed as soft and 
not hard law. Some may disagree with this, arguing that a convention is hard by 
definition and soft law is something else entirely.114 Others contend the provisions 
within a convention must be analysed to determine its overall character.115 In either 
case, there can be little dispute that the Paris Agreement does not place significant 
obligations upon its signatories, instead situating them in a position of discretion that 
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reflects more closely the vague or fragile nature of soft law.116 This character 
underpins the INDC system, attracting criticism here for being ineffective when 
measured against the problem.117  
 
Despite this, it is possible to argue that there exist justifications for a soft approach. 
Abbott and Snidal make the case that there is a continuum of trade-offs that states 
will balance when deciding whether to join a treaty.118 The ‘sovereignty costs’ 
attached to a convention will be determinative of whether or not a state signs up to 
it.119 This is precisely the considerations contemplated by states when setting out 
their stance at the Paris Conference, perhaps explaining why the subsequent 
Agreement is constituted on discretion, which was successful in facilitating 
participation, but unable to generate sovereignty-impacting provisions.  
 
Abbott and Snidal argue softer forms of law attracting greater participation allow for 
individual and collective learning which may encourage states to ‘work out problems 
over time through negotiations shaped by normative guidelines’.120 This might be a 
further rationale underpinning the Agreement, and the ongoing COP system does 
allow for renewed negotiation and improvement. Nonetheless, how long can this 
supposedly progressive approach to climate regulation be sustained given the 
pending escalation of harm and loss of control predicted by the IPCC?121 How long 
can states keep delaying more robust arrangements until the next COP?122 While this 
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thesis broadly agrees with the utility of soft law as a means to evolve regimes and 
facilitate participation, its use as a way to argue the positive character of 
international climate law is severely limited by the intensity and pending nature of 
the threat.  
 
Another argument suggests that the creation of soft norms may help to pressurise 
those states lagging behind where environmental protection is concerned.123 This is 
not occurring in the context of the Paris Agreement. States continue to make 
reference to their economic competitiveness and CO2 contributions as a means to 
justify taking less action on the problem.124 While the work of Skjaerseth et al. on the 
pressurising effect of soft norms has broad utility, in the context of climate change it 
is not having the same effect and states, although masquerading behind arguments 
of intention and effort, are prepared to justify not taking greater action.125 Bearing 
this in mind, the only rational conclusion is that international climate law in its 
current form is unable to pressurise states to greater action, limiting severely the 
argument that the soft nature of the Paris Agreement will have a positive impact on 
the attitude of states, at least not in the timeframe necessitated.  
 
In the context of ICL, the assertion that ‘what we call soft today, will be called hard 
tomorrow’ is inaccurate, and rather, what was hard law yesterday through the Kyoto 
Protocol is now soft law through the Paris Agreement.126 The typical relationship 
between hard and soft norms seems to be operating in reverse. There might be good 
 
123 J Skjaerseth, O Stokke, J Wettestad, ‘Soft Law, Hard Law and Effective 
Implementation of International Environmental Norms’ (2006) 6 (3) Global 
Environmental Politics 104. 
124 See the Section IV Subsection B of this chapter for a thorough explanation of this 
point.  
125 For instance, Canada references in its INDC that it is only responsible for 1.5% of 
global emissions, using this as a means to imply it is not a major cause of the 
problem.  
126 C Castaneda, ‘A Call for Rethinking the Sources of International Law: Soft Law and 
the Other Side of the Coin’ (2013) 13 Anuario Mexicano de Derecho Internacional 
355, 396. 
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reasons for this based on the failings of the Kyoto Protocol, but it is now proving 
clear that the regression to a softer approach has not been successful on the grounds 
that the problem is still exacerbating. The debate surrounding soft and hard norms 
although valid in the wider context of international law loses significance here. We 
have continually witnessed the inability of states to negotiate and tackle the climate 
crisis effectively.127  
 
Although we can only learn from our past mistakes, in this instance the failings of the 
Kyoto Protocol influenced too deeply the Paris Agreement negotiations. The premise 
appears to be that Kyoto was hard and failed and therefore Paris must be soft to 
succeed. While this has proved to attract a greater global consensus the substance of 
the agreement will prove to be ineffective. As the last round of conference 
negotiations approached, the 2°C limit set in Paris was subject to criticism, with the 
USA making public overtures of its intent to leave the convention.128 The Paris 
Agreement may have a high rate of legal effectiveness but this means that it is 
significantly held back according to varying political interests, and the complete 
autonomy afforded states does not paint a positive picture of global climate 
action.129 Pulling back the curtain on the Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution documents will prove they lack the requisite ambition to match the 
scale of the problem and the already questionable aspiration to prevent a 2°C 
temperature increase. 
 
127 A Chandrasekhar, ‘The UN Climate Talks Ended in Deadlock. Is This Really The Best 
the World Can Manage?’ The Guardian (21st December 2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/dec/21/un-climate-talks-
deadlock-cop25> accessed 30th December 2019. 
128 R Harrabin, ‘Paris Agreement: Trump Confirms US Will Leave Climate Accord’ 
(BBC, 24th October 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-
50165596> accessed 29th October 2019; E Hunt, ‘Where Next for the US and the Paris 
Deal?’ The Guardian (2nd June 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/live/2017/jun/01/donald-trump-paris-
climate-agreement-live-news> accessed 11th October 2018.  
129 D Bodansky, ‘The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement’ (2016) 25 Review of 
European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 1. 
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B. Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
 
This subsection will reveal that the discretion-based model of the Paris Agreement 
implemented through the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) 
system offers differing levels of effectiveness depending on the standard applied 
(legal, behaviour, problem-solving). The frame for interpreting effectiveness set 
earlier in this chapter will be applied here.130 A number of Paris signatories and their 
INDCs will comprise the objects of study. These include: Australia; Canada; the 
European Union (EU);131 Russia; Brazil; and Mexico. These signatories have been 
selected because they represent states at varying levels of development and with 
ranging perspectives.132 Australia, Canada and the EU embody developed states; 
Russia, Brazil and Mexico exemplify developing states. It will be shown that across 
the development spectrum, the common but differentiated responsibility model is 
undermined by the overwhelming discretion of the Paris Agreement, reflected 
through INDCs that are totally out of sync with the 2°C ambition. 
 
These six states have signed the Paris Agreement and undertaken ratification 
steps.133 Each one has submitted an INDC document and so met their obligations.134 
Absent any analysis of these documents the Agreement is a legal success. Using this 
 
130 Young’s three standards of effectiveness applied here include: legal, behavioural 
and problem solving. O Young, ‘International Governance: Protecting the 
Environment in a Stateless Society’ (1st edition, Cornell University Press 1994). 
131 The EU is referred to as a state because it acts like a state in terms of its 
participation in the Paris Agreement. 
132 Anonymous, ‘Country Classification: Data sources, country classifications and 
aggregation methodology’ (UN, World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2014) 
ST/ESA/STAT/SER.M49/Rev. 
133 Anonymous, ‘Depository’ (UNTS, 2019) 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-
d&chapter=27&lang=_en&clang=_en> accessed 27th November 2019. 
134 Anonymous, ‘INDC’s Communicated by Parties’ (UNFCCC, 2019) 
<https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions
.aspx> accessed 21st November 2019. 
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standard creates a superficial confidence in the current mechanisms designed to 
mitigate climate change. Across the UNFCCC membership state engagement with the 
Agreement is high and the submission of INDCs helps to generate the misleading 
appearance of effectiveness. At this point the legal standard could be set aside, yet 
to preclude analysis of the INDCs might invite the argument that the targets within 
these documents represent a positive expression of legal will by states, the 
illustration of which might be used to argue that INDCs represent a positive 
representation of climate law. To combat this, the targets found within the INDCs of 
these six states will be examined to determine if their existence in a legal document 
can be afforded any degree of effectiveness.  
 
Looking at the targets of developed states first, the impression is not one of 
ambition. Australia commits to ‘reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 26–28 per 
cent’.135 The EU aims for ‘an at least 40% domestic reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions’,136 and Canada offers to cut ‘emissions by 30%’.137 Australia and Canada 
are highly developed economies with the capacity for greater ambition than these 
targets reflect. Moreover, they both use 2005 as the base level to reduce emissions 
by, lessening further still the aspiration attached. The EU’s target appears more 
determined and does set 1990 as its base year to measure reductions against, but 
considering its own recognition that global emissions must be halved by 2050 it is 
perplexing why its ambition does not reflect this need more accurately.138 The 40% 
target is not based on each EU member making an equivalent reduction but on the 
overall EU emissions decreasing by this much. Some states within the EU will be able 
to take relatively little or no action, denting the intention behind common 
 
135 Australia’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution to a New Climate Change 
Agreement (August 2015), para 3. 
136 Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the EU and its Members States 
(March 2015), Article 3. 
137 Canada’s INDC Submission to the UNFCCC (May 2015), para 3. 
138 Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the EU and its Member States 
(March 2015). 
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responsibilities. With this in mind, these three states have not offered targets that 
take account of their increased capacities as highly developed economies.  
 
Russia pledged to limit ‘anthropogenic greenhouse gases…to 70–75%’.139 This 
language is misleading and Russia is committing only to a 25% to 30% reduction, 
which is not justifiable given its place as the world’s fourth biggest emitter and status 
as a nation of increasing economic capacity.140 Brazil intends to reduce its emissions 
by 37% before 2025 and 43% by 2030.141 This appears at first glance to be quite 
ambitious, but it is softened by the inclusion that these targets ‘might be adjusted, as 
appropriate’, and use of 2005 as the base level to make reductions against further 
dents these objectives.142 Mexico sets an unconditional reduction of 25% and a 
conditional reduction of up to 40% if international support is provided.143 Assuming 
international efforts will not be forthcoming, at least to the required level, Mexico 
will make a 25% reduction at most. The dual-target approach of Brazil and Mexico 
provides a misleading account of what action these states are going to take, and the 
range provided allows a significant amount of ambiguity as to the ambition present. 
The lower end targets are not ambitious, but they are more justifiable given the 
developing status of these states. The ambiguity created by various targets and the 
potential lack of capacity to monitor whether or not they are achieved poses 
feasibility questions that further undermine their vigour.  
 
 
139 The Russian Federation, Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (March 
2015), Table 1. 
140 M Elzen et al., ‘Are G20 economies making enough progress to meet their NDC 
targets’ (2019) 126 Energy policy 238; Anonymous, ‘Russia’ (Climate Action Tracker, 
June 2019) <https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/eu/> accessed 15th August 
2019; Anonymous, ‘On Russia’s Participation in BRICS’ (Russia in BRICS, 2019) 
<https://brics.mid.ru/en_GB/rossia-v-briks> accessed 10th December 2019. 
141 Federative Republic of Brazil: Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
(September 2015), para 5. 
142 Ibid., para 2. 
143 Mexico: Gobierno De La Republica: Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
(March 2015). 
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Across the development spectrum the low level of ambition attached to reduction 
targets indicates that states are not willing to obligate themselves beyond a certain 
threshold. The relative similarity of all six targets may suggest that states are not 
acting according to their respective capacities but instead intend to reflect some idea 
of global parity. Nonetheless, these states can show that they have met their legal 
obligations and politicians can make statements to this affect, pointing to specific 
Paris commitments. Application of the legal standard alone allows a total 
misrepresentation of the situation.  
 
Moving onto the behavioural standard of effectiveness, the next question is whether 
or not these INDC documents are able to establish an action plan in which these 
targets will be met. If they are able to achieve this, the behaviour of each state might 
alter in pursuit of the Paris Agreement’s objectives. However, it is also possible that 
despite behavioural alterations the problem of emissions will persist, and climate 
change may continue to go unanswered.  
 
Australia attempts to signpost a route to its target. Paragraph two talks about a 
‘direct action policy’ and how it supports businesses and communities to ‘reduce 
emissions’, but no explanation is provided on how this policy operates.144 The INDC 
later points to ‘additional policy measures in place to promote the deployment of 
renewable energy’.145 No details as to what these measures are and how they will be 
supporting the renewable energy sector are provided; instead this point masks the 
fact that 84% of Australia’s electricity comes from coal burning.146 However, Australia 
does point out that only 23% of its energy will come from renewable sources by 
 
144 Australia’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution to a New Climate Change 
Agreement (August 2015), para 2. 
145 Ibid., para 8. 
146 P Wolfram, T Wiedmann, M Diesendorf, ‘Carbon Footprint Scenarios for 
Renewable Electricity in Australia’ (2016) 124 Journal of Cleaner Production 236 
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2020,147 highlighting the low level of action that will be taken on energy provision in 
the immediate future.  
 
The INDC claims to place ‘Australia on a stable pathway towards longer term 
emissions reductions’, which is problematic due to the lack of clarity on how this will 
be achieved.148 Considering the wider economic policies in operation it seems 
unlikely this is factually accurate.149 Australia relies on, and exports, a vast amount of 
fossil fuels,150 and even in the INDC restates its role as a ‘leading global resources 
provider’.151 It is reliant on trading in the very thing that is causing the problem, and 
so the extent to which Australia is willing to introduce workable alterations to its 
behaviour is suspicious at best, likely the reason for its vague action plan that will be 
difficult to monitor.152  
 
The EU’s 40% ambition is to be ‘fulfilled jointly’,153 and so its ability to alter the 
behaviour of all 28 Member States is limited, albeit this is subject to internal 
negotiations. The EU carbon trading scheme will further encourage free riding and 
allow some states to avoid behavioural alterations altogether.154 The INDC points to 
the Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) sector to achieve its reduction 
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targets.155 A framework to monitor the impact of LULUCF will be established ‘as soon 
as technical conditions allow’.156 The EU’s lack of preparedness to provide details as 
to the LULUCF sector is either an astonishing oversight or deliberately intended to 
create flexibility.157 This sector can make a significant contribution to overall 
emissions, allowing the level of mitigation efforts that take place across the wider 
economy to be reduced.158 If the EU finds itself in a position to offer significant 
LULUCF reductions this may preclude states taking further action to alter their 
individual behaviour in terms of CO2 output. The EU’s plan lacks the specificity that 
should be demanded from some of the most developed states in the world and again 
creates ambiguity as to what action can be expected. 
 
Canada reveals its intention to rely on international mechanisms to achieve its target, 
which implies the use of carbon-trading schemes.159 As such, a state capable of 
making actual reductions to its emissions and adopting green technologies may well 
continue without making behavioural alterations.160 Carbon trading does offer a way 
for cooperation among states, but in this instance it will allow Canada to avoid taking 
specific action.161 This lack of intent to take action is reflected in the vague plans to 
 
155 LULUCF relates to the preservation of natural land and forests to encourage CO2 
absorption. 
156 Intended Nationally Determined Contribution of the EU and its Member States 
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160 S Jordaan et al., ‘The role of energy technology innovation in reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions: A Case Study of Canada’ (2017) 78 Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
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‘accelerate the phase-out of existing coal fire electricity generation units’.162 There is 
no detail as to how this might be achieved or in what timeframe. Canada should have 
made quantifiable commitments to reduce its own emissions, after which it could 
have made further promises to cooperate through the carbon trading initiatives. 
Instead the INDC alludes to a limited response from Canada that is unable to signpost 
a credible action plan.  
 
The INDCs submitted from these developed states are designed to avoid detailed 
commitments that might be used as a measure of scrutiny. There is an absence of 
rigorously set-out intentions to meet the already unambitious targets that have been 
set. This lack of precision will preclude critics from definitively arguing these states 
have not met their own INDC behavioural obligations. More concerning is that these 
developed states will be able to claim they have a target and a broad plan of action 
to achieve it. They will be able to avoid taking a leading role and easily defend their 
actions when questioned, undermining the front-runner role envisaged for them at 
the founding of the UNFCCC. 
 
Russia’s INDC reveals a distinct lack of detail. It pledges to make economy-wide 
efforts at emissions reduction and lists a number of prominent sectors this applies to, 
but does not provide any details as to how these sectors will be expected to take 
action.163 It seeks to support the renewable energy sector, but the mechanisms and 
the percentage of energy this sector is expected to provide across the economy are 
absent. With regard to the LULUCF sector, the preservation of the Boreal Forests is 
mentioned in connection to mitigation efforts. No measure of detail as to what 
actions will be taken to achieve their protection and restoration is provided. Aside 
from pointing vaguely to ‘forest management’ it is not clear what Russia intends to 
do that will ensure the Boreal Forests are able to help mitigate emissions.164 This lack 
of detail suggests that behavioural changes were not planned when the INDC was 
 
162 Canada’s INDC Submission to the UNFCCC (May 2015), para 6. 
163 The Russian Federation, Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (March 
2015). 
164 Ibid., Table 1. 
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drafted, and it is likely that such alterations are not built into the internal policy 
responses of Russia. 
 
Brazil intends to achieve its reduction targets through LULUCF preservation 
policies.165 It aims to purge all illegal deforestation by 2030 and introduce forestry 
management projects to help curb illegal and unsustainable practices.166 These are 
positive ideas but introducing them will be challenging, and it will be difficult to 
quantify impact in terms of reducing emissions.167 By placing a lot of emphasis on 
these strategies Brazil is traversing unsteady ground.168 Instead of having more 
tangible policies at the level of, for instance energy production, it is targeting the 
social level. It will be hard to monitor and persuade people of the need to cease 
activities they are reliant on for their livelihoods.169 The lack of precision in this area 
also suggests that actual behavioural changes were not planned at the time of 
drafting, perhaps a consequence of the difficulty of implementing such proposals.  
 
Mexico sets out to ‘give priority to the least costly mitigation actions’, which clouds 
its INDC in a shroud of negligible action.170 Its INDC claims to be ‘consistent with 
Mexico’s pathway to reduce 50% of emissions by the year 2050’, which leads to the 
possibility it did not introduce anything new and simply became a copy and paste 
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exercise for the Mexican Government.171 It lists a number of prominent greenhouse 
gases but these are not given reduction targets or linked to action that will see their 
declining use. This is followed by a section within the document titled ‘Planning 
Process’, which acts as a list of instruments that exist in relation to climate change.172 
There is no further detail within this document as to how these instruments will alter 
or prompt behavioural changes to meet the problem.  
 
Moreover, the dates attached to these instruments demonstrate that they were not 
newly adopted but are instead part of an already existing climate policy, which is 
ineffective.173 It has been argued that a developing state taking any action on climate 
change is positive,174 but the implementation of these legislative actions has been 
difficult because of the internal infrastructure of Mexico.175 The Mexican economy 
remains highly dependent on fossil fuels with 89% of its energy coming from their 
use.176 There is a lack of intended action within the INDC that would reduce this 
figure and the climate legislation highlighted has so far been unable to reduce 
Mexico’s reliance on fossil fuels. By transplanting these laws into Mexico’s INDC no 
significant behavioural alterations will be forthcoming.  
 
Across the development spectrum states are unprepared to establish a clear set of 
actions that will lead to the achievement of their targets. The level of development 
does not determine the level of commitment a state will make. If this were the case 
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developed states would be committing to significantly more obligations through 
behavioural alterations. There is something other than capacity and level of 
development that prevents states from adopting robust action plans. Nonetheless, 
although these plans are vague, they still allow the claim that states are taking steps 
to alter their behaviour towards the achievement of the Paris Agreement. If 
questioned any one of these states will be able to point without hesitation to 
behavioural policies that it has legally introduced to meet the climate threat. 
Applying the behavioural standard of effectiveness misrepresents the situation, 
furthering the false confidence we should place in the Paris Agreement. 
 
The analysis above shows that despite achieving legal and behavioural effectiveness 
there are considerable problems with the adoption of these standards. Applying 
them will generate the false impression that the Paris Agreement is effective. 
Utilising the problem-solving standard the INDCs will now be identified as completely 
unable to mitigate climate change, in large part because of the obstructive attitudes 
prevailing. 
 
Australia only intends to implement the upper end of its 26–28% target ‘should 
circumstances allow’.177 This provision permits Australia a way to avoid making more 
stringent commitments. The marginal 2% range also implies that if circumstances do 
not allow the 26% target might become flexible. Australia argues its efforts are 
reflective of other comparable states, setting out its intention to avoid leading 
against the problem. Instead it is willing to partake in a race to the bottom, which is 
reinforced when it ‘reserves the right to adjust our target’.178 The extent to which 
Australia is prepared to tackle the problem is virtually non-existent. This claim can be 
evidenced with reference to the Climate Action Tracker (CAT), which finds the overall 
policies and subsequent actions of Australia when matched against the need to 
 
177 Australia’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution to a New Climate Change 
Agreement (August 2015), para 4. 
178 Ibid.  
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prevent a 2°C temperature increase are seriously inept.179 Its commitments would 
contribute to a temperature increase between 2°C and 3°C, and its current policies 
are working to counteract the global momentum towards emission reductions, 
prompting its efforts to be labelled ‘insufficient’.180  
 
The attitude of the EU is not so readily present within its INDC and unlike Australia it 
does seem to set out with the right intention. However, its 40% target is compared to 
its previous 20% target, appearing to use this as a means to accentuate its improved 
effort.181 This masks that the EU is still not doing enough considering its developed 
status and although improvements are important they do not necessarily reflect 
enough effort to solve the problem. The CAT finds that if the actions of the EU are 
replicated around the world there would be a 2°C to 3°C increase in global 
temperatures.182 The EU’s INDC repeats its historic stance in that it has the 
appearance of a positive approach but this is not reflected through its ambition or 
implementation when compared to the extent of the problem. The CAT classifies the 
current approach of the EU as ‘insufficient’.183  
 
Canada highlights its contribution to global warming that ‘represents only 1.6% of 
the world’s greenhouse gas emissions’.184 There is no point of authority to 
authenticate where this figure comes from, but if accurate 1.6% in a collection of 193 
states still represents a significant share. While the figure might be comparably low 
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to other big emitters it is not low enough to justify Canada taking a nonchalant 
approach. Its inclusion signifies a perception on the part of Canada that there are 
those with responsibility and those without it. This is reinforced when Canada says it 
is ‘committed to doing more in concert with all major emitters’, which might be read 
to mean that it will take further action only in conjunction with other comparable 
states.185 The INDC also points out the approach of Canada is designed to ensure that 
its ‘economic competitiveness is protected.’186 Canada is only prepared to obligate 
itself to the extent reflecting the actions of other states, and is within its competitive 
reach, signifying a similar approach to Australia. 
 
The CAT finds the efforts of Canada are comparable to other developed states, which 
if reflected around the world would force temperatures to rise between 2°C and 
3°C.187 The efforts of Canada are not able to solve the problem or meet the Paris 
Agreement’s objective. The parting statement from Canada that ‘every country must 
do its part’ is contrary to its own level of engagement, reflecting the hidden assertion 
that Canada will not take a leading role on this challenge.188 Studies provide further 
validation for this claim by indicating that Canada is not even going to achieve its 
own INDC commitments by some margin,189 adding justification to the 
characterisation of Canada’s efforts as ‘insufficient’ to meet the problem.190 
 
The message from developed states is very negative. They are not prepared to utilise 
their advanced capacities to implement internal change to cut emissions. They are 
more content to ensure their actions are comparable to other similarly developed 
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states, which has created a race to the bottom scenario. The positions of these three 
states are not unreflective of the wider international community. The developed 
world has the capacity but not the attitude to respond effectively to climate change. 
The developed states should be leading, but they are instead obfuscating and 
inadvertently transferring the Kyoto Protocol’s problem of perceived inequity into the 
Paris Agreement, completely undermining the purpose of total discretion.  
 
Switching to developing states, the CAT takes a scathing view of the Russian INDC, 
finding that its efforts would lead to a global heating of plus 4°C.191 Russia’s target 
will not require it to take any serious action that is not already built into its 
infrastructure. This target allows Russia to mislead through reference to its 
commitment to avoid using global mechanisms to achieve its intended objectives.192 
Its target is so weak it will not require access to carbon-sharing schemes. The entire 
INDC of Russia is lip service to the Paris Agreement absent any real intent on the part 
of the Government to enact changes to its infrastructure that will tackle the problem. 
Russia claims to prioritise long-term commitments, using this as a justification for its 
weak INDC promises that deal with the present. This is nothing more than a smoke 
screen to justify the avoidance of taking action now.193 The CAT classifies the actions 
of Russia as ‘highly insufficient’, which will not see it solve the problem but make it 
much worse.194  
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Brazil holds that ‘12 million hectares of forest by 2030’ will be restored and 
reforested, intending to rely on this to meet its targets.195 This positive commitment 
has been undermined by internal political change. In 2018, now President Jair 
Bolsonaro campaigned on a manifesto to increase deforestation irrespective of 
global commitments.196 The intention of Bolsonaro is to allow logging companies into 
the Amazon Rainforest at a rate that is totally unsustainable and will mean the 12 
million hectares even if restored will be a small figure compared to the amount of 
deforestation that will take place. The ability of Brazil to ensure that its INDC 
commitments are fulfilled has been significantly undercut by a change in 
government.197 The CAT rates the actions of Brazil as ‘insufficient’, finding that 
current efforts will see a 32% reduction by 2030.198 This shows the fragility of the 
discretion-based model. It is also likely that come 2030 the mitigation efforts of Brazil 
will be very far from its stated INDC targets, which will, it is predicted here, continue 
to evaporate under the current administration. 
 
The intent of Mexico to solve the problem of emissions is curbed by its interpretation 
of the situation as someone else’s problem. Mexico, like Canada, points out that it is 
only responsible for 1.4% of global emissions.199 The CAT finds its reduction target ‘is 
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at the least stringent end of what would be a fair share’,200 indicating that the rubric 
of a ‘highly ambitious’ target linked to Mexico’s share of emissions is deceptive.201 
Mexico as the least developed state examined here could argue its actions are more 
defensible. Yet, it has not pledged robust steps to solve this problem in reflection of 
its capacity, and its contribution will see an average temperature increase of 
between 2°C and 3°C.202 The CAT further reveals that as time elapses the actions of 
Mexico are becoming more unsustainable and its current description of insufficient 
will be upgraded to highly insufficient.203 Mexico is not taking responsible or 
proportionate action towards the advancement of a green economy, but instead 
reflects a developing state embarking upon a journey that will see the problem 
intensify. This is particularly worrying given that Mexico admits its susceptibility to 
climatic impact, and even in the face of harm continues to prioritise ruthless 
economic development over sustainable practices. 
 
The restricted capacity of developing states to provide robust problem-solving INDCs 
might have been an argument capable of justifying reduced action. However, not 
unlike the developed states, it is more about the attitude of those drafting the INDCs 
as opposed to their capacity. The common but differentiated responsibility model is 
meant to create a system where each state takes action proportionate to their 
infrastructure and resources, but this has not materialised. Instead states are 
avoiding the required action irrespective of their capacity. They are taking steps to 
increase economic development regardless of the impact this will have on the 
climate or wider environment. The total discretion found in the INDC system has 
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allowed states to avoid taking proportionate action on the climate threat, 
inadvertently undermining the common but differentiated responsibility norm. 
 
Across the development spectrum states have proven untrustworthy to create 
robust problem-solving INDCs. In no example looked at here has a state provided an 
action plan that will see the objectives of the Paris Agreement achieved. Instead it is 
much more likely that global temperatures will continue to rise, and so by the 
problem-solving standard of effectiveness the INDC system and wider Paris 
Agreement must be rendered fundamentally and totally ineffective. 
 
V. Beyond International Climate Law 
 
Despite the existence of international climate law since 1992, greenhouse gas 
emissions have continued to increase. Between 2000 and 2010 the increase in 
output grew by 2.2% compared with an average growth figure of 1.3% between 1970 
and 2000.204 In 2010 over 49 gigatonnes of greenhouse gas emissions were released 
into the atmosphere.205 In both 2010 and 2011 the rate of output increased by 3.5% 
before slowing slightly in 2012 and 2013 to a 1.8% increase.206 September 2016 saw 
the Mauna Loa Observatory report for the first time in recorded history the 
breaching of 400 parts per million of CO2 concentration in the atmosphere.207 In May 
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It is undeniable that greenhouse gas emissions are increasing and in direct 
correlation to this the global temperature is rising. If we carry on at the current rate 
the earth’s atmospheric temperature will warm between 3°C and 5°C by 2100,209 
causing devastation for billions around the globe.210 With this in mind, the objective 
of the UNFCCC to stabilise the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
at a level to prevent dangerous anthropogenic climate change has not been met. 
Instead the framework has been able to achieve hesitance, delay, argument and two 
subsequent Protocols unable to offer any measure of effectiveness when compared 
with the problem. 
 
It is the argument here that the Kyoto Protocol failed and the Paris Agreement will 
not succeed in stemming climate breakdown. The systemic problems inherent within 
these models of international legal response preclude effective agreements. States 
do not align behind a central position and the objectives set and means of achieving 
them are not robustly matched to the scale of the threat. Despite having a global 
span and impacting severely upon the entire international community climate 
change still does not generate a level of unity among states that will see them 
cooperate to take the necessary individual and collective action. The norms of 
international climate law reflect too closely the lowest common denominator. This 
problem reached its peak through the Paris Agreement, which was unable to include 
an ambitious temperature cap or even move beyond merely asking states to set and 
implement their own action plans. The gap between the Paris Agreement’s 
objectives and its means of achieving them is titanic. 
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This is reflected in the INDCs examined, which show that states are intentionally 
avoiding ambitious steps. Some states are even doing virtually nothing despite 
fulfilling their legal obligations under the Paris Agreement. We cannot wait for 
further proof that the current system will not result in a less than 2°C temperature 
increase; instead we must search for alternative ways to bolster the climate 
response. Or to borrow from Sir Geoffrey Palmer we must find new ways to 
stimulate greater international climate action if we are to stave off the advance of 
this certain threat.211   
 
Prior to the beginning of this thesis the researcher had already identified that there 
was scope to examine the nexus between climate change and the UNSC through an 
LLM dissertation. The relationship between the two is somewhat under explored 
and, moreover, as identified in the introduction, there existed a number of gaps in 
the literature that could be reasonably addressed through a PhD. The focus of this 
work was therefore justifiable based on the researcher’s interests and the 
corresponding knowledge gap. Nevertheless, this route may appear somewhat 
exceptional and the question arises, why not try a more sedate pathway that seeks 
to improve the climate framework internally?  
 
In response to this, it can be argued the history of ICL presents evidence that the 
regime cannot be improved, at least not in the timeframe necessitated.212 There 
have been three climate conventions brought into existence, with each one aspiring 
to provide a more effective approach than its predecessor. Yet, despite the evolving 
nature of ICL it has been unable to respond to climate change effectively. The Kyoto 
Protocol was unable to meet its own objectives and the emission of CO2 continued to 
rise. The Paris Agreement sought to change tactic from hard targets to soft 
aspirations, yet the impact this has had on the problem is negligible and CO2 
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emissions continue to escalate. Trying to find ways to evolve ICL through the usual 
forum of international law has been an unproductive exercise so far, at least when 
compared against the problem.  
 
Even if we were to adopt the approach of comparing some positive examples of 
international environmental law against the climate regime, with the hope of 
transplanting some of their principles and mechanisms, we run up against the 
obstacle of incomparable circumstances. For instance, the Montreal Protocol on 
ozone protection from chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) is acknowledged to be one of the 
most successful environmental conventions.213 However, its triumph may not be 
based on the desire of states to force a solution to the problem, but on the fact that 
one was readily available. The technology to replace CFCs was accessible and so 
states, particularly those influential ones like the USA, were open to create a treaty 
that had behavioural impacts.214 In reality the solution may have preceded the 
Protocol, raising questions over its actual value in terms of impact on the problem, 
and preventing a simple transfer of useful principles to the climate regime. 
 
Furthermore, the nature of climate change and ozone depletion and the means of 
addressing them varies vastly. Ozone depletion required the phasing out of specific 
chemicals, facilitated largely through an equivalent replacement. The problem of CO2 
emissions is much more expansive, reaching into every aspect of society and while 
solutions are being presented, there is no single change that can be implemented to 
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solve this dilemma.215 The Montreal Protocol was able to adopt a narrow focus in 
terms of its scope, whereas the climate regime requires a much more intricate 
approach. Moreover, the ozone problem has an entirely different temporal nature 
than climate change and although the Protocol is having a positive impact the 
problem still persists thirty-four years on.216 It is also likely that it will not be solved 
until sometime between 2045 and 2060.217 In regard to climate change we cannot 
wait decades for a convention to slowly impact the problem. Also along these lines, 
the negotiation and creation of treaties like the Montreal Protocol take time, and 
again it is not possible to wait while amendments to the Paris Agreement, or even a 
new treaty, are drafted.218 Comparing the ozone and climate conventions, or that of 
any other subject, offers little realistic chance of challenging the status quo in a 
meaningful way.219  
 
Another option is to argue that the common but differentiated responsibility 
principle could be transformed. If this were possible, why was it not done so at the 
last major renegotiation that took place in 2015? Perhaps part of the problem is that 
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the potential alternative of shared responsibility is too contentious,220 drawing lines 
of division between the international community.221 However, we can see an 
evolution to the implementation of this principle between Kyoto and Paris. The 
former tried to take an equitable stance and charge those most developed with 
greater commitments, but this was met with obstinance and disagreement.222 The 
Paris Agreement responded by removing any differentiation among states through 
the provision of discretion. Yet, this is not solving the problem and so we are left with 
the resounding reality that there is little hope of evolving the responsibility principle 
in time to avert a climate catastrophe. Or at least this thesis does not have the scope 
to examine this argument in any further depth.  
 
The time has come where we must look for more disruptive responses that might 
galvanise the international community into action. For this the UNSC offers a 
potential reply that might facilitate the type of changes required. This is required 
based on the escalation of the threat. With intensifying levels of harm to the 
environment and humanity, there can be little disagreement that climate change 
poses extreme danger. Elevating it to the exceptional level of the UNSC, designed to 
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The UNSC can pass binding mandates on all 193 UN members absent protracted 
negotiations;224 it has access to a range of tools under Chapter VII to encourage the 
uptake of its mandate;225 it also has access to capacity building apparatus that have 
in the past proved useful;226 and if able to agree, the UNSC can elevate concerns 
from the ordinary political agenda to the extraordinary security agenda.227 The 
activation of Article 39 comes with a gravitas that appears to generate a requisite 
response from states.228 In short, the UNSC could take the problem of climate change 
and remove it from the political sphere of legal stagnation and place it in the security 
sphere, which is characterised by greater haste and more intention to tackle threats. 
The remainder of this thesis will embark upon a journey to find a way to securitise 
climate change within the scope of Article 39, in order to promote a more effective 
response to this already present catastrophe that is certain to exacerbate 
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International Security as a Referent Object 
 
‘Climate change poses a long-term global threat, with significant human, national, 




In Chapter One the theory of securitisation was established as the frame through 
which this research would be conducted. Within this theory, a referent object must 
be identified. In other words, an object that must be protected. This chapter intends 
to identify a referent object through examination of the concept of international 
peace and security, looking at how its interpretation has evolved over time. Thus, 
providing a more precise referent object for the purposes of this project and 
narrowing down those threats for examination in the following chapter. First, this 
chapter will set out how to interpret the term international peace and security. 
Second, a historical analysis of the UNSC’s activation of Article 39 will take place to 
demonstrate how international security has become a referent object in its own 
right. Third, it will be shown that climate change is an international security threat, 
justifying the selection and analysis of those threats with security at their centre in 
the next chapter.  
 
II. Interpreting International Peace and Security  
 
The UNSC is charged with maintaining and/or restoring international peace and 
security, making this a viable referent object for the purposes of securitisation 
theory.2 But there is no precise meaning attached to this concept, making it hard to 
pinpoint with any certainty what is or should be protected. Identifying international 
 
1 C Penny, ‘Greening the Security Council: Climate Change as an Emerging Threat to 
International Peace and Security’ (2007) 7 International Environmental Agreements 
35, 37. 
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peace and security as a referent object is further complicated by the evolution of 
subjects that constitute threats to it. The evolution of what constitutes a threat to 
the peace has accordingly developed the meaning behind international peace and 
security. By tracing the history of threats that have come within the meaning of 
Article 39 it will be shown that international peace and security can be interpreted to 
mean a number of different things. Not all of these are comparable or relevant to 
climate change and the purpose of this thesis is to argue for its securitisation. 
However, before that can begin it must be determined how the term international 
peace and security should be read.  
 
Within the Charter of the UN there exists no instruction as to how the term 
international peace and security should be interpreted. It even provides for an 
element of inconsistency when in Article 39 it switches from the dual designation of 
peace and security provided in Article 1, to referring singularly to a threat to peace. 
Kelsen advocated that it was to be interpreted in the singular on the basis that 
‘International security is guaranteed if international peace is maintained’.3 Relying on 
this link would mean the absence of war equates to the provision of security.4 If we 
consider the different forms of security – state; human; environmental; food and 
water security – this becomes problematic. In many of these instances the absence 
of warfare has not resulted in the absence of insecurity.5 Kelsen’s claim that ‘security 
is rather superfluous’ sits in direct contradiction with the reality of developing 
international concerns that may fall more appropriately under the heading of 
 
3 H Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental 
Problems (3rd edition, London, Steven and Sons Limited 1954) 13. 
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security.6 The more viable approach is to recognise a distinction between peace and 
security. 
 
This distinction is not intended to divide the term, rather it is a way to recognise an 
expansion of the understanding that has been afforded to it by drawing on the 
discrete meaning of each word. Galtung delineated the distinct notions of negative 
and positive peace.7 Negative peace is defined as an absence of aggression and or 
war. Positive peace reflects an absence of structural violence (that is to mean 
indirect harm resulting from societal circumstances).8 Structural violence has no 
relation to the usual connotations attached to the word violence, but instead 
references societal circumstances that give rise to discontent and ultimately a sense 
of harm.9 This project will proceed with negative peace as an absence of immediate 
violence and positive peace as an absence of harm from the structures of society. 
 
Moving to security, a singular interpretation is unavailable, with McDonald and 
Brollowski stating it is ‘elastic, fluid and elusive in character’.10 Baldwin did attempt 
to address this elasticity through the identification of an undercurrent of consistency, 
and concluded that security is a policy objective attached to the state.11 This is a very 
narrow explanation of the term, which is unreflective of the emergent forms of 
security that do not necessarily attach themselves to the state.12 The Copenhagen 
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School defines security as an absence of threats to individuals, peoples and states.13 
One qualification to accepting this broad approach is that it does not mention 
international security explicitly and, as Hood points out, the UNSC does in fact deal 
with the security of the international community.14 However, Wolfrum indicates that 
state and international security have become interrelated,15 and Hood suggests that 
they have as a common aim the protection of states.16 Therefore, although the 
Copenhagen School’s approach omits international security, it is reasonable to infer 
that the recognition of state security by extension can mean the collective security of 
the international community.17 Security here means an absence of threats to 
individuals, peoples, states and the international community. With this 
understanding set, it is time to consider how peace and security as distinct ideas 
have manifested within the meaning of international peace and security. To do this a 
historical examination of the UNSC’s activation of Article 39 will follow. 
 
III. The Historical Evolution of Article 39 Threats 
 
Beginning with the period 1946–1990, the Repertoire of the UNSC identifies thirteen 
different situations addressed under Article 39. Yet two of these situations, the 
Portuguese Territory question (Resolution 218) and the dispute between the USA 
and Iran (Resolution 461), are in fact not Article 39 determinations. Resolution 218 
 
Nations, 2005) 78; H Nasu, ‘The Place of Human Security in Collective Security’ (2013) 
18 (1) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 95. 
13 B Buzan, O Waever, J de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1st 
edition, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 1998).  
14 A Hood, ‘Ebola: A Threat to the Parameters of a Threat to the Peace?’ (2015) 16 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 29. 
15 R Wolfrum, ‘Article 1’ in B Simma, D E Khan, G Nolte, A Paulus, (eds), The Charter 
of the United Nations: A Commentary (3rd edition, Oxford University Press 2012) 108. 
16 A Hood, ‘Ebola: A Threat to the Parameters of a Threat to the Peace?’ (2015) 16 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 29. 
17 Thakur points out the ‘definition of any concept involves a trade-off between 
precision and inclusiveness’. R Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security (1st 
edition, CUP 2008) 82. 
 83 
finds the situation only ‘seriously disturbs international peace and security’,18 and 
Resolution 461 only vaguely points to the situation as a threat without actually 
activating Article 39.19 Thus according to the research methods of this thesis, they 
have been removed from examination.  
 
Within the remaining situations engaged there is a clear link to infractions on 
negative peace. In most instances this is explicit, and words like ‘hostilities’,20 
‘military action’,21 ‘civil war’,22 and ‘continuing bloodshed’,23 denote clear incursions. 
Resolution 113 is the exception and the UNSC points only to ‘tensions’ and the 
‘withdrawal of forces’, yet while this is less obvious it is also not beyond the 
spectrum of negative peace because the word ‘forces’ links to conflict.24 Although 
the language used is not identical to that which appeared in the Travaux, it is 
synonymous, indicating a link between the drafting of the Charter and the UNSC’s 
early functioning, lending support to the claim by Kirgis that ‘the Security Council in 
the early years, had the San Francisco proceedings clearly in mind’.25  
 
Only the Southern Rhodesia and South Africa situations do not clearly fall within the 
spectrum of negative peace. However, in both cases there is a lack of consensus as to 
why the UNSC intervened. In the Southern Rhodesia situation some identify the 
possible occurrence of violence as the rationale for intervention,26 while others focus 
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on the internal oppression as justification alone.27 The South Africa situation raises 
similar questions.28 Resolution 418 references the ‘killings of African people, 
including school children and students and others opposing racial discrimination’.29 
Yamashita uses this to suggest that the purpose of the resolution was to engage 
human rights abuses resulting from the Apartheid policy.30 Gill also points out that 
the racial policies internal to South Africa were after ‘hesitation and resistance’ 
considered as threats to peace.31 These claims both ignore the presence within the 
resolution of a link to aggression against neighbouring states.32 It is therefore difficult 
to divest these interventions from negative peace. 
 
Within the period 1946–1990 international peace and security should for the most 
part be considered as an absence of immediate violence. The UNSC was primarily 
concerned with instances that fall somewhere on the continuum of armed conflict. If 
the peace was disturbed, then international peace and security was threatened. The 
Travaux and to a lesser extent the Charter support the UNSC’s early focus on the 
avoidance of such situations.33 The referent object found within international peace 
and security at this time is negative peace. Consequently, the issue of climate change 
would not have been able to come before the UNSC, at least not without a 
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substantial link to a situation of immediate violence, and even quite recently there 
remains debate surrounding such a connection.34 
 
Moving to the period 1990–2001, there is little doubt that just before, and in the 
years, following, the 1992 statement on the expanded challenges linked to 
international peace and security, the UNSC began to include within its remit 
considerations that were once unfamiliar to it. Resolution 688 expressed the UNSC 
was ‘Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population’.35 
Resolution 770 said the ‘humanitarian assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an 
important element in the Council’s effort to restore international peace and 
security’;36 and Resolution 917 focussed on efforts to bring about the ‘full restoration 
of democracy in Haiti’.37 These examples exhibit a new confidence of the UNSC to 
consider international peace and security as more than just the absence of 
immediate violence. Their inclusion suggests that to fulfil its role the UNSC was 
aware that it had to look beyond conflict, leading to the possibility that international 
peace and security had evolved in meaning to include aspects of positive peace and 
security. 
 
Despite these additional considerations, it is nearly always the case that the UNSC 
provided a further line of justification through the inclusion of a link to negative 
peace. In Resolution 713 the UNSC said it was ‘Deeply alarmed by the fighting in 
Yugoslavia’.38 Resolution 787 on Bosnia and Herzegovina reaffirmed ‘the taking of 
territory by force’ was unacceptable.39 Resolution 733 concerning Somalia urged ‘all 
parties to the conflict immediately to cease hostilities’.40 In regard to Rwanda the 
 
34 K Conca, ‘Is There a Role for the UN Security Council on Climate Change’ (2019) 61 
Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 4. 
35 UNSC Res 688 (5th April 1991) UN Doc S/Res/688, Preamble para 3. 
36 UNSC Res 770 (13th August 1992) UN Doc S/Res/770, Preamble para 5. 
37 UNSC Res 917 (6th May 1994) UN Doc S/Res/917, Preamble para 7. 
38 UNSC Res 713 (25th September 1991) UN Doc S/Res/713, Preamble para 3. 
39 UNSC Res 787 (16th November 1992) UN Doc S/Res/787, Operative para 2. 
40 UNSC Res 733 (23rd January 1992) UN Doc S/Res/733, Operative para 4. 
 86 
‘ongoing violence’ was condemned,41 and later Resolution 929 referenced ‘parties to 
the conflict’.42 The precise basis on which the UNSC was relying for intervention in 
these cases is unclear. Was it expanding its authority into new facets of international 
peace and security, or was it recalling the traditional rationale of immediate violence 
as an intrusion on negative peace? The mood of this era is certainly one of expansion 
in terms of the meaning attached to international peace and security. The 
cooperative attitude of the permanent members meant that situations once outside 
the UNSC’s remit were able to find their way to Article 39. Considerations such as 
humanitarian abuse and non-compliance with UNSC resolutions show that elements 
of positive peace and security were beginning to feature in the meaning of 
international peace and security.43 
 
However, it is unlikely that without the already evident beginnings of negative peace 
intrusions the UNSC would have been able to intervene in positive peace or security 
concerns. The interpretative radius may have been too far removed for the 
permanent members to agree and avoid a veto vote.44 Even in the Rwanda situation 
that was unanimously categorised as a humanitarian catastrophe, the permanent 
members identified the nature of the situation as linked to immediate violence. Thus, 
within the period 1990–2001 the UNSC was able to adopt an interpretation of 
international peace and security that encompassed aspects of positive peace and 
security but only alongside negative peace intrusions. The likelihood of climate 
change falling within the remit of peace and security at this time is improbable. The 
permanent members would have been unable to agree that a threat of a nature 
most clearly related to security was within the remit of Article 39.  
 
 
41 UNSC Res 918 (17th May 1994) UN Doc S/Res/918, Preamble para 5. 
42 UNSC Res 929 (22nd June 1994) UN Doc S/Res/929, Operative para 9. 
43 See Resolution 748 for a situation of non-compliance with a UNSC mandate as 
rationale for intervention: UNSC Res 748 (31st March 1992) UN Doc S/Res/748. 
44 A Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council: Countermeasures Against 
Wrongful Sanctions (1st edition, OUP 2011). 
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Moving to the period 2001–2016, certain threat recognitions are considerably 
different in character from all those that preceded them. International terrorism, 
WMD proliferation, the 2014 Ebola outbreak and drug trafficking all exhibit an 
emphasis on security. The first three of these were housed in resolutions and there is 
no doubt that they were brought within the meaning of Article 39. Drug trafficking 
was addressed in Presidential Statement 2009/32 and the Repertoire records it as a 
new Article 39 intervention.45 The language of this presidential statement does not 
explicitly declare drug trafficking as a threat to peace, the linguistics carefully 
avoided this. Nonetheless, this statement evidences a further move of the UNSC into 
the realm of security, and some permanent members were prepared to find drug 
trafficking a threat to international peace and security in their submissions.46 Its 
inclusion here is useful, but it will take a secondary role in comparison to terrorism, 
WMD proliferation and the 2014 Ebola outbreak.  
 
A distinction can be identified in how the content of these resolutions is framed, 
which encourages a shift away from situational threats. In Resolution 1368 the UNSC 
‘Calls [also] on the international community to redouble their efforts to prevent and 
suppress terrorist acts’.47 Resolution 1540 determined to ‘facilitate henceforth an 
effective response to global threats in the area of non-proliferation’.48 Resolution 
2177 held ‘the control of outbreaks of major infectious diseases requires urgent 
action and greater national, regional and international collaboration’.49 Presidential 
Statement 2009/32 references the ‘serious threats posed in some cases by drug 
 
45 UNSC Presidential Statement 2009/32 (8th December 2009) UN Doc 
S/PRST/2009/32; Repertoire of Security Council Practise, ‘Actions with Respect to 
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression (2008-2009)’ (UN 
Repertoire 2019) <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/repertoire/actions> 
accessed 1st December 2019. 
46 The UK held, mimicking the language of Article 39, ‘drug trafficking constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security’. UNSC Verbatim Record (8th December 
2009) UN Doc S/PV/6233, 9. 
47 UNSC Res 1368 (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/Res/1368, Operative para 4. 
48 UNSC Res 1540 (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/Res/1540, Preamble para 15. 
49 UNSC Res 2177 (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/Res/2177, Preamble para 13. 
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trafficking and related international organized crime’.50 In each of these instances the 
UNSC was moving to a thematically framed interpretation of the threats. Even in 
regard to the Ebola outbreak, which was to some extent situational because of its 
concentration in West Africa, the UNSC touched upon the problem of infectious 
diseases more broadly. The indication is that each of these threats exists or could 
exist beyond single incidents and so must be addressed accordingly. This evidences a 
significant departure of the UNSC from its traditional mode of responding to 
situational conflict. 
 
Even in the wake of September 11th the language is directed towards security, with 
China calling terrorism a ‘serious potential danger’,51 suggesting the attacks 
exemplified the danger emanating from terrorism, provoking support not based on 
this negative peace intrusion but on the need to increase security to prevent further 
attacks. On proliferation, France pointed to the ‘security of all States’, identifying 
with clarity the policy goal of Resolution 1540.52 On Ebola, France spoke about an 
‘economic and social crisis that could generate a political crisis’,53 and Russia 
referenced a ‘threat to food security’.54 On drug trafficking the USA argued it has 
‘very serious consequences for the security and development of society’.55 These 
submissions evidence a move to contemplate factors unrelated to negative peace, 
instead centralising aspects of positive peace and security. The inclusion of wider 
considerations is not original to this period and compares to the expansions of the 
1990s, but where they are distinct is that they are not always reliant on a clear link to 
negative peace.  
 
 
50 UNSC Presidential Statement 2009/32 (8th December 2009) UN Doc 
S/PRST/2009/32, 1. 
51 UNSC Verbatim Record (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/PV/4370, 5. 
52 UNSC Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/PV/4956, 2. 
53 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 10. 
54 Ibid., 13. 
55 UNSC Verbatim Record (8th December 2009) UN Doc S/PV/6233, 7. 
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This highlights that the UNSC had switched from an approach of reaction to one of 
prevention. Where it originally sought to restore international peace, it now seeks to 
maintain international security. A likely motivation for this evolution is linked to the 
contemporary character of threats that has somewhat evolved from those historic 
conflicts that were predominantly confined to geographical circumstances. The 
events of September 11th highlighted the need to place security as the first line of 
defence because the consequences of not doing so had become critical.56 The nature 
of terrorism and proliferation as able to cause massive spontaneous devastation 
meant that continuing to prioritise negative peace would not halt these threats. The 
same rationale appears true in the context of Ebola, where prevention of further 
spread, which could be interpreted as the provision of security, was present in the 
minds of the permanent members.57  
 
In some of these instances there is no doubt a link between the need for security and 
the ambition to avoid negative peace infractions.58 An absence of security leading to 
peace concerns does not mean that the former loses merit and actually shows for 
the second time in the UNSC’s history that peace and security do have a 
connection.59 The important finding here is that security is no longer reliant on 
negative peace intrusions, but instead the maintenance of peace in some instances 
became reliant on the provision of security. This might be a contestable point in 
regard to Resolution 1368 because of the violence of the attack that preceded its 
 
56 F Galloway, ‘Anti-Terrorism Resolutions: The Security Council’s Threat to the UN 
System’ (2011) 2 Journal of Terrorism Research 105. 
57 For example, the USA pointed out the ‘need to contain the further spread’ of the 
outbreak: UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 7. 
58 This link is clear in regard to terrorism and proliferation, but even in the context of 
the Ebola outbreak there was some consideration on the need to avoid post-conflict 
peace reversals: France said the outbreak ‘threatened to erase peace dividends and 
to reignite chaos in those countries’ and the UK thought the outbreak could 
‘neutralize the post-conflict gains of recent years’, UNSC Verbatim Record (18th 
September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 10, 17. 
59 The first time was in the period 1990–2001, when security was reliant on peace for 
recognition.  
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adoption, but the introduction of Resolutions 1540 and 2177 showcases that the 
provision of security is intended as a means to preserve peace. Diehl found the 
factors that led to peace were not the reverse of factors that led to conflict.60 The 
UNSC appears to understand this and in order to achieve peace it has refocussed its 
agenda to centralise security, hence the evolution of what international peace and 
security means seems to be a response to changing global conditions. Security in this 
period became a central aspect of international peace and security, and a referent 
object in its own right. 
 
To conclude, an examination of the UNSC’s activation of Article 39 has indicated that 
throughout its history the type of situations that fall within its remit has evolved. At 
one-point international peace and security centralised negative peace as the only 
consideration. As time passed and the Cold War ended, this was expanded to include 
more varied factors, like humanitarian protection and non-compliance. But these 
considerations were always linked to negative peace and without it they were 
incapable of becoming threats in their own right. The post-September 11th 
atmosphere has seen the removal of the need for negative peace to be present 
within a threat, and international security concerns have been identified in their own 
right, possibly due to the need to prevent infractions on negative peace. In any case 
the threat posed by contemporary issues such as terrorism, proliferation and health 
crises were such that the provision of security was prioritised in order to maintain 
international peace and security and not just to restore it. In short, international 
security became a referent object of the UNSC. 
 
IV. Climate Change as an International Security Threat 
 
Analysis of the UNSC’s engagement with the term international peace and security 
has revealed two important points. First, the term has undergone distinct evolutions 
and having never been rigidly defined in the Charter this was plausible and perhaps 
 
60 P Diehl, ‘Exploring Peace: Looking Beyond War and Negative Peace’ (2016) 60 
International Studies Quarterly 1. 
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expected.61 By applying a definition to the words peace and security it became clear 
the interventions of the UNSC progressed from being focussed on negative peace to 
eventually coming to include standalone security concerns. This leads to the second 
finding, that international security can now take a central role in the meaning of 
international peace and security, becoming a referent object in its own right. This is 
important in the context of climate change because of its contemporary security 
character, which largely differentiates it from peace intrusions that were once 
central to the characterisation of international peace and security.62 It will now be 
outlined that climate change reflects an international security threat.  
 
International security threats were shown to have progressed away from situational 
circumstances to become thematic in nature. There can be little doubt that climate 
change manifests thematically. The emissions problem is caused by all states and the 
global heating effect is something that states cannot escape.63 Climate change is 
therefore not isolated to a single discrete circumstance but comprises many varied 
and connected iterations across the globe. Furthermore, the consequences that stem 
from this heating effect exist at the international level. Since the advent of increased 
global temperatures there has been a rise in the number of droughts, floods and 
extreme weather events around the globe.64 Climatic harms resulting from climate 
change are not discretely isolated threats and are instead thematically linked. The 
global ubiquity of these harms mirrors the way in which the UNSC rationalised its 
characterisation of terrorism as a thematic security problem, allowing the same line 
of reasoning to be used to characterise climate change as within the meaning of an 
international security concern. 
 
61 N Susani, ‘United Nations, Purposes and Principles’ (2009) Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law. 
62 It is arguable that climate and conflict have a link, but a direct handling of climate 
change will have to look beyond this, see S Scott, ‘Implications of Climate Change for 
the UN Security Council: Mapping the Range of Potential Policy Responses’ (2015) 91 
International Affairs 1317. 
63 UNEP, ‘The Emissions Gap Report 2016’ (2016). 
64 UNEP, ‘UNEP Yearbook: Emerging Issues in our Global Environment’ (2014).  
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A second line of reasoning to characterise climate change as an international security 
threat follows the repercussions that stem from climate change. Climatic impacts 
such as rising temperatures, increasing precipitation and food and water shortages 
might be more closely akin to human security problems that on their own are not yet 
within the meaning of international peace and security.65 Such impacts might also 
appear at first glance to be domestic problems. Nevertheless, these climate-change-
induced insecurities cause problems at the level of the international community 
because of their impacts on regional and international stability.66 As climatic harm 
manifests, migration becomes a more frequent response.67 Internal territories and 
neighbouring states may start to experience pressures, which could cause an 
increase in regional tension.68 Human security issues may advance through the 
implementation of measures to stop mass migration.69 This might manifest through 
the possibility of immediate violence at international frontiers. It is also possible that 
states may begin to initiate aggressive policies to secure greater access to essential 
natural resources in order to protect their own populations.70 Thus, although at first 
glance climatic implications appear to be human-security-centric or domestic in 
nature they may rapidly link to state and international security. With these 
consequences in mind it is impossible to argue that climate change will not have 
international security repercussions and it might also impact on international peace. 
 
 
65 Food and Agricultural Organisation, ‘The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the 
World’ (2018); IPCC Report, ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C: Summary for Policy Makers’ 
(2018). 
66 IPCC, ‘Climate Change and Land: Summary for Policy Makers’ (2019). 
67 C Farbotko, H Lazrus, ‘The first climate refugees? Contesting Global Narratives of 
Climate Change in Tuvalu’ (2012) 22 Global Environmental Change 382. 
68 Ibid. 
69 O Brown, R McLeman, ‘A Recurring Anarchy? The Emergence of Climate Change as 
a Threat to International Peace and Security’ (2009) 9 Conflict, Security and 
Development 289. 
70 P H Gleick, ‘Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security’ 
(1993) 18 International Security 79; UNEP, ‘GEO 6: Healthy Planet Healthy People’ 
(2019). 
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Some of these arguments are reflected in past interventions of the UNSC. In regard 
to the Ebola outbreak the impact on stability locally and regionally was noted 
throughout discussions.71 There is little doubt that climate change is able to cause 
instability wherever it occurs. A lack of food and water security alone will induce 
mass migration that will have state and/or international level repercussions. It is also 
possible that an extreme weather event may destabilise states causing mass human 
harm and generating economic instability, facilitating a descent into chaos that could 
force further migration and regional challenges. Thus, the nature of climate change 
can be paralleled to the international security implications of other recently 
securitised threats.72   
 
Penny suggests the motivation behind the evolution of what constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security was the ‘cross-border or international consequences 
bringing them closer to traditional interstate security concerns’.73 In regard to the 
expansions that have taken place since 2001 this appears only half correct. The 
meaning of international peace and security does rest on international consequences 
but not necessarily on a link to interstate conflict. The Ebola outbreak, drug 
trafficking, proliferation and terrorism all have international consequences but only 
the latter two might be linked to contemporary conflict.74 The practice of the UNSC 
has removed the need for a clear link to interstate conflict. Other international 
security consequences have taken a more central role, providing another parallel to 
the impacts of climate change. 
 
 
71 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268. 
72 This is something that will be taken forward in much greater detail in Chapter Four. 
73 C Penny, ‘Greening the Security Council: Climate Change as an Emerging Threat to 
International Peace and Security’ (2007) 7 International Environmental Agreements 
35, 57. 
74 White felt that terrorism might be a contemporary form of conflict, and by the 
same argument proliferation might also be classified in this way. N White, The United 
Nations System: Toward International Justice (1st edition, Lynne Rienner 2002). 
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The progression away from situational circumstances meant the UNSC was also able 
to advance from the express identification of negative peace intrusions. In the 
context of climate change its consequential harms may manifest without leading to 
conflict and so this move to other thematic implications is again useful.75 In some 
cases there might be a connection between conflict and climate change but this 
should not mean that all instances of climate change require such a finding.76 In the 
case of proliferation and drug trafficking there was no circumstantial evidence of a 
conflict to lead the UNSC to securitise these subjects.77 This is important because it 
shows that climate change coming within the meaning of international security will 
not have to be preceded by a negative peace infraction or perhaps even any instance 
of harm, though this latter possibility is unlikely and will be explored much more 
rigorously in Chapter Four. 
 
Moving on, in all instances of international security there was a focus on pre-
emption. Even in regard to Resolutions 1368 and 2177 that were linked to factual 
events, the UNSC showed its intent to prevent future or further harm. The UNSC 
moved from restoring international peace and security to maintaining it. This is 
something that must take place in regard to climate change. If the UNSC embarks 
upon a practice of engaging climatic impacts as they arise it will forever be 
responding to already manifesting harm as opposed to preventing it in the first place. 
This is totally unsustainable given the extreme and exacerbating impacts stemming 
from climate change around the globe, which was an underlying motivation in the 
securitisation of terrorism and proliferation. There is a strong parallel between 
climate change and the reason for contemporary threats being handled pre-
emptively, adding further arguments that it is also an international security concern.  
 
75 J Barnett, W N Adger, ‘Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict’ 
(2007) 26 Political Geography 639. 
76 J Selby et al., ‘Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War Revisited’ (2017) Political 
Geography 232. 
77 At least no evidence was used to justify intervention in the verbatim records: UNSC 
Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc S PV/4956; UNSC Verbatim Record (8th 
December 2009) UN Doc S/PV/6233. 
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If climate change is to fall within the meaning of international peace and security, it 
will do so at the latter end of the evolutionary continuum where international 
security and pre-emption have been centralised. Infractions on negative peace were 
not required in this latest era as the intention was to pre-empt harm that could have 
ramifications at the international level. As Kendall put it, ‘state borders have 
disintegrated’ and with this comes a ‘revised understanding of what constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security’.78 Climate change erodes state borders 
completely, in terms of causes and impacts, adding further weight to the argument 
that it is in fact an international security threat.  
 
However, this does not necessarily mean the UNSC will find international peace and 
security is now linked to climate change. There are international security 
consequences stemming from climate change, but the normative evolution of the 
meaning attached to international peace and security has been inconsistent. 
Mahapatra analysed the UNSC’s engagement with two similar situations of intrastate 
conflict, Mali and Syria, identifying that although there were factual comparisons 
only one was brought successfully within the meaning of Article 39.79 This signals the 
inconsistency with which international peace and security exists, and as Hehir argues, 
this is unlikely to change unless there becomes a way in which to limit the decision 
making of the permanent members to a factual interpretation of the situation devoid 
of all improper considerations.80 This is an unlikely prospect at least in terms of 
formal amendment to the UN Charter because the permanent members have a 
deciding vote on reform options, courtesy of Article 108.81 
 
78 R Kendall, ‘Climate Change as a Security Threat to the Pacific Islands’ (2012) 16 
New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law 83, 94. 
79 D A Mahapatra, ‘The Mandate and the (In)Effectiveness of the United Nations 
Security Council and International Peace and Security: The Contexts of Syria and 
Mali’ (2016) 21 Geopolitics 43. 
80 A Hehir, ‘The Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (2013) 38 International Security 137. 
81 Charter of the United Nations (24th October 1945), 1 UNTS XVI, Article 108. 
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This inconsistency problem is likely to become even more pronounced in regard to 
climate change. The prospect of arguing a link between climate change and conflict is 
one thing, but to argue that climate change should be addressed pre-emptively as an 
international security threat is quite another. Even through a comparison of the 
UNSC’s recent anticipatory approach that prioritises security and the precautionary 
and preventative action principles of environmental law, it is challenging to see past 
the unpredictability of when a situation will be classified as a threat to peace. 
Although Trina Ng is correct in her assertion that the visibility of climate change 
consequences should ‘compel the SC to embrace climate change as a “threat to 
peace”’, this is unlikely to get much traction simply by finding that it is an 
international security threat.82 Finding that international peace and security now 
means the provision of international security is only part way to bringing climate 
change before the UNSC. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
Within the concept of international peace and security it is now possible to claim 
that international security has become a referent object in its own right. Since the 
early millennium the UNSC has on several occasions been able to prioritise the 
provision of international security as a way to maintain international peace and 
security. This is an extremely helpful finding because climate change fits much more 
easily within the understanding of what constitutes a threat to international security. 
Thus, providing a justification for focus to be placed on these threats in the 
construction of a comparative argument that follows in the next two chapters.  
 
Moving forward with the rest of this thesis, attention must now turn to the 
securitisation arguments put forward by the permanent members in regard to the 
international security threats. The intention is to find out how they argued for their 
 
82 T Ng, ‘Safeguarding Peace and Security in our Warming World: A Role for the 
Security Council’ (2010) 15 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 275, 288. 
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securitisation. The following chapter will examine the speech acts of the permanent 
members in regard to terrorism, proliferation and the Ebola outbreak of 2014, using 
the relevant verbatim records and resolutions as primary sources to identify the 
consistently employed narratives and the underpinning thresholds and triggers 






























Narratives, Thresholds and Triggers 
 
‘The Council appears to be adopting a practise whereby it is questionable whether its 




This chapter will examine the speech acts of the permanent members when 
securitising the subjects of terrorism, proliferation and the 2014 Ebola outbreak. It is 
at this point that securitisation theory has most utility, because through examination 
of these speech acts it will be possible to identify how the permanent members have 
constructed arguments to transfer objects to the security agenda. The following 
section will provide some additional clarity on the purpose and presentation of this 
chapter. Following this, those narratives that consistently appeared across the 
speech acts of the threats noted above will be analysed in the following order: 
magnitude; transnational scale; collective interest; insufficient response; and 
urgency.   
 
II. Purpose and Presentation of Data 
 
If climate change is to be brought within the umbrella of Chapter VII, the UNSC must 
find that it constitutes a threat to international peace and security under Article 39.2 
The connection between climate change and Article 39 has been analysed in the 
literature, with arguments based on harm, security and human wellbeing.3 These 
 
1 A Hood, ‘Ebola: A Threat to the Parameters of a Threat to the Peace?’ (2015) 16 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 29, 47. 
2 Chapter VII reflects the far-reaching powers of the UNSC that must be 
operationalised in the fight against climate change as per the argument in Chapter 
Two that highlighted the need for an exceptional response to this threat. 
3 S Cousins, ‘UN Security Council: Playing a Role in the International Climate Change 
Regime?’ (2013) 25 (2) Global Change, Peace and Security 191; C Penny, ‘Greening 
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arguments, although containing great validity have not yet been able to push climate 
change into the remit of Article 39. This is partly because they fail to engage the 
question of the permanent members, instead merely highlighting that any progress 
will have to have their acquiescence. It is here that this project seeks to intervene, 
not by defining what constitutes a threat to peace but by using securitisation theory 
to analyse concrete instances where Article 39 was activated, asking how this course 
of action was argued by the particular actors involved.4 
 
The question of how as opposed to what has the benefit of flexibility. By asking what 
a threat to peace is, attempt is being made to fit climate change into a rigid model 
reflective of an already established term, albeit one that fluctuates. By asking how an 
issue is justified as a threat to peace we are able to draw useful parallels that are 
applicable to climate change but do not require it to fit within an already cast shape. 
Recognising the severity of the threat and the pressing timeframe we have to 
respond, we must find out how the activation of Article 39 has been justified 
previously, in order to mobilise this knowledge in the context of climate change. The 
theory of securitisation provides a useful lens in which to approach this task. 
 
Chapter One established that the permanent members are going to be examined as 
the main securitising actors because of their position of control over the agenda of 
the UNSC. They are the gatekeepers of securitisation. The intention of this chapter is 
to find out how they have argued to securitise past international security threats. 
Specific verbatim records will be examined, through which the speech acts of the 
permanent members will be identified and analysed via an inductive reasoning 
method. Corresponding resolutions will feature where appropriate to showcase 
important parts of the arguments used to facilitate the securitisation of these issues. 
 
 
the Security Council: Climate Change as an Emerging Threat to International Peace 
and Security’ (2007) 7 International Environmental Agreements 35; S Scott, ‘Climate 
Change and Peak Oil as Threats to International Peace and Security: Is it Time for the 
Security Council to Legislate?’ (2008) 9 Melbourne Journal of International Law 495. 
4 For a full discussion on this point see Chapter One.  
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The narratives presented here were identified through the course of an inductive 
reasoning process and include magnitude; transnational scale; collective interest; 
insufficient response; and urgency. Analysis of the relevant security threats revealed 
that these markers are always given attention by the permanent members. Others 
do manifest but with less consistency, and so their value in understanding the core 
arguments leading to securitisation is limited, excluding them from the purview of 
this research. For example, a sixth narrative was being considered through the guise 
of ‘scope’, which was loosely interpreted to mean the wider impact of a threat. On 
terrorism and Ebola there was consideration of wider impacts through the societal 
implications present.5 In regard to proliferation no such considerations were offered, 
and so scope was not a consistently present narrative in the securitisation of the 
three international security threats, removing it from the final presentation here. 
 
When making arguments throughout this chapter, statements from the permanent 
members will be used to evidence the presence of narratives. At times each 
permanent member’s statement will feature on a particular point to showcase the 
different security logics being used to construct a narrative.6 At other times where 
they make the same point only one or two statements may be used as an example of 
the argument put forward. In either case, the permanent members will always have 
agreed with the statements of their counterparts or a veto would have been cast. 
Arguably, then, a statement made by one permanent member can be interpreted to 
reflect the agreement, or at least acquiescence, existing between them. Hence, it is 




5 UNSC Verbatim Record (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/PV/4370; UNSC Verbatim 
Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268. 
6 Chapter One set out the idea that there are consistent patterns in the way issues 
are constructed as threats, which Buzan et al. call the grammar or logic of security. B 
Buzan, O Waever, J de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1st edition, 
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 1998). 
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This idea to understand what prompts the securitisation of a threat has its origins in 
some earlier work on the UNSC. In 2005 Knight argued to develop a framework of 
intervention that could be used to determine the appropriateness and legality of 
using Chapter VII to protect the environment.7 Applying a number of criteria to 
environmental harm, Knight argued that the UNSC could be called upon to intervene 
when certain conditions arose.8 This idea was the antecedent for thinking about 
thresholds that when crossed could lead to intervention. Knight pulled her criteria 
from the In Larger Freedom Report, which means it was not crafted directly from the 
normative behaviour of the UNSC.9 It was unable to command the authority needed 
to convince the UNSC to securitise environmental harm. Despite this argument being 
rooted in pragmatism and legitimacy it has not been advanced any further. 
 
What securitisation theory does to circumvent this problem is situate those actors 
involved in the process as the central focus. Any knowledge gained comes directly 
from their practice, removing the need for externally sourced criteria as a way to 
argue for intervention. Securitisation theory helps us to navigate through the 
hegemony of the permanent members and understand Article 39 from a perspective 
stemming directly from their own political exigencies. Using securitisation theory 
advances Knight’s initial idea of an intervention criteria but reverses it, switching 
from the application of an external criteria to the UNSC, to generating an 
intervention argument from the internal practice of securitising actors. This thesis 
seeks to find out if there are consistent narratives underpinned by specific thresholds 
and triggers that lead the permanent members to securitise threats. This will allow 
the creation of an argument for UNSC involvement in matters not yet within its 
remit, like climate change.  
 
 
7 A Knight, ‘Global Environmental Threats: Can the Security Council Protect Our 
Earth?’ (2005) 80 (5) New York University Law Review 1549. 
8 Ibid., Knight’s criteria included: magnitude; causation; risk; proportionality; and the 
balancing of intervention against non-intervention. 
9 K Annan, ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for 
All’ (United Nations, 2005). 
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III. Narrative: Magnitude 
 
The first narrative to be examined by this project is magnitude. The meaning 
attached to this term is derived from the UNSC. Resolution 794 referred to the 
‘magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia’.10 Resolution 929 
held ‘the magnitude of the human crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and 
security in the region’.11 The UNSC uses the term magnitude to refer to the degree of 
harm taking place to human life. For the purposes of this thesis the term magnitude 
refers to the degree of harm caused to human life by a threat to peace. Two 
arguments will be proffered: first, there are two forms of magnitude, tangible and 
potential; second, triggers can be identified that underpin its use as a security 
narrative, but while holding importance they cannot be considered exclusively as the 
rationale for securitisation.    
 
Analysing the three international security threats revealed that magnitude was a 
consistent narrative used by the permanent members when arguing for 
securitisation. Resolutions 1368 and 2177 were adopted on the basis of visible 
casualties. In Verbatim Record 4370 every permanent member included a comment 
on the direct impact to the victims, their families and/or the American people, 
encapsulated by the UK expressing ‘heartfelt sympathy for the many bereaved and 
injured’.12 In regard to the Ebola outbreak, the UK said every day means ‘more Ebola 
deaths’;13 and France pointed out that ‘several thousand people have already died’.14 
In both instances the permanent members appreciated the magnitude of the threat 
despite not always being aware of the specific details. There was a reliance on the 
fact that lives had already been lost, providing a security logic that was easy to 
interpret as necessitating an exceptional response.  
 
 
10 UNSC Res 794 (3rd December 1992) UN Doc S/Res/794, Preamble para 3. 
11 UNSC Res 929 (22nd June 1994) UN Doc S/Res/929, Preamble para 10. 
12 UNSC Verbatim Record (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/PV/4370, 2. 
13 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 17. 
14 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 10. 
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Employing a narrative based on magnitude was not original to these threats and was 
present in the UNSC’s securitisation of humanitarian situations in the 1990s.15 It 
seems that when moving into the realm of international security the permanent 
members have done so with reference to a narrative used to justify past 
interventions. The securitisation of new issues is not always straightforward and so it 
is possible that this overlapping narrative of magnitude was intended to add a layer 
of legitimacy when moving international security to the UNSC’s agenda.16 Magnitude, 
based on the security logic of lives lost, is a narrative loaded with graphic imagery, 
giving it a certain amount of impact in the securitisation of an issue.17 Its use here is 
therefore unsurprising.  
 
The more curious discovery is that magnitude can manifest potentially through the 
hypothetical existence of a threat. An isolated reading of Resolution 1540 and 
Verbatim Record 4956 indicates the threat was hypothetical, as opposed to 
Resolutions 1368 and 2177 that were based on actual threats. This finding is not 
always recognised and Heupel disagrees that Resolution 1540 is constructed on a 
hypothetical threat, basing her argument on the discovery of the A Q Khan 
proliferation network in 2003.18 Khan operated an international network for some 
years, distributing sensitive materials to state and non-state actors.19 It was not until 
the ship BBC China was interdicted on route to Libya that the network was 
 
15 L Fielding, ‘Taking a Closer Look at Threats to Peace: The Power of the Security 
Council to Address Humanitarian Crises’ (1996) 73 University of Detroit Mercy Law 
Review 551. 
16 K Peters, ‘Disasters, climate change and securitisation: the United Nations Security 
Council and the United Kingdom’s Security Policy’ (2018) 42 Disasters 196. 
17 Going back to early UNSC interventions, it has been able to draw on magnitude as 
a way to justify the securitisation of an issue. See Chapter Three for evidence of this 
in regard to the South Africa Question, UNSC Res 418 (4th November 1977) UN Doc 
S/Res/418.  
18 M Heupel, ‘Combining Hierarchical and Soft Modes of Governance: The UN 
Security Council’s Approach to Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Proliferation after 9/11’ (2008) 43 Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic 
International Studies Association 7. 
19 J Russell, ‘Peering into the Abyss’ (2006) 13 Non-Proliferation Review 645. 
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uncovered and the Libyan regime decided to expose Khan’s operation.20 In the wake 
of this discovery the USA began to push a policy of response culminating in 
Resolution 1540.21 However, nowhere in Resolution 1540 or Verbatim Record 4956 is 
there reference to Khan’s network or any specific proliferation activities. Instead, it 
was grounded in the hypothetical combination of proliferation and the involvement 
of terrorist organisations.22  
 
The lack of factual grounding present within Resolution 1540 did not stop the 
permanent members developing a logic of security based on potential magnitude. 
The UK and USA both used the word ‘deadly’ to describe the proliferation threat;23 
and the UK further indicated that the resolution ‘will reduce the risk of any future 
tragedy’.24 France and Russia used the words ‘danger’ and ‘crucial’, which link to the 
severity of the threat that could be interpreted to mean magnitude.25 These 
adjectives indicate an awareness that proliferation would result in severe adverse 
effects on human life. This connection is not uncommon, and the literature 
frequently identifies a risk to human life from proliferation.26 Others linking 
proliferation and terrorism also rely heavily on the risk of harm to human life.27 The 
 
20 B Kellman, ‘Criminalization and the Control of WMD Proliferation: The Security 
Council Acts’ (2004) 11 The Non-Proliferation Review 142. 
21 M Asada, ‘Security Council Resolution 1540 to Combat WMD Terrorism: 
Effectiveness and Legitimacy in International Legislation’ (2008) 13 Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law 303. 
22 France encapsulated this by stating in ‘an era of widespread terrorism, it 
[proliferation] increases the risk of seeing them [WMDs] fall into the hands of the 
most dangerous’, and China talked about the need to ‘prevent the further 
proliferation of such weapons’, UNSC Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc 
S/PV/4956, 2, 6. 
23 UNSC Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/PV/4956, 6, 7. 
24 Ibid., 8. 
25 Ibid., 2, 6.  
26 M Shulman, ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative as a New Paradigm for Peace and 
Security’ (Strategic Securities Institute, 2006) 7. 
27 J Yoo, G Sulmasy, ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Model for International 
Cooperation’ (2006) 35 Hofstra Law Review 405; E Rosand, ‘Combating WMD 
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permanent members employed a security logic drawn from the general mood of 
caution surrounding these weapons.28 This strengthened their argument for 
securitisation by drawing on well-supported lines of reasoning that were hard to 
refute.  
 
The similarity in the adjectives used also creates a uniformity in the logic of security 
employed by the permanent members. They were agreed on the justifications 
required to securitise proliferation, despite a lack of evidence to substantiate this 
argument. This reflects the finding in the securitisation literature that threats do not 
always require a factual grounding to be securitised,29 suggesting the permanent 
members are able to act in a similar fashion to securitising actors operating in other 
contexts. This logic, based on hypothetical harm, indicates a transition from reaction 
to pre-emption on the part of the permanent members where proliferation is 
concerned.  
 
Evidence of this transition to a pre-emptive stance is also present in regard to 
terrorism and Ebola, but in a much less noticeable fashion because of the tangible 
magnitudes that command a more central position. Resolution 1368 pointed to the 
prevention of future attacks, with a thematic interpretation of the threat percolating 
through the verbatim record. The UK opined that ‘mass terrorism is the new evil in 
our world today, perpetrated by fanatics who are utterly indifferent to the sanctity of 
human life’; China said that terrorism ‘causes tremendous losses to the lives and 
property of innocent civilians’ and is a ‘serious potential danger to international 
peace and security’; and Russia called terrorism a ‘plague of the twenty-first 
 
Terrorism: The Short-Sighted US-led Multilateral Approach’ (2009) 44 The 
International Spectator 81. 
28 The G8 Statement of 2005 determined ‘to prevent the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction to terrorists and other criminals’, G8 Statement on Counter Terrorism, 
Gleneagles 2005, Para 2; the More Secure World Report also made similar overtures, 
UNGA Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ‘A 
more secure world: Our shared responsibility’ (2nd Dec 2004) A/59/565. 
29 F Ciuta, ‘Security and the Problem of Context: a Hermeneutical Critique of 
Securitisation Theory’ (2009) 35 Review of International Studies 301. 
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century’.30 This language casts terrorism as something that will continue to manifest 
unless a response is forthcoming. Use of the words ‘fanatics’, ‘potential’ and ‘plague’ 
all create connotations of something that must be dealt with pre-emptively or will 
continue to manifest. Linking terrorism to human life, innocent civilians and human 
health also created a sense of severity and reinforced that it must be addressed pre-
emptively. It appears the permanent members adopted their positions based, also, 
on the possibility of future lives being lost to terrorism. 
 
Turning to Ebola, the permanent members expressed an appreciation of potential 
magnitude through their recognition that the virus would continue to exacerbate. 
The USA held that ‘We have all been alarmed by the models of the Ebola trajectory 
that we have seen – models in which infections rise in steep, terrifying curves’.31 
France said there was a ‘possibility of tens or even hundreds of thousands of more 
deaths in the future’.32 The UK stated that ‘Ebola will kill many thousands more’.33 It 
is clear to see the permanent members can move beyond tangible to potential 
magnitude. This consistent focus on the possibility of future lives being lost allows 
the assertion that potential magnitude assumes a consistent degree of importance 
within the securitising arguments of the permanent members. The difficulty lies in 
how tangible and potential magnitudes can be analysed to identify a threshold, and 
whether or not a relationship between the two varieties of magnitude exists. 
 
With regard to Resolutions 1368 and 2177 it is possible to identify a numerical 
threshold where magnitude is concerned. The September 11th attacks claimed 2,996 
lives, although at the time of adopting Resolution 1368 this figure was unknown to 
the permanent members.34 Still, US President Bush had the previous night indicated 
that thousands of lives had been lost, and this was somewhat evident through the 
 
30 UNSC Verbatim Record (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/PV/4370, 2, 5, 5. 
31 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 9. 
32 Ibid., 10. 
33 Ibid., 18. 
34 Anonymous, ‘9/11 Attacks’ (The History, 27th August 2018) <https://www.history 
.com/topics/21st-century/9-11-attacks#section_6> accessed 10th September 2018. 
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extent of the attack.35 At the time of passing Resolution 2177 the permanent 
members were told that 2,500 deaths had already occurred as a result of the Ebola 
outbreak.36 These comparable figures allow the claim that a loss of life reaching into 
the thousands may represent the crossing of a threshold. This suggests the 
magnitude of a threat has to be numerically high to prompt the permanent members 
to begin securitisation, adding a significant amount of importance to this threshold. 
 
When we compare Resolutions 1368 and 2177 with past instances of terrorism and 
Ebola that were not successfully securitised, the claim that a high magnitude is 
important becomes further strengthened. Resolution 1269 was loosely preceded by 
the Moscow bomb of September 1999 where over 200 people were killed.37 The 
1998 bombing of the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania underscored the adoption 
of Resolution 1189 and saw 213 deaths in Nairobi,38 and 11 deaths in Dar es 
Salaam.39 The 1988 Lockerbie bombing killed 270 people and drew the UNSC into the 
 
35 The White House, ‘Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation’ (The 
White House Archives, 11th of September 2001) <https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html> accessed 29th 
August 2018. 
36 By the end of its cycle Ebola had infected 28,610 people and killed 11,308: CDC, 
‘Years of Ebola Virus Disease Outbreaks: 40 Years of Ebola Virus Disease Around the 
World’ (CDC, 2019) <https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/chronology.html> 
accessed 10th May 2019. 
37 Russia acted as the sponsor for Resolution 1269 and during the 4053rd meeting 
preceding its adoption, the Russian representative referenced the ‘recent terrorist 
acts in Russia’, UNSC Verbatim Record (19th October 1999) UN Doc S/PV/4053, 13; 
Anonymous, ‘Timeline of Russian terror attacks’ The Guardian (London, 24th January 
2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/24/russian-terror-attacks-
timeline> accessed 29th March 2019. 
38 W J Crowe et al., ‘Report of the Accountability Review Boards, Bombings of the 
U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7th, 1998’ 
(U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., 1998) <https://fas.org/irp/threat/ 
arb/board_nairobi.html> accessed 21st March 2019. 
39 Ibid. 
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matter albeit via the non-compliance of Libya and not terrorism specifically.40 Since 
the discovery of Ebola in 1976 there have been various outbreaks.41 In 1976 Zaire 
experienced 250 deaths; in 1995 a DRC outbreak exhibited 250 deaths; the Ugandan 
outbreak of 2000 caused 224 deaths.42 Resolutions 1368 and 2177 were underpinned 
by a magnitude not previously seen in regard to each threat. Furthermore, where 
Ebola was concerned its incremental progression throughout 2014 supports the 
claim that magnitude was crucial, and only when a certain number of deaths were 
confirmed did the permanent members see the need to securitise it.43  
 
In regard to Ebola, magnitude cannot be the only reason for securitisation. Under the 
category of infectious diseases, in which Ebola is classed, the WHO lists influenza and 
cholera. Influenza manifests in around 290,000 to 650,000 deaths per annum.44 
Cholera results in an estimated number of deaths between 21,000 and 143,000 per 
annum.45 From this comparison it is clear the 2014 Ebola outbreak is not distinctive 
in terms of magnitude. The permanent members were not motivated to securitise 
Ebola on this basis alone or they would be doing so in regard to at least influenza and 
cholera, not to mention a host of other health crises, like HIV that has managed to 
get the UNSC’s attention, albeit outside the remit of Article 39.46 Even if we accept 
 
40 M Plachta, ‘The Lockerbie Case: The Role of the Security Council in Enforcing the 
Principle Aut Dedere Aut Judicare’ (2001) 12 EJIL 125. 
41 CDC, ‘Years of Ebola Virus Disease Outbreaks: 40 Years of Ebola Virus Disease 
Around the World’ (CDC, 2019) 
<https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/chronology.html> accessed 10th May 2019. 
42 Ibid. 
43 CDC, ‘2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa Epidemic Curves’ (CDC 2019) 
<https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/2014-2016-outbreak/cumulative-cases-
graphs.html> last accessed 22nd July 2019. 
44 WHO, ‘Influenza (Seasonal) Ask the Expert: Influenza Q&A’ (WHO, 6th November 
2018) <https://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/influenza-
(seasonal)> accessed 19th April 2019. 
45 WHO, ‘Cholera: Key Facts’ (WHO, 17th January 2019) 
<https://www.who.int/en/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/cholera> accessed 16th 
May 2019. 
46 HIV is not an infectious disease by classification, but it is a globally spanning virus 
that in 2017 36.9 million people were living with, and 940,000 people had died from. 
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that tangible magnitude is important, it cannot be the only threshold crossed that 
provokes the activation of Article 39, and so the possibility of several factors 
triggering securitisation is given empirical support.  
 
Also, by considering the finding above that potential magnitude was consistently 
present in the rationales of the permanent members the value of tangible magnitude 
might appear to diminish further. It becomes unclear as to whether the permanent 
members were responding to the tangible magnitude present, or the potential 
magnitude that may follow if intervention was not forthcoming. Moreover, 
Resolution 1540 showcases that the permanent members are prepared to rely on 
potential magnitude alone, again offering a line of reasoning to devalue tangible 
magnitude as a motivation for securitisation.  
 
At first glance this might appear to undermine the significance of the tangible 
magnitudes in relation to Resolutions 1368 and 2177. However, returning to the 
historic instances of terrorism and Ebola, it is possible to find an argument that 
supports the importance of tangible magnitude. In both threats the magnitude was 
low, at least comparatively to the interventions through Resolutions 1368 and 2177, 
meaning the perceived potential magnitude was also low, allowing the permanent 
members to avoid the activation of Article 39. When these magnitudes increased so 
did the potential of future magnitudes. Therefore, the tangible magnitudes feed 
clearly into the perception of potential magnitudes, and so the former remains 
crucial in leading the decision-making of the permanent members to securitise a 
threat. 
 
If this is correct it casts Resolution 1540 as an outlier because it lacks a tangible 
magnitude. A possible explanation lies in the nature of the threat.47 Proliferation and 
 
WHO, ‘Global Health Observatory (GHO) Data: HIV/AIDS’ (WHO 2019) 
<https://www.who.int/gho/hiv/en/> accessed 23rd May 2019. 
47 D Joyner, ‘Non-proliferation Law and the United Nations System: Resolution 1540 
and the Limits of the Power of the Security Council’ (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 489. 
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the use of WMDs has since the creation of such devices been considered a global 
problem of dire ramifications.48 Evidence of this can be found as early as 1968 where 
Resolution 255 was adopted to provide direct support to the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty.49 This was again reflected in 1992 where proliferation was characterised as a 
crucial global concern,50 indicating that a consistent logic of security existed on the 
subject of WMDs over a prolonged period of time, likely making it easier for the 
permanent members to identify and adopt this narrative at the point of Resolution 
1540. Thus, the logic of routine in regard to the speech act, probably helps to build 
consensus among the permanent members, allowing them to act decisively when the 
time comes for an exceptional intervention. 
 
Contrary to this both terrorism and Ebola have historically been considered 
problematic but not on the same scale, demonstrated again through the past 
magnitudes associated with them.51 Moreover, terrorism has divided opinion, 
confirmed by the long-standing debates over how to assign a definition to the 
 
48 L Scheinman, ‘Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in a Changing World 
Order’ (1992) 23 Security Dialogue 37; D Joyner, ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative: 
Non-proliferation, Counter-proliferation, and International Law’ (2005) 30 Yale 
Journal of International Law 507. 
49 UNSC Res 255 (19th June 1968) UN Doc S/Res/255. 
50 India stated, ‘We fully share the concerns expressed by several leaders on the 
threat posed to international peace and security by the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons;’ Zimbabwe referred to the ‘growing menace from the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction’ and the President of the Council declared the 
‘proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security’, UNSC Verbatim Record (31st January 1992) UN Doc S/PV/3046, 
99, 127, 145. 
51 J Kinsman, ‘“A Time for Fear”: Local, National and International Responses to a 
Large Ebola Outbreak in Uganda’ (2012) 8 Globalisation and Health 
<https://globalizationandhealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1744-8603-8-
15> accessed 31st July 2019.  
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term;52 and health as a concern for the UNSC has also been the subject of dispute.53 
Proliferation is distinct from terrorism and Ebola in terms of the historic unity 
attached to it. For the permanent members to contemplate the activation of Article 
39, only in very rare instances will a lack of tangible magnitude be acceptable. The 
proliferation of WMDs reflects one of these rare instances and the permanent 
members understand very well that such weapons are not to be used because of 
their catastrophic effects.54 In more ordinary instances an example of the threat 
posed must be evident and where magnitude is concerned thousands of lives must 
be affected if this narrative is to be employed. The use of security logics based on 
harm already caused holds an important place in creating unity among the 
permanent members and cannot be overlooked when looking to find a way to argue 
the securitisation of climate change. 
 
IV. Narrative: Transnational Scale  
 
The second narrative to be analysed is transnational scale. The word transnational 
refers to something taking place or having an effect in more than one state.55 Russell 
referred to ‘transnational corporations’,56 and McInnes discussed ‘transnational 
interactions’, indicating the word can be applied in varying contexts.57 The word scale 
is used to portray the extent of something.58 Exemplifying this, Wellens discussed 
 
52 B Ganor, ‘Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom 
Fighter’ (2002) 3 Police Practise and Research 287. 
53 C McInnes, A Roemer-Mahler, ‘From Security to Risk: Reframing Global Health 
Threats’ (2017) 93 International Affairs 1313. 
54 The fact that both the USA and Russia avoided the use of such weapons during the 
Cold War evidences their reluctance to open the door to this type of conflict. 
55 Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (adopted 15th November 2000, 
entered into force 29th September 2003) UNTS 2225, 209, Article 3(2). 
56 J Russell, ‘Peering into the Abyss’ (2006) 13 Non-Proliferation Review 645, 646. 
57 C McInnes, ‘WHO’s Next? Changing Authority in Global Health Governance After 
Ebola’ (2015) 91 International Affairs 1299, 1310 . 
58 This broadly aligns with the Oxford Dictionary definition of the term. 
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human rights abuse referring to ‘large-scale violations’,59 and Knight referred to 
‘regional or global scale’ harm.60 These two words (transnational, scale) have 
independent application, but they are combined here to refer to the extent a threat 
exists transnationally.61 Two arguments will be proffered: first, transnational scale 
consistently appears across each threat but the manner and importance attached to 
it varies; second, there exists a correlation between transnational scale and 
magnitude that impacts the significance of this narrative as a justification for 
securitisation.  
 
In each international security threat, the permanent members reference 
transnational scale. In Verbatim Record 4370 Russia said terrorism ‘transcends 
national borders’.62 Discussing proliferation the USA pointed to the use of ‘any route 
or channel’ open to proliferators across ‘a variety of countries’.63 On Ebola, Russia 
referenced the challenge facing ‘States in the region’.64 This consistent appreciation 
provides a base level of importance to transnational scale, meaning it might act as a 
prerequisite for securitisation by ensuring that Article 2(7) of the Charter is not 
infringed.65 Any argument seeking to securitise an international security threat 
within the meaning of Article 39 will have to exhibit a transnational scale. Beyond 
this base level acknowledgement, the permanent members are relatively free in how 
they interpret transnational scale. This has led to each international security threat 
exhibiting different qualities, and so a like for like comparison is largely unhelpful in 
revealing consistently applied thresholds or triggers that underpin this narrative. 
 
 
59 K Wellens, ‘The UN Security Council and New Threats to the Peace: Back to the 
Future’ (2003) 8 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 15, 59. 
60 A Knight, ‘Global Environmental Threats: Can the Security Council Protect Our 
Earth?’ (2005) 80 (5) New York University Law Review 1549, 1553. 
61 The nature of some threats allows them to increase in scale and as a consequence 
become transnational. Examples include the 2014 Ebola outbreak or HIV. 
62 UNSC Verbatim Record (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/PV/4370, 5. 
63 UNSC Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/PV/4956, 5. 
64 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 12. 
65 Article 2(7) protects the domestic jurisdiction of states from UN interference. 
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International terrorism divides the permanent members where transnational scale is 
concerned. The UK referred to it as a ‘global issue’.66 China and Russia used the 
phrase ‘international terrorism’, and France called for a ‘global strategy’.67 The USA 
referred to a ‘war against terrorism’ and highlighted that no distinction would be 
made ‘between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbour 
them’, broadly alluding to the crossing of international frontiers.68 One point of unity 
does emerge because the permanent members are all uninterested in specific border 
crossings. However, these statements provide only a vague impression that the 
threat was transnational, and the language choices suggest diverging interpretations. 
The varying logics of security employed show that the permanent members were 
able to view the threat according to their individual perspectives. Yet, this did not 
cause disagreement and the broad link between these submissions was enough to 
secure unity behind this narrative. Or it might be the case that transnational scale is 
only able to assume a very low level of importance to their securitisation arguments 
and so a more definitive unity was not required.  
 
The literature often disagrees with this finding. For instance, Wellens when 
discussing terrorism suggests that ‘it is the international character of the acts, which 
bestow upon them the qualification of being a threat’.69 Unfortunately what this 
means remains vague and Wellens fails to clarify how he interprets the word 
international in this context. It might be argued that a semantic difference exists 
between the words international and transnational, with the latter referring more 
clearly to the crossing of borders and the former pointing to a threat existing at the 
interstate level. In either case there is a lack of clarification by the permanent 
members and a distinct absence of precision in their decision making, invalidating 
Wellens’ point that an international character is crucial.  
 
 
66 UNSC Verbatim Record (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/PV/4370, 3. 
67 Ibid., 7. 
68 UNSC Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/PV/4956, 7. 
69 K Wellens, ‘The UN Security Council and New Threats to the Peace: Back to the 
Future’ (2003) 8 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 15, 42. 
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Others also place undue emphasis on the transnational scale of terrorism. Cortright 
refers to Al-Qaeda’s nature as spread across sixty states, tacitly implying the UNSC’s 
intervention was based on this transnational scale.70 Heupel also focusses explicitly 
on the transnational scale of terrorism and how the UNSC has gradually adapted its 
response accordingly.71 Cortright and Heupel overlook that Resolution 1368 was the 
precursor to Resolution 1373 upon which they found their arguments, with the 
former adopted absent the same level of information available. There is no doubt 
that Resolution 1373 is hugely important, but without this earlier intervention it is 
possible no such follow up would have occurred. We have to concentrate on 
Resolution 1368 as the original point where terrorism was securitised, within which 
there is a general lack of focus on a specific transnational scale, reducing its level of 
importance as a securitisation narrative. Securitisation may not need to rely on the 
finding of an international character, but for the presence of Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter.  
 
Where proliferation is concerned there is a broad-stroke approach to identifying a 
transnational scale, and again there is a lack of precision to substantiate this point. 
France pointed to the ‘emergence of trafficking networks’ but offered no observation 
as to the size or number of these networks or even evidence that they existed, let 
alone transnationally.72 The USA referred to the ‘flow of these deadly weapons and 
materials’ but did not offer any accuracy as to how significant or where this flow was 
taking place.73 Russia pointed to the ‘black market’, merely alluding to a scale that 
may or may not be transnational.74 The permanent members are content to accept 
 
70 D Cortright, ‘Can the UN Battle Terrorism Effectively?’ (2005) 133 (2716) USA 
Today 62. 
71 M Heupel, ‘Adapting to Transnational Terrorism: The UN Security Council’s 
Evolving Approach to Terrorism’ (2007) 38 Security Dialogue 477. 
72 UNSC Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/PV/4956, 2. 
73 Ibid., 5. 
74 Ibid., 6. 
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one another’s vague assertions of a transnational problem,75 but in terms of 
identifying the scale to which this was taking place there is a lack of detail provided.  
 
Returning to the idea that the discovery of the Khan network in 2003 was a stimulus 
for Resolution 1540,76 Albright and Hinterstein provide some level of clarity as to the 
transnational extent of this network, finding that it lasted for at least two decades 
and interacted with at least three states.77 This raises the question, why did the 
permanent members avoid resorting to this example of a proliferation network to 
support their arguments? It could be contended that they wanted a forward-looking 
resolution to tackle future proliferation, and this makes sense given the tone of 
Resolution 1540.78 Yet, there is no reason why the Khan network could not have 
exemplified the transnational scale of the problem and substantiated with evidence 
the possibility of non-state actor involvement.79 This decision to avoid validating 
Resolution 1540 with evidence of a transnational scale indicates again that it might 
not have been a crucial security logic for the permanent members. Combined with 
the varied interpretations provided, it is again plausible that transnational scale is 




75 France referred to ‘joint action’, the USA pointed to ‘strong export controls’ and 
China spoke of the ‘international non-proliferation process’, all alluding to the need 
for state-level cooperation because of the transnational character of the threat, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/PV/4956, 2, 5, 6. 
76 M Heupel, ‘Surmounting the Obstacles to Implementing UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540’ (2008) 15 Non-Proliferation Review 95. 
77 D Albright, C Hinderstein, ‘Unravelling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation 
Networks’ (2005) 28 Washington Quarterly 109. 
78 Within Resolution 1540 the operative paragraphs make clear the emphasis on 
transnational character, UNSC Res 1540 (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/Res/1540, 
Operative para 3(c). 
79 Russell finds that globalization and non-state actors are overlapping subjects. With 
the permanent members focussing on the latter it could be argued they were hinting 
at the transnational scale of the problem, but this is conjecture lacking supportive 
evidence. J Russell, ‘Peering into the Abyss’ (2006) 13 Non-Proliferation Review 645. 
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Unlike the previous two threats, Resolution 2177 was based on a discrete scenario 
and subject to an extremely high level of evidentiary clarity. The outbreak was 
predominantly restricted to West Africa and the USA noted that the ‘virus jumped 
across borders’, with China echoing that ‘Diseases do not heed national borders’.80 
Furthermore, all permanent members focussed on the spread of the virus through 
Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone. The transnational scale was identified restrictively, 
only involving three frontiers.81 These border crossings were the product of the 
manner in which the disease spread, leading Wilson to refer to the transnational 
scale as a ‘spill-over effect’.82 The outbreak became transnational as a result of an 
increasing domestic spread that allowed it to reach and extend beyond borders. This 
shows a transnational scale does not have to be linked to a globally recurring 
problem as in the case of terrorism or proliferation. Instead the transnational scale 
can be limited to a regional existence involving very few states, signifying a relatively 
low threshold may exist where this narrative is concerned.  
 
The level of attention paid to transnational scale in the Ebola situation might at first 
glance appear to increase its level of importance as a narrative for securitisation. 
However, the timing of Resolution 2177 undermines the significance of transnational 
scale on the basis that if the permanent members were concerned by the virus 
crossing borders they would have intervened much earlier in 2014.83 The fact they 
did not indicates that something other than the transnational scale motivated their 
decision to intervene. As the magnitude of the outbreak evolved throughout 2014 it 
makes sense that this logic assumed greater significance in their process of 
 
80 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 8, 15. 
81 Focus rested on Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, but reference was made to 
‘Nigeria and beyond’, UNSC Res 2177 (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/Res/2177, 
Preamble para 3. 
82 G Wilson, ‘Collective Security, “Threats to the Peace”, and the Ebola Outbreak’ 
(2015) 6 Journal of the Philosophy of International Law 1, 13. 
83 WHO, ‘Statement on the 1st Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee on the 2014 
Ebola Outbreak in West Africa’ (Media Centre, WHO Statement, 8th August 2014) 
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/> 
accessed 17th July 2019. 
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reasoning. This validates Wilson’s argument that state security lost ground to human 
security because only once a certain impact on humanity was recorded, irrespective 
of borders being crossed, did the permanent members intervene.84 Even though this 
detailed attention contrasts Resolutions 1368 and 1540, the level of importance 
placed on the transnational scale is similarly narrow, adding further weight to the 
possibility that its role as a securitising narrative is limited. 
 
What then can we learn from the transnational scale of the three international 
security threats? We know there is a level of importance attached to this marker 
because the permanent members consistently allude to it. The manner in which they 
seek to substantiate the existence of a transnational scale indicates that it does not 
occupy a routinely high level of importance. Even in the Ebola example where there 
was a much greater focus on the precise nature of the transnational scale it was 
found that the timing of Resolution 2177 undermined its significance in comparison 
to other markers like magnitude. We also know that the manner of the transnational 
scale varies significantly, and this undermines the possibility of any definitive 
thresholds being identified to underpin the consistent use of security logics. 
However, as the following paragraphs will detail, if we consider transnational scale in 
correlation to the magnitude of a threat an interesting pattern emerges that helps to 
explain how this narrative retains importance in the securitisation process.   
 
Creating a spectrum of magnitude going from low to high, it appears that the 
transnational scale associated with the threat adopts a reverse correlation. In other 
words, a higher magnitude will result in transnational scale assuming a lower priority 
to the permanent members. At the high end of the magnitude spectrum sits the 
proliferation threat. Corresponding to this, the level of attention paid to 
transnational scale was minimal. The permanent members did point out broad-
stroke characteristics of the proliferation threat that linked to transnational scale, 
but they remained vague in their portrayal of this aspect, refusing to acknowledge 
 
84 G Wilson, ‘Collective Security, “Threats to the Peace”, and the Ebola Outbreak’ 
(2015) 6 Journal of the Philosophy of International Law 1. 
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any prior examples that might have exemplified it. The fact a possible example of 
transnational scale was available but ignored suggests it was not a crucial security 
logic in the decision to activate Article 39 and took on less significance than the 
perceived magnitude of the threat. 
 
Moving to terrorism, the correlation between transnational scale and magnitude 
again appears to favour the latter, with all of the permanent members making 
overtures towards the lives lost and harm caused. Conversely, the effort made to 
substantiate a transnational scale was questionable. Russia and China point to 
‘international terrorism’ offering no indication of what this actually pertained to.85 
China also highlighted that the assault was isolated to the USA pointing out the 
location of the ‘terrorist attacks against New York, Washington, D.C., and 
Pennsylvania’, which might be read to undermine any arguments of a transnational 
scale.86 The UK and France remained vague, pointing to the global nature of the 
problem and the need for a response equal to this. The lack of cohesion on 
transnational scale was unnecessary because the high magnitude of the attacks had 
already generated ‘solidarity’ among the permanent members, leading their decision 
to activate Article 39.87 
 
Where Resolution 1368 is concerned a complication arises because the focus of the 
text is not exclusively on the facts of September 11th. Instead the permanent 
members chose to give a thematic existence to the threat of terrorism. The UK said 
‘mass terrorism is the new evil in our world today’ and Russia referred to terrorism 
as a ‘plague of the twenty-first century’.88 By introducing the September 11th attacks 
as within the broader threat of terrorism the transnational scale of the problem was 
given a much greater existence, which might challenge the idea that scale and 
magnitude negatively correlate. Evidence of this thematic transnational scale was 
absent from the verbatim record; however, research does indicate that instances of 
 
85 UNSC Verbatim Record (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/PV/4370, 5. 
86 Ibid., 5. 
87 Ibid., 5. 
88 Ibid., 2, 5. 
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terrorism were on the rise. The number of terror attacks taking place around the 
globe each year between 1995 and 2001 was greater than the typical number of 
annual attacks that took place between 1961 and 1994.89 Further exemplifying this 
point, in 1989 only three global terror attacks took place but in 1999 this figure had 
increased to twelve.90   
 
Viewing terrorism thematically, the transnational scale of the threat was increasing, 
and this could lead to the conclusion that it was able to gain some ground on 
magnitude as a security logic. Looking deeper, these instances actually support the 
position of magnitude over transnational scale on the basis that an increasing 
number of transnational attacks were unable to provoke securitisation. They indicate 
that something was different about the September 11th attacks, which was their 
magnitude. Although the relationship between transnational scale and magnitude is 
not as one-sided where terrorism is concerned, the latter remained a more 
important security logic. This means the correlation between magnitude and 
transnational scale sits somewhere closer to the middle of the spectrum but still 
leans towards the magnitude end. 
 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Ebola virus does not exhibit a high level of 
magnitude inherent within its nature.91 For the magnitude of the virus to be high the 
scale of the outbreak must be commensurate. Historic outbreaks of Ebola were 
confined to rural regions with a limited capacity to spread, exhibiting a subsequently 
 
89 U.S. Department of State, ‘Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief 
Chronology’ (U.S. Department of State, Archives, January 2001 – January 2009) 
<https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm> accessed 28th March 
2019. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ebola is transmitted between humans and its magnitude is directly linked to its 
ability to spread, which has historically been limited. C Enemark, ‘Ebola, Disease-
Control, and the Security Council: From Securitisation to Securing Circulation’ (2017) 
2 Journal of Global Security Studies 137. 
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low domestic scale and a correspondingly low magnitude.92 In converse to this the 
2014 outbreak saw the virus spread further than ever previously documented taking 
it beyond borders,93 encapsulated by the USA that pointed to the ‘spread across 
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone’.94 Without this ‘unprecedented scale’ the 
magnitude of the outbreak would not have been so high.95 Had the outbreak not 
become transnational the magnitude would have been much less and it is possible 
intervention would not have taken place when it did and this might explain why 
there was much more focus on the transnational scale in this instance.96 In contrast 
to proliferation the transnational scale of the outbreak was the more important 
metric for judging the level of the threat. The lower the magnitude of a threat the 
more important the transnational scale becomes to justify securitisation.  
 
Despite a base level of importance to this threshold marker, the level of attention it 
receives can vary. There is no doubt that the securitisation of an international 
security threat will rely on transnational scale to some extent. However, it must 
always be analysed in the context of other narratives to determine the value 
attached to it by the permanent members when making their securitisation 
arguments. It is an important narrative, but only to the extent that it creates a broad 
unity among the permanent members, from which they can rely on their own 
security logics to make arguments for securitisation.  
 
V. Narrative: Collective Interest 
 
92 CDC, ‘Years of Ebola Virus Disease Outbreaks: 40 Years of Ebola Virus Disease 
Around the World’ (CDC, 2019) 
<https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/history/chronology.html> accessed 10th May 2019. 
93 D Fidler, ‘Epic Failure of Ebola and Global Health Security’ (2015) 21 Brown Journal 
of World Affairs 179. 
94 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 8. 
95 Ibid., 10. 
96 To exemplify this point consider that the DRC Ebola outbreak of 2018 is largely 
confined to one state and the UNSC has yet to intervene despite an exacerbating 
magnitude, WHO, ‘Ebola Virus Disease Democratic Republic of the Congo: External 
Situation Report 1’ (WHO, 11th May 2018). 
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The third narrative to be examined by this project is collective interest. The meaning 
behind this term comes from the submissions made before the UNSC in the 1992 
heads of state meeting.97 China said that it was ‘ready to cooperate with all the other 
members of the Security Council, to discuss issues of common interest to the 
international community’.98 The UK held some threats require ‘the collective 
response of the international community’.99 Applying these statements here, the 
collective interest narrative refers to matters that are common to all states and so it 
is in their interests to respond together. Two arguments will be submitted: first, 
collective interest consistently manifests as a security logic within the three 
international security threats assuming a significant level of importance despite 
varying degrees of existence; second, collective interest concerns must manifest 
indiscriminately, demanding universal responses. 
 
Across each of the three international security threats collective interest consistently 
manifests as a security logic of the permanent members. With regard to terrorism 
the UK stated that it ‘was an attack on the whole of modern civilisation’, and Russia 
said ‘It is a brazen challenge to all of humankind’.100 Addressing proliferation France 
said international initiatives in this area were ‘essential for the security of all 
states’,101 and the USA said ‘no one nation can meet this challenge alone’.102 
Speaking on Ebola, China held the outbreak was ‘threatening the security of 
international public health’.103 The Ebola outbreak is the least prominent example of 
the permanent members advancing the idea of collective interest, yet it still assumes 
a place in their overall securitisation arguments. The question becomes, what 
 
97 UNSC Verbatim Record (31st January 1992) UN Doc S/PV/3046. 
98 Ibid., 94. 
99 Ibid., 147 – The President was referring directly in this sentence to economic and 
social development, but just a few pages prior had highlighted acts of terrorism as 
something for the ‘international community to deal effectively with’, Ibid., 144. 
100 UNSC Verbatim Record (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/PV/4370, 3, 5. 
101 UNSC Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/PV/4956, 2. 
102 Ibid., 6. 
103 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 8, 15. 
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allowed these threats to generate a sense of collective interest and was there a 
threshold or trigger present? 
 
Terrorism was portrayed as against humanity and advanced as a thematic problem, 
linking all instances under one banner. Despite Russia saying that the September 11th 
attack ‘transcends national borders’, it in fact did not and a thematic character was 
the only way to circumvent the reality that it was limited to one state.104 Portraying 
terrorism as a thematic problem France offered that ‘most of our countries have 
suffered’ its effects, indicating through use of the word ‘most’ that the collective 
interest was not universal but merely widespread.105 This leads to the indication that 
Resolution 1368 was not adopted on the basis that all states were experiencing 
insecurity as a result of terrorism, simply that some states had experienced terror-
related insecurity.106 The threshold for collective interest may not have to be 
universal to become a security logic. 
 
While this argument probably helped to convince the wider UNSC membership of the 
need to support the resolution, its strength to sway the permanent members absent 
the magnitude of the September 11th attacks was limited. In Verbatim Record 4053 
preceding Resolution 1269 where Article 39 was not activated, the USA said ‘All of us 
have a stake in this fight’; the UK argued terrorism was a ‘threat to the wider peace 
and security of the international system’; and China stated that ‘international 
terrorist activities have become increasingly rampant’.107 The difference between 
Resolutions 1269 and 1368 was the support the latter was able to get from the 
magnitude of the attacks. The collective interest argument thus appears reliant on 
the support of other threshold markers to achieve the activation of Article 39, 




104 UNSC Verbatim Record (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/PV/4370, 5. 
105 Ibid., 7. 
106 A point given validity by the fact the USA was one such state. 
107 UNSC Verbatim Record (19th October 1999) UN Doc S/PV/4053, 7, 8, 9. 
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Examining proliferation, the extent to which harm is directed at states cannot be 
measured because no such examples exist. This problem is overcome in the body of 
Resolution 1540 where the idea of collective interest stemming from proliferation is 
linked closely to terrorism and the involvement of non-state actors, providing 
enough justification for a thematic characterisation of the threat.108 France said ‘In 
an era of widespread terrorism, it [proliferation] increases the risk of seeing them 
[WMDs] fall into the hands of the most dangerous’.109 Despite the USA arguing ‘this 
threat and the actions we are taking today concern the entire United Nations 
membership’, it appears this is not the case.110 The entire UN membership was not 
threatened by terrorism and so equally the entire UN membership was not 
threatened by proliferation.111 Again, where proliferation is concerned the collective 
interest threshold emanating from the threat need only be widespread and not 
universal.  
 
Resolution 2177 was centred firmly on the Ebola outbreak of West Africa and not 
given a thematic character, but the permanent members continued to advance the 
idea of collective interest. The USA focussed on the nature of the disease, 
highlighting its capacity for ‘exponential spread’ and then arguing the ‘United 
Nations was built for global challenges like this one’.112 France took a similar stance 
and said ‘Our collective responsibility is focussed on three priorities: to act, to 
coordinate and to prevent’, arguing Ebola ‘could spread far beyond the region’.113 
These linguistic choices are intended to reinforce the collective interest inherent to 
the outbreak by advancing the risk to the international community. Terrorism and 
proliferation were afforded collective interest status through a thematic character 
connecting all instances of the threat together, generating a security logic based on 
widespread harm. Contrary to this the Ebola outbreak appears to generate collective 
 
108 UNSC Res 1540 (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/Res/1540, Preamble paras 8, 14. 
109 UNSC Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/PV/4956, 2. 
110 We will return to this idea later in this section. 
111 UNSC Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/PV/4956, 5. 
112 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 9. 
113 Ibid., 10. 
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interest through the potential reach of a single outbreak, which was exhibited 
through its grip on West Africa.114  
 
The presence of this security logic is not based on similar factual realities and 
collective interest is not determined by actual harm. In the case of terrorism and 
proliferation the harm was characterised as widespread, and this was only achieved 
via a thematic interpretation of each threat. Looking at Ebola the actual harm was 
limited in the most part to three regional states. In each case there was no example 
of universal harm taking place. It might be argued the lack of thematic character 
granted to the Ebola outbreak reduces the collective interest argument. However, 
this is a reflection of the nature of the threat that required circumstantial and not 
abstract responses. In other words, the Ebola outbreak did not require a thematic 
characterisation to generate the required response, and this does not infringe upon 
the collective interest argument present. This does mean the threshold for actual 
harm emanating from these threats is variable. In regard to terrorism and 
proliferation the harm had to be widespread, where Ebola is concerned the harm 
was in the most part limited to a few states, making it difficult to identify a consistent 
trigger that will prompt the creation of a narrative based on collective interest.  
 
If we accept the actual harm emanating from each threat presents a varying and 
non-universal threshold in terms of collective interest, this raises the possibility that 
something else might have been motivating the permanent members to employ this 
security logic. The answer to this comes from the indiscriminate nature of the three 
threats. Although each one was only able to implicate a portion of the international 
community the exact membership of this portion was unspecified. Each of the three 
international security threats was indiscriminate in terms of which states may be 
affected. In regard to terrorism the UK said the attack was ‘against humanity itself 
and the values and freedoms we all share’ and France said it is against the ‘values 
 
114 Russia pointed to the spread on the ‘African Continent’, with the UK suggesting 
other ‘countries in the region must be ready if the disease spreads to them’. UNSC 
Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 12, 17. 
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and principles that unite us’.115 Although terrorism was unable to offer a universal 
element of actual harm it was able to offer insecurity to any state that shared the 
same value system. Considering most states have signed up to the UN Charter, which 
is a value system, it becomes clear that terrorism was of collective interest based on 
its potential to affect any state within this system.  
 
In regard to proliferation the permanent members all pointed to the ‘involvement of 
non-state actors’,116 with the USA recognising this new dynamic would result in an 
‘uncontrolled spread’.117 France said ‘international initiatives in this area’ must be 
strengthened for the ‘security of all states’.118 By using this type of language the USA 
and France are alluding to the idea that the threat could indiscriminately affect 
states. Furthermore, precisely as above, the link with terrorism meant the 
permanent members were transferring the same logic into the proliferation setting. 
Russia said WMDs were being proliferated ‘primarily for terrorist purposes’ and the 
UK said such weapons ‘might fall into the hands of terrorists’.119 Such arguments 
reflect the possibility that any state might become the target of terrorism and so any 
state might be subject to proliferation-related consequences, again exhibiting an 
indiscriminate harm. 
 
In the context of Ebola, France said ‘It is our obligation to halt the outbreak before it 
spreads out of control’ and China argued the outbreak ‘has been spreading rapidly, 
widely and deeply’.120 The outbreak was characterised with the potential to spread 
out of control, providing a link to an indiscriminate character because it had the 
potential to impact any member of the international community. This is a slight 
stretch because the statements made are less clear. But the linguistic focus on 
control, or lack of it, imparts the idea of something that has an elemental character 
 
115 UNSC Verbatim Record (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/PV/4370, 2, 7. 
116 UNSC Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/PV/4956, 6. 
117 Ibid., 5. 
118 Ibid., 2. 
119 Ibid., 6, 7. 
120 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 10, 15. 
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of unpredictability, reinforced with adjectives like ‘rapidly’, ‘widely and ‘deeply’.121 At 
the passing of Resolution 2177 there was a general lack of spread beyond Western 
Africa, yet, there was nonetheless indiscriminate potential, and this connected the 
whole of the international community to the problem creating a strong narrative to 
argue for securitisation.  
 
This recognition of an indiscriminate nature is the most important finding of the 
collective interest narrative because this is the core argument that draws in the 
international community, forcing states to accept they have a vested interest to 
address the threat. When applying the lens of indiscriminate character, the threshold 
for collective interest becomes quite high where all three international security 
threats are concerned. Where actual harm only needs to threaten a collection of 
states presenting a low threshold, the indiscriminate nature of a threat must be 
universal at least in potential, creating a high threshold. Still, this might be 
challenged when we consider that collective interest also has a relationship with 
collective responses.  
 
The verbatim records show that collective interest is also based on the necessity to 
create universal responses, without which international security cannot be achieved. 
In regard to terrorism China referred to the ‘ongoing enhancement of cooperation’; 
Russia pointed to the task of ‘joining the efforts of the entire international 
community in combatting terror’.122 On proliferation, France said there was a need 
to ‘improve joint action’.123 The USA said ‘we need the broadest possible cooperation 
to stop them’, and the UK pointed to the need for ‘cooperative and inclusive 
measures’.124 On Ebola, the USA said that ‘we have not come together sufficiently to 
confront it’ and argued the response ‘must be an all-hands on deck operation’.125 
China held that fighting Ebola ‘was a common responsibility of all countries in the 
 
121 Ibid., 15. 
122 UNSC Verbatim Record (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/PV/4370, 5, 5. 
123 UNSC Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/PV/4956, 2. 
124 Ibid., 5, 7. 
125 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 8. 
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world’126 and the UK said ‘we need a mammoth and sustainable global effort if we 
are to beat this scourge’.127 
 
Where terrorism and proliferation are concerned this is based on the fact that no 
matter what the permanent members do in their own states or regions they will 
remain at risk if offenders are able to operate freely in other parts of the world. 
Krisch, discussing terrorism calls this a technical response because it focusses on the 
disruption of activities that lead to terror events.128 A failure to disrupt these threats 
globally would allow the harm emanating from them to remain, indiscriminately 
creating insecurity, which could affect the permanent members. Despite the fact that 
the actual harm emanating from these two threats does not need to be universal and 
differing security logics exist, the indiscriminate nature of harm resulting from a lack 
of universal responses meant that the collective interest threshold must remain high 
to underpin this narrative.  
 
However, if we consider that the permanent members often operate according to 
self-interest, the insecurity present perhaps does not need to be universal or 
widespread but only able to question their defences.129 It is beyond doubt that in the 
wake of September 11th the USA embarked upon a mission to securitise international 
terrorism through the UNSC, with the White House making a concerted effort to rally 
the international community into this way of thinking.130 The leadership of the USA 
was also paramount in the momentum that led to Resolution 1540.131 The 
 
126 Ibid., 15. 
127 Ibid., 18. 
128 N Krisch, ‘The Rise and Fall of Collective Security: Terrorism, US Hegemony, and 
the Plight of the Security Council’ in C Walter, S Voneky, S Roeben, F Schorkopf, (eds) 
Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security Versus Liberty 
(1st edition, Springer 2003) 879. 
129 Ibid. Treading this line, Krisch goes as far as to call the USA a hegemon.  
130 K Stiles, ‘The Power of Procedure and the Procedures of the Powerful: Anti-Terror 
Law in the United Nations’ (2006) 43 Journal of Peace Research 37. 
131 J Yoo, G Sulmasy, ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative: A Model for International 
Cooperation’ (2006) 35 Hofstra Law Review 405. 
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permanent members largely drafted the text of this resolution between themselves, 
indicating that they felt some sort of ownership over the problem.132 Collective 
interest may need to be present on a superficial level, but the reality is the 
permanent members might only need to believe that they are threatened, at which 
point they will adopt a leadership role to seek the securitisation of the matter.133 In 
other words, the permanent members will rely on the security logic of indiscriminate 
harm if they are the ones that are threatened. 
 
The Ebola outbreak does not fit so easily with this argument on the basis that even 
though the disease was indiscriminate, it was at the adoption of Resolution 2177 not 
seriously threatening to undermine the security of the permanent members. In the 
preceding paragraph it was suggested that to protect some states everyone has to 
respond collectively, with regard to Ebola the same argument is apparent except the 
difference is that the states in need of protection did not explicitly include the 
permanent members. The nature of the Ebola virus was such that if left to 
exacerbate it would have spread regionally, continentally, and then perhaps 
globally.134 This potential might have been enough to encourage the permanent 
members to securitise the matter. However, it is also worth noting that the 
permanent members do act for the resolution of situations that do not explicitly 
involve them and, as Nasu argues, this has moved towards the protection of human 
security in recent years.135 They are able to intervene absent any direct correlation 
 
132 J Burroughs, ‘The Role of the UN Security Council’ in J Burroughs et al., Nuclear 
Disorder or Cooperative Security? The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission 
<http://wmdreport.org/ndcs/online/NuclearDisorderPart1Section3.pdf> accessed 
24th April 2019. 
133 This finding largely supports the argument of Sandler, who finds terrorism 
provides a security challenge for targeted nations. T Sandler, ‘Collective Versus 
Unilateral Responses to Terrorism’ in W F Shughart, R D Tollison (eds) Policy 
Challenges and Political Responses (1st edition, Springer 2005) 75. 
134 C Enemark, ‘Ebola, Disease-Control, and the Security Council: From Securitisation 
to Securing Circulation’ (2017) 2 Journal of Global Security Studies 137. 
135 H Nasu, ‘The Place of Human Security in Collective Security’ (2013) 18 Journal of 
Conflict and Security 95. 
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between the harm and their security, acting exactly as the UNSC was envisioned to 
behave.136 The Ebola virus may represent one of these instances and intervention 
could have been premised on the basis that the group needed to protect some of its 
members, and potentially many of its members, from an indiscriminate harm 
demanding collective responses.  
 
To recap, the collective interest narrative offers a number of different lessons to take 
away. First, where an actual harm is concerned the threshold for collective interest is 
relatively low, only needing to affect a small number of states. However, this finding 
is qualified because the indiscriminate nature of the threat means that the affected 
states cannot be identified pre-emptively. The collective interest emanating from a 
threat must be universal in that any state might be affected. In combination with the 
fact that anything other than a universal set of responses will allow the 
indiscriminate nature of the threat to continue to pose problems for the 
international community, it appears that collective interest is based on a relatively 
high threshold. This, of course, rests on ignoring the fact that the permanent 
members act as hegemons and will move to securitise an issue of collective interest if 
they can identify themselves as the recipients of potential harm.  
 
VI. Narrative: Insufficient Response 
 
The fourth narrative to be examined is insufficient response. The UNSC consistently 
includes reference within resolutions to the intended response mechanisms to a 
threat, such as conventions or international institutions.137 The wider literature on 
the three international security threats also places emphasis on the intended 
 
136 Other examples of this would be the South Africa question, UNSC Res 418 (4th 
November 1977) UN Doc S/Res/418; or the Rwanda situation, UNSC Res 929 (22nd 
June 1994) UN Doc S/Res/929. 
137 UNSC Res 1368 (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/Res/1368, Operative para 4; 
UNSC Res 1540 (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/Res/1540, Preamble para 5; UNSC Res 
2177 (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/Res/2177, Preamble para 12. 
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responses and their level of competence.138 Insufficient response refers to the 
inability of the intended mechanisms to tackle the threat in question. Two arguments 
will be proffered: first, the permanent members take a flexible view when identifying 
where along the chain of causation an insufficient response exists; second, in all 
three international security threats the intended response mechanisms were 
overwhelmed by the evolution of another threshold marker, which was paramount 
in this narrative becoming part of the securitisation argument.  
 
The precise focus of the UNSC when looking at intended responses appears to vary 
along the chain of causation. Resolution 1368 concentrated on the inaction of states 
when it called for ‘full implementation of the relevant international anti-terrorist 
conventions’.139 At the adoption of this resolution the operation of the anti-terror 
conventions was ‘extremely low’.140 Their ability to tackle terrorism was not under 
scrutiny because they had not been able to operate properly. The possibility of an 
insufficient response was directed towards the inaction of states that had caused this 
problem. China explicitly focussed on this low state engagement, through its 
expression of support for ‘the practical implementation of the relevant international 
conventions’, drawing a line of causation between this inaction and the inability of 
the anti-terror conventions to operate sufficiently.141 Despite no other permanent 
 
138 Ward said that the ‘global community lacked the necessary tools to deal with the 
scope of the challenge posed by international terrorism’. C Ward, ‘Building Capacity 
to Combat International Terrorism: The Role of the United Nations Security Council’ 
(2003) 8 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 289, 289; Garvey said ‘the nuclear 
weapons devil has worked its way out of the containment formally attributed to the 
treaty [NPT]’. J Garvey, ‘A New Architecture for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons’ (2008) 12 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 339, 340; Gostin argued that 
the ‘international response to the current outbreak of Ebola virus in West Africa…has 
been fractured and delayed’. L Gostin, ‘Ebola: Towards an International Health 
Systems Fund’ (2014) 384 The Lancet 1321, 1321. 
139 UNSC Res 1368 (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/Res/1368, Operative para 4. 
140 Only two countries had ratified or acceded to all twelve anti-terror agreements. C 
Ward, ‘Building Capacity to Combat International Terrorism: The Role of the United 
Nations Security Council’ (2003) 8 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 289, 291. 
141 UNSC Verbatim Record (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/PV/4370, 5. 
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members making this point, they were able to include within Resolution 1368 an 
unequivocal direction that states should respond by implementing the relevant 
conventions, signifying their broad agreement that this lack of engagement was a 
problem. 
 
The extent of this agreement includes an understanding of what was causing poor 
state engagement. Resolution 1368 is influenced by the problematic content of 
conventions. Ward found a disconnection among the conventions because they were 
unable to sidestep definitional issues and create agreement as to the nature of the 
terror threat.142 Resolution 1368 avoided these definitional problems by grouping 
‘any act of international terrorism’ together as a threat to international peace and 
security.143 Operative Paragraph four effectively streamlines the different 
conventions into a single regime, by calling for universal implementation.144 It takes 
aim at a central reason why states were reluctant to engage the anti-terror 
conventions and removes any element of choice where implementation was 
concerned. The permanent members did not focus on this point in their submissions, 
but they were able to identify the source of the insufficient response and agree on 
how to proceed.  
 
Examining proliferation, in Verbatim Record 4956 every permanent member made 
comments related to the intended responses, either by talking about the role of 
Resolution 1540,145 or by recognising the validity of the current non-proliferation 
 
142 C Ward, ‘Building Capacity to Combat International Terrorism: The Role of the 
United Nations Security Council’ (2003) 8 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 289, 
291. 
143 UNSC Res 1368 (12th September 2001) UN Doc S/Res/1368, Operative para 1. 
144 W Messmer, C Yordan, ‘A Partnership to Counter International Terrorism: The UN 
Security Council and the UN Member States’ (2011) 34 Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 843. 
145 France stated Resolution 1540 was responding to ‘a gap in the regime’, and the 
UK pointed out that the resolution was responding ‘to threats not covered by 
existing regimes’, UNSC Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc/S/PV/4956, 2, 7. 
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regime.146 This increased attention is likely because the non-proliferation regime had 
been in operation since 1968, generating near universal membership and so could be 
evaluated in terms of its proficiency.147 Russia referenced non-state actors and their 
terrorist intentions, finding that the resolution was ‘targeted specifically at that 
threat’.148 France said the resolution was ‘filling a gap in the regime’ and China said it 
was ‘enhancing the international non-proliferation process’.149 The logic of security 
here is not based on the actions of states, as was the case with terrorism, but on the 
deficiency of the regime that had fallen behind the evolving threat. Securitisation can 
therefore be justified according to a regime’s effectiveness irrespective of high levels 
of state engagement. 
 
However, the permanent members adopted a second interpretation of insufficient 
response by linking the non-proliferation regime to the subsequent action of states. 
The USA said that each member state would need to ‘review its national laws…to 
meet the resolution’s requirements’, and Russia said ‘it contains a set of practical 
measures at the national level’.150 The gap in the non-proliferation regime had a 
direct link to the intended response of states.151 By relying on the mechanisms of the 
non-proliferation regime states had become exposed to the non-state actor 
dimension.152 The security logic underpinning the adoption of Resolution 1540 is 
based on the need to improve the intended response of the non-proliferation regime 
and as a consequence the response of states that were party to it. The insufficient 
 
146 China pointed out that Resolution 1540 was adopted in ‘compliance with existing 
international law’ UNSC Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc/S/PV/4956, 6. 
147 L Scheinman, ‘Nuclear Safeguards and Non-Proliferation in a Changing World 
Order’ (1992) 23 Security Dialogue 37. 
148 UNSC Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/PV/4956, 6. 
149 Ibid., 2, 6. 
150 Ibid., 5, 6. 
151 P Crail, ‘Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540’ (2006) 13 Non-
Proliferation Review 355. 
152 M Asada, ‘Security Council Resolution 1540 to Combat WMD Terrorism: 
Effectiveness and Legitimacy in International Legislation’ (2009) 13 Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law 303. 
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response narrative is drawn from a holistic view that looks along the line of causation 
to identify the point at which a remedy is required.  
 
This level of attention was repeated in Verbatim Record 7268, but with much more 
focus on the capacity of states to respond to the Ebola outbreak. France said ‘we will 
find a lasting solution only by helping the affected countries to strengthen their 
health systems’.153 The USA called for ‘flooding them with the resources that are 
desperately needed’.154 Russia spoke about ‘providing financial and technical 
assistance to suffering countries’155 and China said the ‘international community 
should respond…by expeditiously providing assistance to the affected countries’.156 
The permanent members made clear there was a response deficit from the three 
most affected states, and a connection was made between this and the 
manifestation of harm. Thus, even where the threat is linked directly to the response 
capacity of states the permanent members can identify a line of causation; they are 
not limited to the insufficient responses of international mechanisms and can base 
their argument for securitisation on state circumstances. 
 
However, a link between the insufficient response of the three most affected states 
and the support provided by the World Health Organisation (WHO) is also present. 
Russia said, ‘we plan to contribute $3.5 million to the WHO to step up the 
organisations readiness to respond’.157 China also pledged a financial contribution to 
the WHO but only after affirming it was making a contribution directly to the states 
suffering. By referencing the need for further institutional engagement the 
permanent members were inadvertently pointing out that this had been less than 
adequate. This is a point made often in the literature, and so although the 
 
153 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 11. 
154 Ibid., 8. 
155 Ibid., 12. 
156 Ibid., 15; the USA, and the UK both made similar assertions with significant 
attention to detail, indicating clearly that the response capacity of states was their 
priority.  
157 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 13. 
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permanent members appear to take a diplomatic line it is clear the insufficient 
response of the WHO to the outbreak was part of their reasoning to securitise the 
threat.158 They can interpret an insufficient response not just directly but also 
indirectly, by looking further along the line of causation to other factors that have led 
to the threat exacerbating. This makes this narrative flexible according to the specific 
circumstances of each threat the UNSC deals with, which is precisely the point of 
using securitisation theory here as a means to identify repeating themes that are 
applicable in ranging circumstances.  
 
Each intended response was insufficient in its own way, which is useful because of 
the flexibility it provides, but also does not allow us to say with any certainty what 
threshold that when crossed underpinned this narrative. Circumventing this 
problem, it might be possible to ignore the distinct points of insufficiency and simply 
ask what prompted a belief from the permanent members that the intended 
responses were insufficient, allowing the creation of this narrative.  
 
At first glance the events of September 11th immediately overwhelmed the anti-
terror conventions, rendering them suddenly unequipped to respond to terrorism. 
Taking this approach, however, ignores all prior instances of terrorism that equally 
exposed the ineptitude of the anti-terror conventions.159 Acknowledging these past 
attacks suggests two things. First, the anti-terror conventions were overwhelmed 
 
158 D Fidler, ‘Epic Failure of Ebola and Global Health Security’ (2015) 21 Brown 
Journal of World Affairs 179; L Gostin, ‘Ebola: A Crisis in Global Leadership’ (2014) 
384 The Lancet 1323; A Kamradt-Scott, ‘WHO’s to Blame? The World Health 
Organisation and the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa’ (2016) 37 Third World 
Quarterly 401. 
159 W J Crowe et al, ‘Report of the Accountability Review Boards, Bombings of the 
U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7th, 1998’ 
(U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., 1998) <https://fas.org/irp/threat/ 
arb/board_nairobi.html> accessed 21st March 2019; Anonymous, ‘Timeline of 
Russian terror attacks’ The Guardian (London, 24th January 2011) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/24/russian-terror-attacks-timeline> 
accessed 29th March 2019; M Plachta, ‘The Lockerbie Case: The Role of the Security 
Council in Enforcing the Principle Aut Dedere Aut Judicare’ (2001) 12 EJIL 125. 
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incrementally. With each attack that took place in the years preceding 2001, the 
conventions were undermined. Secondly, the point at which this became untenable 
for the permanent members was when the magnitude of international terrorism 
increased dramatically. Only then did they acknowledge that there was a response 
deficiency. Magnitude and response insufficiency are connected, and only when the 
former reached a certain level did the latter become measured as overwhelmed.  
 
The magnitude of the September 11th attacks highlighted to the permanent members 
that the autonomy of states to choose whether to engage with the conventions was 
no longer plausible.160 Taking a slightly different view, Ward argues the tools to 
address terrorism were absent, though this is not strictly correct.161 The tools were in 
fact present, they were simply housed in a forum that could not mobilise them 
effectively. This is important because the existence of these tools up to the point of 
September 11th was deemed sufficient. Even though Resolution 1269 called for 
greater implementation of the anti-terror conventions and was largely ignored by the 
international community,162 this did not provoke the permanent members to take 
further action.163 At the point of Resolution 1269 it is possible to claim the 
insufficient response of the international community was not deemed problematic 
enough to take further action and activate Article 39. The difference between 
Resolutions 1269 and 1368 is the magnitude attached to each attack that preceded 
them, rendering the choice of states to join conventions as no longer viable, thus 
confirming a link between magnitude and response insufficiency, at least in the case 
of terrorism.164  
 
 
160 C De Jonge Oudraat, ‘Combating Terrorism’ (2003) 26 Washington Quarterly 163. 
161 C Ward, ‘Building Capacity to Combat International Terrorism: The Role of the 
United Nations Security Council’ (2003) 8 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 289. 
162 C De Jonge Oudraat, ‘Combating Terrorism’ (2003) 26 Washington Quarterly 163. 
163 UNSC Res 1269 (19th of October 1999) UN Doc S/Res/1269. 
164 M Heupel, ‘Combining Hierarchical and Soft Modes of Governance: The UN 
Security Council’s Approach to Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Proliferation after 9/11’ (2008) 43 Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic 
International Studies Association 7. 
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Moving to the proliferation threat, Resolution 1540 is not explicitly underpinned by a 
factual event and so it is more challenging to identify what prompted the realisation 
from the permanent members that the non-proliferation regime was insufficient. 
This did not stop them introducing a link to terrorism. Russia indicated the nexus 
between proliferation and terrorism was a ‘crucial’ concern and the UK characterised 
it as ‘urgent and horrific’.165 Relying on this link it might be possible to suggest that 
the stimulus for Resolution 1540 was linked to the magnitude of terrorism that could 
now reach the intensity of September 11th. This poses the question why did 
Resolution 1540 not follow the September 11th timeline more closely? The delay until 
2004 suggests the link between terrorism and proliferation was not premised on the 
September 11th attacks and so magnitude is removed as a factor that led to the non-
proliferation regime being viewed as insufficient.  
 
Looking beyond the verbatim record, there is a strong current of thought that 
connects the discovery of the Khan network in 2003 to the adoption of Resolution 
1540.166 The extent to which the Khan network was operating and its ability to 
successfully subvert all non-proliferation efforts meant there was a very real 
possibility that terrorist groups were able to access WMDs, providing justification for 
the link between the two subjects.167 This does not mean magnitude suddenly 
became relevant. Instead, focussing on the extent of the Khan network, its 
transnational scale was exposed by Libya detailing just a small portion of its 
international activities.168 The discovery of Khan’s network represents a single 
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incident, but its activities had been going on for two decades.169 It is therefore very 
likely that the transnational scale of the threat was vast, and, as such, had 
completely voided the non-proliferation regime.170 The transnational scale of 
proliferation was potentially so widespread the permanent members realised the 
intended responses were completely insufficient, hence they used adjectives like 
‘crucial’ and ‘urgent’ to justify securitisation.171  
 
Turning to the Ebola outbreak of 2014, for the first nine months the permanent 
members chose not to intervene, which suggests they were content with the 
intended response mechanisms up to that point. At the adoption of Resolution 2177 
it became clear a shift in attitude had occurred. The USA held ‘the affected countries 
had no prior knowledge or experience’ and ‘it has overwhelmed clinics and 
hospitals’.172 Russia highlighted its efforts to ‘strengthen the public health-care 
system[s]’173 and China argued the ‘current Ebola outbreak has overwhelmed the 
public health systems of the three countries’.174 The permanent members were able 
to identity that the intended response through state health care provision had been 
overrun. Evidence also exists to prove this was the case.175 The combination of 
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magnitude and scale was pivotal in this realisation. Only when the magnitude and 
scale of the outbreak reached certain levels did the permanent members come to 
realise that there was a response deficiency, relying on this to create a powerful 
security logic to underpin this narrative.  
 
The permanent members also engaged with the indirect response of the WHO to 
address the outbreak, suggesting a realisation it too had become overwhelmed. 
However, it is not clear if the permanent members came to this conclusion on their 
own or whether they were led by the submissions of health experts before the 
UNSC.176 Dr Chan (then Director General of the WHO) used the word ‘emergency’ 
and stated the situation was ‘likely the greatest peacetime challenge that the United 
Nations and its agencies have ever faced’.177 Dr Chan also highlighted the ‘degree of 
suffering’ and ‘magnitude of cascading consequences’.178 Dr Nabarro reinforced a 
sense of urgency by stating the ‘outbreak that is advancing in an exponential fashion’ 
has a ‘rapid upward acceleration’.179 Within these submissions it became clear the 
response from the WHO and the wider international community was insufficient. The 
language used reflects the increasing scale and magnitude of the problem, linking the 
inability of the WHO to respond to the same logics of security that were used to 
reason an insufficient state response to Ebola. 
 
In summary, the permanent members are consistently concerned with the intended 
response mechanisms. Where they direct their attention depends on the level of 
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causation that can be identified between the intended responses and the harm. 
However, despite taking a different approach to each threat the permanent 
members are clear in their finding that the responses in question were overwhelmed 
and unable to respond effectively to the threat because of an advancing magnitude 
and/or transnational scale, which likely highlighted the collective security 
implications.  
 
VII. Narrative: Urgency 
 
The final narrative to be examined is urgency. The meaning attached to this term is 
derived from the ordinary sense of the word, which denotes the quality of something 
requiring immediate attention.180 Urgency is partially reflective of the concept of 
imminence, which is sometimes attached to discussions on self-defence and the 
remit of the UNSC.181 However, there is an inherent amount of semantic ambiguity 
attached to this concept,182 compounded by arguments related to the temporal 
interpretation of an imminent threat.183 Moreover, the UNSC through its linguistic 
choices has overtly characterised threats as urgent, providing a sound justification 
for its selection here.184 Two arguments will be made. First, urgency is consistently 
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found as a rationale for intervention to the point that it features explicitly in each 
resolution, signifying a high level of agreement among the permanent members. 
Second, the logics used by the permanent members to characterise a threat as 
urgent vary according to specific circumstances, but in each case another narrative 
underpins this finding.  
 
Across the three international security threats a link to urgency can be identified in 
each resolution. On terrorism, Resolution 1368 calls on states to work ‘urgently to 
bring to justice the perpetrators’.185 Resolution 1540 on proliferation, recognises the 
‘urgent need for all States to take additional effective measures to prevent [the] 
proliferation’.186 In response to the Ebola outbreak, Resolution 2177 underscored 
‘that the control of outbreaks of major infectious diseases requires urgent action’ 
and called on ‘States to provide urgent resources and assistance’.187 The linguistic 
choices of a resolution are important and when the permanent members disagree on 
a formulation, they can force the UNSC into paralysis.188 When they agree this does 
not necessarily mean a resolution will be constructed with such strong language. It is 
evident that the permanent members were firmly in agreement that there was an 
urgent character inherent to these international security threats. The deliberate 
linguistic choices are intended to reflect this and remove any ambiguity as to what 
was expected from the international community. Attention now turns to ask what 
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allowed these three threats to be characterised with the same sense of urgency 
despite their different circumstances.  
 
With regard to terrorism, the sense of urgency portrayed by the permanent 
members comes from a number of logics, but each with the same underlying 
premise. The UK referred to terrorism as ‘the new evil in our world today’.189 China, 
Russia and France referenced the ‘challenge’ posed to the ‘international 
community’.190 The USA pointed to the ‘war against terrorism’.191 Within these 
statements is the logic that the threat was ongoing. Although the attacks appeared 
to be isolated, they represented the manifestation of something more. By 
recognising that the threat was ongoing the permanent members were able to infer 
a need to respond with urgency to prevent further harm. It was their implication that 
without an urgent response from the international community the threat would be 
allowed to continue or repeat. Despite the lack of uniformity in the linguistics 
employed, it is possible to see that this narrative comes from the same source, 
adding a sense of unity that increases its importance to the overall securitisation 
argument.   
 
However, this also appears to be true in the UNSC’s previous handling of terrorism 
prior to the activation of Article 39. Resolution 1269 held it was ‘Deeply concerned 
by the increase in acts of international terrorism’.192 In the corresponding verbatim 
record, the USA said ‘terrorism has shown no sign of letting up’ and France referred 
to the ‘fight against terrorism’ noting ‘this was not the first time the Council has 
taken a stand on this subject’.193 The permanent members were aware of the 
ongoing threat but notably avoided characterising it as urgent throughout Resolution 
1269. Instead words like ‘necessity’, ‘encourages’ and ‘priority’ are used to frame the 
need to respond, all of which have less linguistic presence than a characterisation of 
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urgent.194 It cannot be the case that terrorism acquired a sense of urgency simply 
because of its ongoing thematic nature. 
 
The answer to this is found by considering urgency alongside magnitude.195 
September 11th was distinct from past attacks because of its increased magnitude. 
Only when this reached a certain level did this ongoing threat become urgent 
according to the permanent members. If left outside the scope of Article 39 and 
absent a suitable response, there was a chance similarly severe attacks could take 
place. The logic of security used to frame threats as urgent was based on the 
identification of an increase in magnitude. Although the permanent members were 
unified in their interpretation of terrorism as an urgent threat, this was unable to 
stand as a security logic in its own right.  
 
Turning to proliferation, a sense of urgency was argued by creating a link to 
terrorism. The UK argued that such weapons and materials ‘might fall into the hands 
of terrorists’ and in ‘the face of that threat…it was imperative’ for the Council to 
act.196 Although China did not reference terrorism directly, it spoke of the 
involvement of ‘non-state actors’, which could be interpreted to include terrorists.197 
Making this connection, proliferation was being viewed through the same lens as 
terrorism, which was an urgent priority of the permanent members.198 However, in 
the case of terrorism, it was an increased magnitude that gave life to a sense of 
urgency. Where proliferation is concerned the severity of the consequences of such 
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weapons had long been understood.199 Thus, although proliferation was cast as an 
urgent threat because of its connection to terrorism, it seems that the exact logic of 
security employed was not identical. 
 
An additional logic on proliferation is present that addresses this distinction. France 
referred to the ‘emergence of trafficking networks’.200 The USA said proliferation ‘is a 
clear and present threat’.201 China spoke of the need to prevent ‘further 
proliferation’.202 Russia said proliferation was ‘becoming one of the crucial threats to 
international peace and security’.203 The UK claimed it was ‘a real, urgent and horrific 
threat’.204 The argument appears to be that the international community had already 
fallen behind the threat and so there was an urgent need to catch up. Although the 
verbatim record is absent specific examples of proliferation, it has been argued there 
was at least a contextual backdrop to the UNSC intervening.205 It is not unreasonable 
to assert that the sense of urgency underlying the permanent member’s arguments 
is based on a belief that the threat was already in existence, which they are able to 
agree upon despite offering no facts to support this belief. Again, this shows the 
strength of urgency as a narrative as it did not require hard justificatory evidence for 
the permanent members to employ it.  
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Connected to this logic the idea of scale becomes important. Proliferation was 
historically confined to state aspiration.206 This changed with the adoption of 
Resolution 1540. France referred to ‘an additional dimension to the danger of 
proliferation’ and pinpointed this as ‘the involvement of non-state actors’.207 The 
USA said that non-state actors were ‘seeking to exploit weak export-control laws and 
security measures in a variety of countries’.208 The switch of focus from state to non-
state actor proliferation meant a huge increase in the scale of the threat that was 
already taking place around the world. The new sense of scale was perceived to be 
vast, transnational and when linked to terrorism able to create a sense of urgency. 
Proliferation was potentially taking place on a transnational scale never before seen 
and this security logic was used to generate a sense of urgency that the permanent 
members were able to unite around. 
 
Turning to the Ebola outbreak, the permanent members were acutely aware that the 
situation was urgent. The USA called for ‘swift and decisive action’.209 France said, 
‘this is an emergency’, ‘let us act now’.210 Russia thought the affected countries could 
not continue without ‘the coordinated response of the international community’.211 
China said ‘time is of the essence’,212 and the UK declared ‘there is simply no time to 
waste’.213 A temporal factor is present in their interpretation of the situation, 
creating a sense of urgency. This contrasts their earlier engagement through 
Resolution 2176, where the word urgent does not feature.214 However, within 
Resolution 2176 attention is drawn to two documents for consideration that do 
 
206 P Crail, ‘Implementing the UN Security Council Resolution 1540’ (2006) 13 Non-
Proliferation Review 355.  
207 UNSC Verbatim Record (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/PV/4956, 2. 
208 Ibid., 5.  
209 Ibid., 7. 
210 Ibid., 10, 11. 
211 Ibid., 12.  
212 Ibid., 15. 
213 Ibid., 17.  
214 UNSC Res 2176 (15th September 2014) UN Doc S/Res/2176; UNSC Verbatim 
Record (15th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7263. 
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include a very brief characterisation of the Ebola crisis as urgent.215 Nevertheless, 
there was a clear change in temporal understanding of the threat between the two 
meetings, which although only three days apart led to the threat being characterised 
as urgent. 
 
One possible reason for this change in perspective was the exacerbating magnitude 
and scale of the outbreak. These two triggers were becoming more severe, and the 
permanent members were aware that this escalating dynamic was only going to 
continue. The USA and France referenced the ‘unprecedented’ scale of the 
outbreak.216 China said the ‘Ebola pandemic is rapidly spreading’ and the UK argued 
that the ‘United Nations has a vital role to play in bringing Ebola under control’.217 
The expansion of the epidemic in terms of magnitude and scale does support a 
temporal characterisation leading to a sense of urgency. But it is unlikely that this 
alone could be attributed as the reason for the permanent members suddenly 
believing a response was urgent. If they were led by these motivations, they would 
have intervened much earlier in 2014. It is also questionable how much change in 
magnitude and scale could have taken place in the three days between UNSC 
meetings. No doubt these triggers helped to substantiate the urgency of the 
situation, but they must have been accompanied by something more to generate a 
sense of urgency.  
 
As the Ebola outbreak spread across the three most affected states its impact 
beyond health became apparent. France argued that the outbreak had become ‘an 
economic and social crisis that could also generate a political crisis’ and ‘reignite 
 
215 UNGA Report of the Secretary General, ‘Twenty-eighth progress report of the 
Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia’ (15th august 2014) UN 
Doc S/2014/598; 
UNGA Letter of the Secretary General, ‘Letter dated 28th August 2014 from the 
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (2nd September 
2014) UN Doc S/2014/644. 
216 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 7, 10.  
217 Ibid., 15, 17.  
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chaos in those countries’.218 Russia spoke of the ‘broader consequences of the 
outbreak’.219 China referred to the outbreak as a ‘multifaceted problem, impacting 
the politics, security, economics and societies of those countries concerned’.220 The 
UK called it a ‘humanitarian, social and economic crisis’.221 These broader logics 
underpin the argument that without international intervention there was a 
possibility that the three most affected states would have continued to spiral 
downward. The urgent characterisation of the situation can be linked to the 
possibility of states collapsing, which differentiates this outbreak from past health 
crises and provides a very strong narrative to support securitisation.222 
 
Because of this broader impact on the viability of the states in question, the 
collective interest in stopping the outbreak from exacerbating any further was 
becoming more visible. The USA referenced its jump ‘across borders’ and the need to 
halt ‘further spread’.223 France said, ‘we know the epidemic could spread far beyond 
the region’ and Russia noted its spread ‘on the African continent’.224 China took the 
strongest position and said the outbreak was ‘threatening the security of 
international public health’.225 As the states involved became overwhelmed the risk 
of wider spread increased. The permanent members were justifying their 
intervention on the need to stop the spread at the source in order to avoid collective 
interest repercussions. This led China to argue that the ‘international community 
should respond to the Ebola outbreak with a heightened sense of urgency’.226 The 
logic of security used here is based on the need to halt the outbreak before it 
 
218 Ibid., 10. 
219 Ibid., 13. 
220 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 15. 
221 Ibid., 17. 
222 Health crises alone have been unable to achieve Article 39 status in the past. For 
an example of this see the HIV/AIDS resolution that failed to activate Article 39: 
UNSC Res 1308 (17th July 2000) UN Doc S/Res/1308. 
223 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268, 7, 8, 9.  
224 Ibid., 10, 12.  
225 Ibid., 15. 
226 Ibid., 15. 
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spreads through the international community, indicating that urgency is again 
dependent on the evolution of another narrative.  
 
To recap, urgency is an important narrative used by the permanent members. 
However, they develop this narrative from varying security logics and so it is difficult 
to definitively substantiate what will trigger an argument of urgency. Yet, the 
evolution of other thresholds when connected to urgency was able to explain the 
foundations of this narrative and allow the justifications for its use to come to light. 
Urgency does not stand alone but is derived from its relationship to the evolution of 
other narratives. 
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has examined the securitisation of the three international security 
threats (terrorism, proliferation, Ebola) according to the arguments of the 
permanent members. The knowledge acquired allows the claim that when certain 
thresholds and triggers are crossed the permanent members are able to unite in the 
activation of Article 39 through the creation of these five narratives. The logics of 
security employed can at times vary on the surface, but often there is an underlying 
source that allows the permanent members to unite behind them. These narratives 
are not independent, and the above analysis has shown they often work in 
conjunction with one another. Only when the right conditions across each narrative 
are met will the activation of Article 39 be possible, and the need for securitisation 
become apparent to the permanent members. Securitisation theory has usefully 
been employed, identifying how the permanent members have sought the 
securitisation of these three international security threats.   
 
When evaluating any international security threat in the context of a potential Article 
39 activation the magnitude, transnational scale, collective interest, insufficient 
response and urgency narratives must be examined holistically. On its own the 
acquisition of this knowledge does not offer any further advance on securitising 
climate change before the UNSC. All it achieves is to illuminate the thresholds and 
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triggers that allow the permanent members to unite behind these narratives. The 
following chapter will apply these findings to climate change in order to provide a 
































Framing Climate Change as an Article 39 Threat 
 
‘The current and projected implications of climate change could easily support its 




Chapter Four examined the narratives employed by the permanent members when 
arguing for the securitisation of international security threats. Within these 
narratives, the thresholds and triggers that when crossed led to intervention were 
explored and knowledge on what underpins securitisation collected. The next stage 
is to take the lessons learnt and apply them to climate change. In other words, does 
climate change reflect these narratives, and does it cross the thresholds and triggers 
that would convince the permanent members to securitise it? However, it is not the 
intention to simply find that climate change reflects the securitisation narratives and 
hope that the UNSC intervenes. Rather, this chapter is concerned with providing the 
most suitable frame for those who would argue the securitisation of climate change 
before the UNSC. In effect, it wishes to provide potential securitising actors, or those 
that wish to influence them, a viable means with which to convince the permanent 
members of the need to embark upon the securitisation of climate change.  
 
Securitisation theory was first used to understand how the permanent members 
seek to argue the activation of Article 39. This information is now being used to 
construct an argument that might help to transfer climate change to the security 
agenda. The structure of this chapter will follow the five narratives: magnitude; 
transnational scale; collective interest; insufficient response; and urgency. Following 
this, it will be considered how framing climate change in this way might be usefully 
applied in practice.  
 
1 C Penny, ‘Climate Change as a Threat to International Peace and Security’ in S Scott, 
C Ku (eds) Climate Change and the UN Security Council (1st edn, EE 2018) 25, 43. 
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II. Climate Change: Magnitude 
 
Across the three international security threats the permanent members responded 
to both tangible and potential magnitude. However, it was only in the proliferation 
instance that an example of tangible magnitude was not required to lead them. 
Proliferation is subject to a long-standing belief that if left to exacerbate the 
consequences will be grave.2 Climate change in contrast is a somewhat new concern, 
only coming before the UNSC in 2007.3 In addition, it has often been characterised as 
outside the security agenda, further limiting the chance of it suddenly acquiring the 
character of a grave concern.4 Like the terrorism and Ebola instances, a tangible 
example of climatic magnitude will be necessary to lead the permanent members to 
alter their perspective.  
 
The WHO estimates there are in excess of 150,000 annual deaths from climatic 
impacts.5 Examined in isolation this number crosses the tangible magnitude 
threshold required to attract the attention of the permanent members. This figure is 
broken down into three broad categories: altering disease patterns; food and water 
insecurity; and extreme weather events. Immediately this poses a problem for the 
permanent members because it is not explicitly clear where the magnitude of 
climatic impact comes from. The dispersed and non-discrete nature of these climatic 
harms means they do not lend themselves well to the usual manner in which the 
permanent members operate. That is, to identify and respond to instances of clearly 
identifiable harm. 
 
2 UNSC Verbatim Record (31st January 1992) UN Doc S/PV/3046; UNSC Verbatim 
Record (19th June 1968) UN Doc S/PV/1433. 
3 UNSC Verbatim Record (17th April 2007) UN Doc S/PV/5663. 
4 As recently as January 2019 Russia has stated a belief that it is ‘excessive, and even 
counterproductive, to consider climate change in the Security Council’, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (25th January 2019) UN Doc S/PV/8451, 16. 
5 Anonymous, ‘Climate Change’ (WHO, Health and Environment Linkages Initiative 
(HELI, 2019) <https://www.who.int/heli/risks/climate/climatechange/en/> accessed 
29th August 2019. 
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Leading up to the adoption of Resolutions 1368 and 2177, the permanent members 
were able to pinpoint a set of circumstances with a clearly identifiable magnitude. 
Applying this to climate change, it is not visible where the 150,000 fatalities per year 
originate. Despite this estimate from the WHO placing climatic magnitude above the 
threshold identified, it is unlikely on its own to generate the requisite attention from 
the permanent members.6 The timeframe involved might also pose a problem. The 
WHO indicates this climatic magnitude takes place over the course of a twelve-
month period, which makes it harder to pinpoint a discrete set of circumstances able 
to generate the required sense of urgency. The way in which terrorism caught the 
attention of the permanent members is not applicable to this overarching climatic 
magnitude noted by the WHO. The Ebola instance shows an elongated view is 
possible, and the UNSC monitored the situation over a period of months, allowing a 
parallel to be drawn with annual climatic magnitude. This argument is limited by the 
relatively isolated geographic nature of the harm that resulted from the outbreak 
compared to the dispersed magnitude stemming from climate change.  
 
This overarching interpretation of climatic magnitude is unable to offer a viable 
means in which to present climate change as triggering the threshold to attract 
permanent member attention, despite being numerically sufficient. To 
circumnavigate this problem the different manifestations of climatic magnitude 
noted by the WHO will be analysed according to their individual instances, which 
might have a greater chance of exhibiting the conditions necessary to attract the 
permanent members. The following paragraphs will assess disease exacerbation, 
food and water insecurity, and extreme weather events. 
 
The climatic magnitude from altering disease patterns comes from changing global 
temperatures, creating the conditions that allow an increase in their geographic 
 
6 Chapter Four found that the magnitude of actual harm from international security 
threats has to reach into the thousands.  
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range.7 Exemplifying this, malaria-carrying mosquitoes can move beyond their 
traditional territories.8 Mosquitoes also transmit dengue fever, which has become 
more prolific in recent decades and has started to manifest beyond its traditional 
zones.9 The WHO is cautious in its prognosis of exactly how many deaths are being 
caused because of the link between climate change and disease exacerbation, stating 
that, ‘Measuring the health effects from climate change can only be very 
approximate’.10 Rocklov and Tozan illustrate this point, estimating that dengue fever 
currently claims 10,000 lives per year, but they were unable to pinpoint a distinction 
within this figure according to conventional and additional climatic impacts.11 
Climate change is exacerbating the mortality rate of diseases but it is difficult to 
operationalize this into an argument that could be used to persuade the permanent 
members of the need to intervene because no clear lines of distinction exist to 
highlight the specific impact of climate change. 
 
A further problem is that climatic magnitude from increased disease spread would 
likely be felt across vast geographic spaces. Unlike the 2014 Ebola outbreak, it may 
not be easy for the permanent members to isolate a set of circumstances and 
identify a magnitude that warrants intervention. The more likely reality is that a 
disease exacerbated by a warming climate will have a very widespread impact 
reflecting the vast spread of increasing temperatures, diluting the appearance of 
 
7 S Ryan et al., ‘Global Expansion and Redistribution of Aedes-borne Virus 
Transmission Risk with Climate Change’ (2019) 13 PLOS: Neglected Tropical Diseases 
1. 
8 C Flavin, H French, G Gardner, ‘State of the World 2002’ (World Watch Institute, 
2002). 
9 Anonymous, ‘A Billion People Will Be Newly Exposed to Diseases Like Dengue Fever 
as World Temperatures Rise’ (Georgetown University Medical Centre, 28th March 
2019) <https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/03/190328150856.htm> 
accessed 30th August 2019. 
10 Anonymous, ‘Climate Change and Health’ (WHO, 2019) 
<https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/climate-change-and-health> 
accessed 29th August 2019. 
11 J Rocklov, Y Tozan, ‘Climate Change and the Rising Infectiousness of Dengue’ 
(2019) 3 Emerging Topics in Life Sciences 133. 
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harm and so failing to generate global attention.12 Nevertheless, this is speculation 
and an outbreak of significant magnitude beyond a disease’s usual territory may be 
able to command global focus, and encourage the permanent members to 
intervene.13 For now, disease exacerbation from climate change remains unable to 
offer the permanent members the character of magnitude to prompt securitisation. 
 
Moving to food and water security, both will be placed under significant strain with a 
temperature increase of 1.5°C.14 In terms of quantifying the current impact of this 
insecurity, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) expresses the difficulty of 
accurately linking climatic impacts with malnutrition, but does find the prevalence of 
undernourishment directly correlated to those states experiencing severe drought 
conditions between 2006 and 2016.15 Exemplifying this, in 2013 cereal production in 
Lesotho was at a ten-year low because of droughts, causing ‘725,000 people’ to be 
food insecure.16 Such events offer a discrete set of circumstances to accentuate the 
threat and so might have potential to draw the attention of the permanent 
members.  
 
The FAO found that ‘countries with high exposure [to climate shocks] have more 
than double the number of undernourished people (351 million more) as those 
without high exposure’.17 The report does not detail how many deaths occur as a 
direct result of climatic-induced undernourishment. It does find in 2017 that 29 
million people suffered ‘acute food insecurity’ as a result of climate shocks, with 3.9 
 
12 It has been argued this attention was crucial in the securitisation of the Ebola 
outbreak. C McInnes, ‘Crisis! What crisis? Global health and the 2014-15 West 
African Ebola Outbreak’ (2016) 37 Third World Quarterly 380. 
13 IPCC Report, ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C: Summary for Policy Makers’ (2018) 11. 
14 Ibid. 
15 FAO, ‘The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World’ (2018). 
16 UNEP, ‘Yearbook: Emerging Issues in Our Global Environment 2013’ (2013), 15; UN 
Central Emergency Response Fund, ‘Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator Report 2012 
on the Use of CERF Funds in Lesotho’ (UN CERF, 2012). 
17 FAO, ‘The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World’ (2018) 54. 
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million requiring ‘urgent life-saving emergency assistance’.18 In 2013 there were 
875,000 deaths in children under the age of five because of ‘wasting’ due to food 
insecurity, malnourishment and poor access to water.19 These impacts are 
exacerbated by climate change and so it is reasonable to attribute at least a portion 
of these figures to it. It is not unfounded to assert that thousands of people 
worldwide are suffering appalling food and water insecurity as a result of climate 
change. 
 
The magnitude coming from food and water insecurity is likely able to trigger the 
required threshold to attract the attention of the permanent members. The problem 
is this magnitude is not based on a discrete set of circumstances. The deaths involved 
are dispersed, sometimes globally, and not isolated to a clearly identifiable event 
that can be linked to climate change. The likelihood of the permanent members 
identifying a climatic magnitude from this widespread harm is slim, despite the 
thousands of lives lost every year crossing the numerical threshold. The global 
circumstances and non-linear nature of food and water insecurity is unable to 
discretely characterise the harm as a climatic magnitude caused by rising 
temperatures, limiting its utility here as a frame for the securitisation of climate 
change. 
 
Examining the last category of climatic harm noted by the WHO, the term extreme 
weather event refers to floods, droughts, heatwaves, high precipitation rates, 
wildfires, storms and hurricanes.20 The IPCC says ‘extreme weather and climate 
events have been observed since about 1950’ and some have been linked to 
changing temperatures, rising sea levels and increasing precipitation.21 As the global 
climate undergoes changes to its natural state, extreme weather events increase in 
frequency and power, making it difficult to dismiss climate change as the cause of 
 
18 Ibid., 58. 
19 Ibid., 19. 
20 WMO, ‘Atlas of Mortality and Economic Losses from Weather, Climate and Water 
Extremes (1970-2012)’ (2014).  
21 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers’ (2014), 7. 
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the exacerbating impacts.22 These events offer the most potential in terms of 
identifying climatic magnitude because they often manifest in discrete conditions 
with a clear causal link to the harm. Extreme weather events are able to sidestep the 
limitations noted above in regard to disease exacerbation and food and water 
insecurity. They offer an improved chance of projecting the required character of 
climatic magnitude to draw the attention of the permanent members. 
 
The UNEP documented a range of extreme events and the resulting magnitudes: 
landslides in Haiti caused several deaths and displaced 65,000 people; 13,500 
families were affected by flooding in Paraguay after heavy rains; flash floods in Russia 
killed 144 and affected 15,000 people; floods in Myanmar left 6,000 people without 
homes; tropical storms in South China killed 34 people and affected hundreds of 
thousands more; an Indian monsoon killed 27 and left 900,000 people homeless.23 
These figures show that discrete climatic magnitude is quantifiable in regard to 
extreme weather events, but in most cases the isolated nature of these events 
meant the harm was then too low to draw in the permanent members. This will 
probably allow them to continue ignoring these events in the same way they ignored 
instances of terrorism prior to September 11th and Ebola prior to 2014. If extreme 
events are to be used to characterise climate change as exhibiting the required 
magnitude, they will need to exhibit a level of harm reflecting that seen on 
September 11th or during the 2014 Ebola outbreak.  
 
The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) provides evidence of climatic impact 
that might meet this threshold, finding that between 1970 and 2012, 1.94 million 
 
22 See, for example, Hurricane Dorian. S Gibbens, ‘How Warm Oceans Supercharge 
Deadly Hurricanes’ National Geographic (4th September 2019) 
<https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/environment-and-
conservation/2019/09/how-warm-oceans-supercharge-deadly-hurricanes> accessed 
1st December 2019. 
23 UNEP, ‘Yearbook: Emerging Issues in Our Global Environment 2013’ (2013) 14, 15.  
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deaths have occurred as a result of extreme weather events.24 This figure is 
cumulative, drawn across many instances, and so it is unlikely to get the attention of 
the permanent members on its own for similar reasons to those argued above. 
Examining the details of this figure, however, provides some valuable findings. In 
2010 the Russian Federation experienced extreme heat that resulted in 55,736 
deaths; in 2008 Storm Nargis killed 138,866 people in Myanmar; and in 1983 an 
Ethiopian drought killed 300,000 people.25 The report goes on to find that Hurricane 
Mitch (1998) killed 14,600 people and in Venezuela a flash flood took 30,000 lives 
(1999).26 Additional research shows the European heatwave in 2003 killed 70,000 
people.27 These examples provide evidence of discrete climatic events exhibiting a 
magnitude well in excess of that required to attract the attention of the permanent 
members.  
 
Climatic magnitude from extreme weather events is able to trigger the threshold 
required for securitisation. The terrorism and Ebola interventions were premised on 
a magnitude reaching into the thousands within discreet circumstances that the 
permanent members could easily interpret as distinct from past iterations of each 
threat. The climatic magnitude from these events reflects this in terms of numerical 
quantification and distinct character of harm. The connection between the event and 
the impact is easily identifiable and discrete enough to accentuate the magnitude of 
the harm. The link to climate change is scientifically inarguable because as the world 
has warmed these events have intensified. Extreme weather events provide the 
perfect frame for climate change to be characterised with a magnitude that is able to 
trigger the permanent member’s threshold for intervention. The only way to prevent 
the future occurrence of these high magnitude events is to respond to rising 
temperatures through the implementation of a technical response that addresses 
 
24 WMO, ‘Atlas of Mortality and Economic Losses from Weather, Climate and Water 
Extremes (1970–2012)’ (2014). 
25 Ibid., 8. 
26 Ibid., 6. 
27 J M Robine et al., ‘Death Toll Exceeded 70,000 in Europe During the Summer of 
2003’ (2008) 331 Science Direct 171. 
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the cause of this problem.28 This reflects a similar argument to that used to pass 
Resolution 1373 and so there is scope to believe it could be employed to attract the 
attention of the permanent members in regard to climate change.29 
 
A further argument to convince the permanent members of the need to intervene 
comes from the potential magnitude that accompanies climatic impacts. As 
temperatures increase it is estimated that one billion people could find themselves 
living in areas experiencing diseases that were once restricted to more tropical 
climates.30 By the year 2050, 5.7 billion people could be living in regions of water 
scarcity and by 2025 48% of global land could become prone to drought, which will 
have a severe impact on food and water availability for the surrounding 
populations.31 Food security will become an issue for one hundred million people 
worldwide.32 Between 1995 and 2015 the GEO6 Report found that 1.7 billion people 
have been affected by extreme weather events, of which 700,000 died.33 The 
implication is that unless changes are made a similar number of climate casualties 
will manifest in the immediate future.  
 
The potential magnitude associated with climatic impact is vast and well beyond the 
thresholds previously reasoned by the permanent members. These magnitudes alone 
should be enough to help make the permanent members understand what the 
 
28 This idea of a technical response is drawn from the arguments of Krisch, who was 
discussing the UNSC’s response to terrorism. N Krisch, ‘The Rise and Fall of Collective 
Security: Terrorism, US Hegemony, and the Plight of the Security Council’ in C Walter, 
S Voneky, S Roeben, F Schorkopf (eds), Terrorism as a Challenge for National and 
International Law: Security Versus Liberty (1st edition, Springer 2003) 879. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Anonymous, ‘A Billion People Will Be Newly Exposed to Diseases Like Dengue 
Fever as World Temperatures Rise’ (Georgetown University Medical Centre, 28th 
March 2019) 
<https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/03/190328150856.htm> accessed 
30th August 2019. 
31 UNEP, ‘Frontiers 2018/19: Emerging Issues of Environmental Concern’ (2018). 
32 IPCC, ‘Climate Change and Land: Summary for Policy Makers’ (2019) 28. 
33 UNEP, ‘GEO6: Healthy Planet Healthy People’ (2019). 
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future holds unless securitisation is forthcoming. Also, these speculative magnitudes 
hold further import because they reflect the relationship between tangible and 
potential magnitude that was evident in regard to terrorism and Ebola. It was 
ambiguous as to whether the permanent members were relying solely on the 
tangible magnitude, or the fact it represented an example of what could potentially 
follow. It is important that a relationship between tangible and potential climatic 
harm can be presented to the permanent members in order to create the same 
conditions they relied on in past instances of securitisation, rendering these findings 
extremely useful in framing climatic magnitude. 
 
Although disease exacerbation and food and water insecurity are devastating, it is 
only by centralising extreme weather events that climate change can be framed in a 
way that triggers the magnitude narrative with the character required to replicate 
the lines of reasoning used by the permanent members. This is the most plausible 
way to argue the magnitude narrative has been triggered by climate change and so 
convince the permanent members of the need to intervene via a technical response. 
Given these findings, the rest of this chapter will have to focus on extreme weather 
events to remain consistent in the development of an argument to frame climate 
change as in need of securitisation. 
 
III. Climate Change: Transnational Scale 
 
Each international security threat exhibited some form of transnational scale, 
suggesting a base level of importance to this marker. However, there was a lack of 
consistency in the character of transnational scale, which is useful because it means 
climate change can be compared to the different templates to see which it fits most 
closely with. The level of attention on transnational scale varied, which indicates that 
when applying this marker to climate change there is room for flexibility. Connecting 
to this level of attention was a relationship with magnitude and so this marker 
cannot be analysed in isolation. To remain consistent with the findings above, focus 
will have to be on the transnational scale of climate change in connection to extreme 
weather events.   
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First, it must be clear that climate change manifests at the transnational level. The 
characterisation of climate change by environmental reports appears to have a long-
standing interpretation of the problem as existing globally. The State of the World 
Report 2002 said ‘Global emissions of carbon have grown’ and referred to ‘climbing 
global temperatures’.34 The UNEP references ‘global climate change’35 and the IPCC 
places significant emphasis on global warming.36 Climate change is a global concern 
because the entire planet is warming, but this is only the cause of climatic impact. 
When looking at the international security threats the permanent members were 
less interested in delving into their foundational causes, and more concerned with 
identifying the manifesting consequences. An examination of climate change must 
follow this pattern and focus on how climatic impacts from extreme weather events 
are transnational.  
 
The UNEP finds that ‘all countries…are vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate 
change’.37 This suggests that climatic-induced extreme weather events can be given a 
thematic characterisation by virtue of their global ubiquity, despite the discrete 
nature of these events. The UNEP further holds that ‘all countries are connected’ by 
climate change impacts.38 By connecting states together in this way the focus is 
removed from each discrete event and placed on the broader problem of climate 
change, further reinforcing a transnational scale via a thematic interpretation of the 
harm. This reflects the same pathway reasoned by the permanent members to view 
terrorism as a global problem. Instead of allowing the different instances of terrorism 
to be viewed according to their own individual circumstances they were grouped as 
part of a broader problem. Applying this here, climate change is the broader problem 
that is able to have discrete impacts around the globe in the form of extreme 
 
34 C Flavin, H French, G Gardner, ‘State of the World 2002’ (World Watch Institute 
2002) 31, 5. 
35 UNEP, ‘Yearbook: Emerging Issues in Our Global Environment 2014’ (2014) 7. 
36 IPCC, ‘Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Summary for Policymakers’ (2018). 
37 UNEP, ‘Yearbook: Emerging Issues in Our Global Environment 2013’ (2013) 7. 
38 Ibid., 7. 
 160 
weather events. This provides a strong argument that climate change triggers the 
threshold required for the identification of a transnational scale. 
 
Unlike the terrorism example climatic impacts have a second thematic connection 
because they are all linked by the exact same cause, namely rising temperatures. 
Terrorism may have been global in terms of existence, but attacks and groups were 
not linked by a common cause or set of circumstances.39 With climatic impact the 
cause is always the same and each event is connected to changing global conditions, 
making it impossible to disconnect extreme weather events from climate change. 
This reinforces the transnational scale, and frames climate change in such a way that 
it is difficult to ignore the need for a technical response at the international level. If 
this thematic interpretation of the problem could be linked explicitly to the 
experiences of the permanent members it would offer a robust argument to 
convince them of the transnational scale of climate change and the need for a 
commensurate response. However, any event connected to this thematic 
characterisation will have to exhibit a relationship with magnitude able to trigger the 
threshold of intervention if it is to get the attention of the permanent members. 
 
A high magnitude attached to an event could preclude the need for a clear or 
significant transnational scale, allowing greater reliance on a thematic identification 
of this marker. A low magnitude event would be reliant on a strong and obvious 
transnational scale that increases the range of the threat. In the terrorism instance 
the permanent members prioritised the magnitude of the attack and only vaguely 
pointed to the transnational scale as linked to the thematic ubiquity of the harm. The 
extreme events listed by the UNEP had low magnitudes and so would not be able to 
rely on a vague transnational scale through a thematic characterisation to get the 
attention of the permanent members. Moreover, in each of these cases the harm 
appears to be isolated within state borders, demanding still greater magnitudes. 
These low numerical illustrations would prevent the permanent members from being 
 
39 B Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (revised and expanded edition, Colombia University 
Press 2006). 
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able to minimise the need for a specific transnational scale. Only in cases where 
there is significant loss of life will the attention of the permanent members be 
available in regard to a thematic interpretation of transnational scale, and this is not 
arguable in regard to the extreme weather events listed by the UNEP. 
 
Considering the WMO findings, tens of thousands of people were found to have died 
from discrete climatic weather events.40 The magnitude of these events was such 
that it would preclude the need to identify a clear transnational scale, reflecting the 
relationship between magnitude and scale that was present in regard to terrorism 
and to a lesser extent proliferation. Only by centralising these extreme events of 
sizeable magnitude is it possible to rely on the thematic transnational scale of 
climate change. As long as there is evidence that the extreme events in question are 
linked to climate change the permanent members could be convinced to lessen their 
requirement for an obvious transnational scale, relying instead on the thematic 
interpretation of the threat.  
 
It is possible they will be reluctant to rely on this thematic characterisation of climate 
change, thus demanding a more tangible transnational scale. Looking at the regional 
spread of the 2014 Ebola outbreak the permanent members were able to identify a 
localised transnational scale based on a spillover effect. Applying this here, the IPCC 
finds ‘Changes in climate can amplify environmentally induced migration both within 
countries and across borders’.41 The State of the World Report also pointed to the 
‘flow of people across international borders’ because of climate-induced impacts.42 
Discrete climatic impacts such as extreme weather events and their consequences 
can become transnational in and of themselves, just like in the case of Ebola. The 
2017 South Asia floods exemplify this type of transnational scale, with high 
precipitation causing flooding across India, Bangladesh, and Nepal, forcing people to 
 
40 WMO, ‘Atlas of Mortality and Economic Losses from Weather, Climate and Water 
Extremes (1970–2012)’ (2014). 
41 IPCC, ‘Climate Change and Land: Summary for Policy Makers’ (2019) 17. 
42 C Flavin, H French, G Gardner, ‘State of the World 2002’ (World Watch Institute, 
2002) 130. 
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migrate.43 In this instance the existence and impact of an extreme weather event 
was able to spill across borders, providing a clearly identifiable transnational scale to 
the problem of climate change and so lessening the reliance on a thematic 
interpretation. Any arguments seeking to traverse this pathway will have to carefully 
identify and frame the relationship that exists between magnitude and transnational 
scale. Looking at some of the WMO examples it would not be difficult to argue that 
high magnitude events are also able to cross borders and so trigger the thresholds of 
intervention. Reversing the situation, it might be more challenging to argue that 
events with a high transnational scale and low magnitude should be securitised. In 
the context of disease exacerbation and food and water insecurity this problem 
largely precluded these aspects being useful frames for climate change.  
 
The most persuasive argument to make in regard to this marker is that climate 
change exists as a thematic threat, exhibiting a vast transnational scale. Taking this 
approach while allowing for less precision in regard to border crossings will 
necessitate that only those extreme weather events with a high magnitude are used 
to frame the problem. As long as the magnitude is high there will be less need for 
clear indicators of a transnational scale to trigger intervention. Framing climate 
change in this way and focussing on this symbiotic connection between magnitude 
and transnational scale offers the best way to argue its securitisation. 
 
IV. Climate Change: Collective Interest 
 
It must be decided whether or not there are collective interest implications from 
climate change. It was discovered the actual harm resulting from a threat does not 
need to be universal, instead it only needs to be widespread. The indiscriminate 
nature of the harm, however, must create the potential for any member of the 
international community to experience it. Furthermore, the permanent members 
 
43 Anonymous, ‘Severe Monsoon Rains Flood South Asia’ (NASA, Earth Observatory, 
8th September 2017) <https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/90920/severe-
monsoon-rains-flood-south-asia> accessed 3rd September 2019. 
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might need to be subjected to that harm to fully realise the collective security 
implications and the need for comprehensive international responses. 
 
The link between climate change and collective interest must be premised on the 
impact extreme weather events have around the world. The IPCC details some 
examples of widespread climatic harm from extreme weather events: tropical 
cyclones are continental and 1.15 billion people live in areas that experience them;44 
across North America ‘Flooding and heavy precipitation events have a variety of 
significant direct and indirect…impacts’;45 in Europe ‘Coastal flooding is an important’ 
disaster;46 across Africa an ‘overall increase in dryness’ has been observed, which will 
lead to widespread food and water insecurity.47 The harm emanating from climate 
change is not universal because not every state is equally affected by these impacts. 
But these findings indicate climatic impact from extreme events is present around 
the world and able to have a widespread impression on both states and peoples. In 
many of these examples the climatic harm is continental, making it hard to refute 
that extreme weather events cause widespread destruction. The first threshold is 
easily met, but it is only a preliminary trigger, holding less significance to the 
permanent members than those that follow. 
 
More challenging, the impact must be indiscriminate, posing potential harm to any 
member of the international community. Toulmin said ‘it is clear…that everybody is 
vulnerable in some way’ to the impacts of climate change.48 Unpacking this 
statement in regard to extreme weather events, their spread across the globe 
ensures that very few states remain outside the path of harm. The uncontrollable 
 
44 IPCC, ‘Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate 
Change Adaptation’ (2012) 240. 
45 Ibid., 259. 
46 Ibid., 256. 
47 Ibid., 253. 
48 J Vidal, ‘Climate Change Will Hit Poor Countries Hardest, Study Shows’ The 
Guardian (27th September 2013) <https://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2013/sep/27/climate-change-poor-countries-ipcc> accessed 10th 
September 2019. 
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nature of these events parallels the reasoning used by the permanent members to 
securitise the 2014 Ebola outbreak. Adjectives like rapidly, widely and deeply were 
applied to the Ebola outbreak and could easily be used to describe the nature of 
extreme weather events, reinforcing the possibility they could strike indiscriminately, 
creating a comparative argument that might have utility in convincing the permanent 
members to intervene. Alone this argument will likely not reach the threshold 
required to persuade the permanent members to recognise an indiscriminate nature.  
 
This is because the possibility exists that climatic impact will be worse for developing 
states, which may be unable to adapt to climatic consequences.49 This might allow 
the argument that developed states could avoid or absorb the harm from climate 
change.50 Challenging this, the nature of extreme weather events is becoming more 
unpredictable. Hurricane Dorian, for instance, was able to cause unexpected and 
significant harm to the USA.51 Studies also show that some of the biggest global 
economies including the USA and China are likely to feel climatic consequences to a 
far more pronounced degree than was previously thought, undermining their ability 
to absorb these shocks.52 The permanent members have been the recipients of 
indiscriminate harm and they will continue to face these climatic consequences along 
with the rest of the international community. Any suggestion that they will be able to 
avoid indiscriminate climatic harm is misleading and climate change should be 
framed to reflect this fact. 
 
 
49 Q Schiermeier, ‘Telltale Warming Likely to Hit Poorer Countries First’ (2018) 556 
Nature 415. 
50 P Nath, B Behera, ‘A critical Review of Impact of and Adaptation to Climate Change 
in Developed and Developing Economies’ (2010) 13 Environment, Development and 
Sustainability 141. 
51 S Gibbens, ‘How Warm Oceans Supercharge Deadly Hurricanes’ National 
Geographic (4th September 2019) 
<https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2019/09/how-warm-water-
fuels-a-hurricane/> accessed 16th September 2019. 
52 K Ricke, L Drouet, K Caldeira, M Tavoni, ‘Country-level Social Cost of Carbon’ (2018) 
8 Nature Climate Change 895. 
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The above argument indicates that climatic harm can have a direct impact on the 
permanent members. Their territories and peoples are not excluded from the impact 
of extreme weather events and their economies will be severely affected. This is a 
useful point in helping to present an argument that they are equally vulnerable to 
climatic harm. Yet, as the terrorism example clarifies, an event will need to take 
place to exemplify this vulnerability and its magnitude will need to be significant, 
even when one of their territories comes under threat.53 This poses the question, are 
the climatic magnitudes being experienced by the permanent members comparable 
to September 11th and so able to inspire a leadership role in the securitisation 
process?  
 
In 2003 a severe European heatwave resulted in the premature death of 70,000 
people.54 The 2019 record temperatures in France saw 1,500 heat-related deaths.55 
In Russia, 55,000 premature deaths were provoked by the heatwave of 2010.56 The 
USA and China have been exposed to heatwave impacts exacerbated by climate 
change,57 and the UK experiences severe precipitation events.58 Even if the 
permanent members adopt the more cynical position of only responding when their 
own security is challenged it is not hard to argue that climate change is posing the 
 
53 The city of Moscow was the subject of a terror attack prior to Resolution 1269, but 
the magnitude was likely not enough to prompt the securitisation of terrorism 
through Article 39. 
54 J M Robine et al., ‘Death Toll Exceeded 70,000 in Europe During the Summer of 
2003’ (2008) 331 Science Direct 171. 
55 R Brackett, ‘Summer Heat Waves Kill 1,500 People in France’ (The Weather 
Channel, 8th September 2019) <https://weather.com/news/news/2019-09-08-
summer-heat-waves-kill-1500-people-in-france> accessed 10th September 2019. 
56 WMO, ‘Atlas of Mortality and Economic Losses from Weather, Climate and Water 
Extremes (1970–2012)’ (2014). 
57 IPCC, ‘Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate 
Change Adaptation’ (2012), 258; J Tan et al., ‘Heat Wave Impacts on Mortality in 
Shanghai, 1998 and 2003’ (2007) 51 International Journal of Biometeorology 193. 
58 Anonymous, ‘Economic Impacts of Flooding in the UK’ (LSE, 14th January 2016) 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/news/economic-impacts-of-flooding-in-
the-uk/> accessed 1st November 2019. 
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necessary harm directly to them, with a level of magnitude that is sometimes more 
than reflective of the threshold required to trigger intervention. Combined with the 
indiscriminate and unpredictable nature of extreme weather events, the permanent 
members could be convinced of the collective interest inherent to climate change. 
Any argument presenting this case to them should highlight their vulnerability with 
reference to specific examples featuring a high magnitude, in the hope of prompting 
a recognition that they are subject to indiscriminate harm. Again, it is clear the 
collective interest argument is connected to the magnitude of an event with the 
latter assuming a significant level of sway over this marker, reinforcing that these 
triggers must be analysed and argued holistically. 
 
The final point in regard to collective interest is to establish that only through a 
collective response can the harm be addressed. The permanent members must 
believe their own security can only be improved via collective responses. As was the 
case with all three international security threats, but most clearly evident through 
proliferation, the only way to respond and safeguard the interests of the permanent 
members was to develop collective responses. In the proliferation instance all states 
had to adopt measures to stop the activities of non-state actors. A failure to create 
this blanket response would have allowed the insecurity to continue and the 
vulnerability of the permanent members would have remained irrespective of their 
own independent measures, a point not lost on them. 
 
Applying this to extreme weather, once an event takes off it is impossible to stop. 
Hurricane Dorian offers a recent example of an extreme event that once in operation 
could not be mitigated, leading eventually to massive amounts of harm.59 In 2019 the 
UK experienced extreme levels of precipitation and it was rendered unable to 
 
59 S Gibbens, ‘How Warm Oceans Supercharge Deadly Hurricanes’ National 
Geographic (4th September 2019) 
<https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/environment-and-
conservation/2019/09/how-warm-oceans-supercharge-deadly-hurricanes> accessed 
1st December 2019. 
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mitigate the impact or provide successful adaptive mechanisms.60 Such events are 
beyond the ability of even the most developed to respond and even the permanent 
members become mere witnesses to the devastation inflicted. The only way for 
these events to be addressed is pre-emptively through the technical response of 
collective emissions reduction. It must be stressed that the permanent members are 
not able to mitigate these events independently or immediately prior to their 
inception. Once an extreme weather event has begun it is already too late. The only 
way they can respond is by mitigating the causes of climate change, which was 
precisely the reasoning used to securitise proliferation and so there is scope to 
believe this frame can be usefully applied to climate change. 
 
To recap, the collective interest narrative is triggered by climatic impacts from 
extreme weather events, with the requisite level of harm, indiscriminate character 
and necessity for collective response all present. The permanent members are 
equally vulnerable once an extreme weather event begins. They will not be able to 
mitigate these climatic harms without the pre-emptive and combined response of 
the international community. Relying on specific examples where the territory of a 
permanent member is harmed by an extreme event will have the greatest likelihood 
of success in convincing them of the collective interest implications. It is also 
reasonable to suggest that the best chance of advancing this argument will be 
through an immediate response to an extreme weather event decimating the 
territory of a permanent member. This will help to highlight the collective interest 
inherent to climate change that they cannot avoid, and reinforce the urgent need for 
technical responses at the international level to pre-empt these disasters. 
 
V. Climate Change: Insufficient Response 
 
 
60 Anonymous, ‘UK Weather: More Rain Forecast After Flash Floods Across Britain’ 
(BBC, 2nd October 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-49890229> accessed 1st 
November 2019. 
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The permanent members consistently made reference to the intended responses to 
a threat, which included looking at the functioning of conventions, the content of 
conventions, the actions of states, and the ability of institutions to fulfil their role. 
This broad spectrum is useful because it allows arguments to be made concerning 
the actions of states and the content of the international climate framework.61 In 
addition to identifying the point at which an insufficient response exists the 
permanent members must also be under the impression that the intended response 
has become overwhelmed. 
 
There can be little doubt that the intended responses to climate change housed in 
international climate law are insufficient. Chapter One provided a detailed analysis of 
the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement in which it was argued that both approaches 
(hard and soft) have proven unable to stem climate change. These legal responses 
attempt to target the global emission of greenhouse gases by creating a unified 
international response. The fact that emissions continue to rise and have done so 
throughout the history of ICL shows the intended responses to climate change are 
insufficient. There can be no debate on this point. What, however, is up for 
consideration is whether or not the permanent members have the scope to identify 
the point at which this response is insufficient? 
 
The first option is to look at the terrorism precedent and the point at which the 
permanent members identified an insufficient response. There was little focus on 
this aspect in their submissions,62 but inclusion within Resolution 1368 indicated a 
tacit agreement among the permanent members that the failure of states to sign up 
to the anti-terror conventions was a significant point of insufficiency. There is little 
point comparing the intended climate responses to the terrorism example because 
ICL exhibits a very successful engagement rate, having attained near universal 
 
61 As will be expanded in Chapter Six the permanent members do reference 
international climate law.  
62 Only China explicitly referenced this point.  
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membership.63 There can be no claim that international climate law is insufficient 
because of a lack of engagement from the international community. 
 
Turning attention to the proliferation example, the permanent members identified 
an insufficient response because of gaps in the regime. Proliferation had evolved to 
include non-state actors, which meant the primary focus of the regime, 
concentrating on the action of states, had inadvertently created gaps susceptible to 
exploitation.64 These gaps transferred to the response of states that equally became 
insufficient against the new non-state actor dynamic. Applying this to ICL, it is 
possible to argue that gaps exist in the framework. The Paris Agreement exhibits a 
clear lack of binding obligations, within which a number of vital aspects of the 
problem are allowed to go unaddressed. For instance, there is no provision on the 
need to phase out fossil fuels.65 There is also a lack of reduction targets to facilitate 
the achievement of its broader objectives. However, these gaps are not the product 
of an evolving threat but are instead deliberately negotiated by state parties. Had 
states been willing to include binding and specific obligations they would have, and 
so at first glance it is difficult to compare the insufficient response of the climate 
framework to the reasoning that led to intervention in the proliferation instance.   
 
However, there is also an inadvertent gap in the climate framework that might be 
exploited to show the permanent members that the intended response is 
insufficient. The common but differentiated responsibility norm, although centralised 
through Paris to allow states to set their own response agenda, is in some cases 
 
63 Anonymous, ‘Depository’ (UN Treaty Collection, 2019) 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-
d&chapter=27&lang=_en&clang=_en> accessed 27th November 2019. 
64 D Albright, C Hinderstein, ‘Unravelling the A.Q. Khan and Future Proliferation 
Networks’ (2005) 28 Washington Quarterly 109. 
65 J Dehm, ‘Post Paris Reflections: Fossil Fuels, Human Rights and the Need to 
Excavate New Ideas for Climate Justice’ (2017) 8 Journal of Human Rights and the 
Environment 280. 
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resulting in little or no action being taken to reduce emissions.66 The Agreement 
commits to ‘Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 
2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase 
to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’.67 As the INDCs and NDCs continue to come 
under scrutiny it is becoming clear that there is a significant gap between the 
objective of Paris and the means with which to achieve it. States may have been 
given the autonomy to set and meet their own climate obligations, but their actions 
must still match the ambition of the Agreement. At present they are not, and so it is 
arguable an unintentional gap in the framework exists that will preclude the 
achievement of its objectives. This should be highlighted to the permanent members 
and emphasis placed on the ability of this gap to undermine the entire regime, 
reflecting the same rationales used in the proliferation setting.  
 
Despite already having a point to highlight an insufficient response to the permanent 
members, it is worth touching on the Ebola example that highlights a different way 
to reason this narrative. In this instance the insufficient response was identified 
directly through the inability of specific states to respond to the Ebola emergency. 
Applying this to climate change it might be possible to argue an insufficiency based 
on the capacity of states to respond to the needs of the climate framework. The 
obvious line to take here is that developing states may struggle to generate or 
implement a sufficient INDC to mitigate climate change.68 Mexico, for instance, 
highlighted in its INDC that it could take greater action if international support is 
provided, indicating that levels of capacity might determine the sufficiency of state 
 
66 J Rogelj et al., ‘Paris Agreement Climate Proposals Need a Boost to Keep Warming 
Well Below the 2°C’ (2016) Nature 534. 
67 Paris Agreement to The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(adopted 12th December 2015, entered into force on the 4th of November 2016) UN 
Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, Article 2(1)(a). 
68 P Christoff, R Eckersley, ‘Comparing State Responses’ in J Dryzek, R Norgaard (eds) 
The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society (1st edition, Oxford University 
Press 2011) 431. 
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responses.69 It could be argued before the UNSC that many states in a similar 
position to Mexico will need support if they are to introduce a sufficient response to 
the threat. The permanent members are not beyond adopting this line of argument 
and so it may have merit in helping to convince them of the need to intervene.  
 
This means those developed states that have the capacity but are choosing not to 
respond will be ignored by the UNSC. This is not a satisfactory scenario and if the 
UNSC is to intervene it should be through a balanced approach that does not 
prejudice states based on development. With that in mind, the developed states are 
supposed to be providing support to international climate funds and developing 
greater international response capacity.70 They are as yet failing to do so, at least to 
the degree necessitated by the scale of the problem and the needs of developing 
states.71 This could be used to highlight to the permanent members that there is an 
expectation within the Paris Agreement that is not being fulfilled because of the 
unexpected lack of commitment in the INDCs of the developed states. Those with the 
means to support climate mitigation are not making the requisite commitments and 
the permanent members have in the past taken aim at this type of inadvertent 
inaction. When they reasoned the Ebola intervention it was based on the need for 
those developed states to provide greater financial and physical resources to the 
WHO. This argument allows the insufficient climate response to be framed in a way 
that directly resonates with the past motivations of the permanent members.   
 
The permanent members could be petitioned to intervene based on the incapacity of 
developing states to sufficiently respond, and the choice of developed states to 
 
69 Mexico: Gobierno De La Republica: Intended Nationally Determined Contribution 
(March 2015). 
70 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9th May 1992, 
entered into force 21st March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107, Article 4(3); Paris Agreement to 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 12th 
December 2015, entered into force 4th November 2016) UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, Article 9(3). 
71 M Fridahl et al., ‘Supporting Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions through the 
Green Climate Fund: Governance Capacities and Challenges’ (2014) 4 CCLR 257. 
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insufficiently respond to UNFCCC mechanisms. Taking this dual approach, they could 
be petitioned to intervene based on the inadvertent gaps in the intended response of 
ICL. Targeting the developing and developed world by identifying the shortcomings 
attributable to each will help to ensure that no group of states are prejudiced by 
intervention, and arguments of inequity and colonial aspiration will be marginalised. 
Highlighting that the accidental gaps inherent to the Paris Agreement and wider 
UNFCCC are seriously damaging its chance of success should be the predominant 
frame used to present this argument to the permanent members. 
 
Turning to the other important finding within this narrative, the intended responses 
to a threat must be overwhelmed. In the case of all three international security 
threats there was a link between the developing magnitude and or transnational 
scale of the threats, which had rendered the intended responses insufficient. In 
regard to climate change this point must be made with reference to extreme 
weather events. Looking at the examples highlighted earlier by the WMO, their 
magnitude was significant enough to warrant the argument that the intended 
responses to climate change are overwhelmed.72 As the atmosphere has continued 
to heat these events have become more frequent and in some instances exhibited an 
amplified intensity.73 Moreover, in some cases tens of thousands of deaths have 
occurred.74 Linking the insufficient response to an increasing magnitude would allow 
 
72 WMO, ‘Atlas of Mortality and Economic Losses from Weather, Climate and Water 
Extremes (1970–2012)’ (2014). 
73 S Gibbens, ‘How Warm Oceans Supercharge Deadly Hurricanes’ National 
Geographic (4th September 2019) 
<https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/environment-and-
conservation/2019/09/how-warm-oceans-supercharge-deadly-hurricanes> accessed 
1st December 2019; M Le Page, ‘Cyclone Kenneth is one of the strongest storms to hit 
mainland Africa’ New Scientist (26th April 2019) 
<https://www.newscientist.com/article/2200925-cyclone-kenneth-is-one-of-the-
strongest-storms-to-hit-mainland-africa/> accessed 19th November 2019. 
74 WMO, ‘Atlas of Mortality and Economic Losses from Weather, Climate and Water 
Extremes (1970–2012)’ (2014). 
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the argument that the UNFCCC and subsequent conventions are being overwhelmed 
and have been for some time.  
 
This might invite argument from climate sceptics that the Paris Agreement now 
exists, and it is against this latest incarnation of ICL that we must compare climatic 
events. To that end, in 2019 Cyclone Idai struck the African continent causing mass 
devastation.75 Sprawling through Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe, Idai had a 
transnational scale, not too dissimilar to that of the 2014 Ebola outbreak.76 The 
magnitude of Idai in terms of death toll was over 1000 people.77 Idai was able to 
affect 1.8 million people, displacing over four hundred thousand and causing many 
thousands to suffer disease.78 Idai represents one of the worst ‘weather related 
disaster[s] to hit the southern hemisphere’.79 Its destructive power was compounded 
by the warmer atmosphere, which contained a greater concentration of moisture 
that was deposited in Mozambique causing mass flooding.80 The overall 
humanitarian impact of Idai was catastrophic, leaving 2.2 million people in need of 
 
75 M Goldberg, ‘Cyclone Idai Has Caused Massive Devastation in Mozambique, 
Malawi and Zimbabwe’ (UN Dispatch, 19th March 2019) 
<https://www.undispatch.com/cyclone-idai-has-caused-massive-devastation-in-
mozambique-malawi-and-zimbabwe/> accessed 5th December 2019. 
76 Anonymous, ‘Idai (Southern Indian Ocean)’ (NASA: Hurricane and Typhoon 
Updates, 28th March 2019) <https://blogs.nasa.gov/hurricanes/tag/idai-2019/> 
accessed 5th December 2019. 
77 S Leahy, ‘Why Cyclone Idai Was So Destructive’ National Geographic (21st March 
2019) <https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/environment/2019/03/why-cyclone-
idai-was-so-destructive> accessed 5th December 2019. 
78 Anonymous, ‘Tropical Cyclones Idai and Kenneth’ (WHO, 10th May 2019) 
<https://www.afro.who.int/sites/default/files/2019-
05/NationalSitRep1Mozambique10May2019_ENG.pdf> accessed 6th December 2019. 
79 S Leahy, ‘Why Cyclone Idai Was So Destructive’ National Geographic (21st March 
2019) <https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/environment/2019/03/why-cyclone-
idai-was-so-destructive> accessed 5th December 2019. 
80 Ibid. 
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urgent assistance.81 There is no question, extreme weather events routinely 
overwhelm the Paris Agreement and wider UNFCCC. 
 
This is just one example of how climatic impacts are continuing to exacerbate and 
become far more problematic for states all around the world. The insufficient 
response of the Paris Agreement to address the problem of emissions and so halt the 
exacerbation of these extreme events represents a complete failure of the ordinary 
mechanisms, which must now be considered overwhelmed.82 The intersection 
between magnitude and insufficient response is irrefutable and will only get worse. 
Making this argument to the permanent members might convince them that the 
status quo should not be allowed to prevail.83 This argument would have most 
impact if presented immediately after an extreme weather event strikes one of their 
territories, but it is also applicable to events occurring around the globe. Framing 
climate change in this way offers the best approach to argue that the ordinary 
responses are insufficient.  
 
VI. Climate Change: Urgency 
 
Within the international security threats, the permanent members identified an 
urgent need to respond. The variation through which this manifested means there is 
scope to consider a number of pathways in which climatic harm could be framed as 
 
81 Anonymous, ‘Cyclones Idai and Kenneth’ (UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, 2019) <https://www.unocha.org/southern-and-eastern-africa-
rosea/cyclones-idai-and-kenneth> accessed 5th December 2019. 
82 F Harvey, ‘One Climate Crisis Disaster Happening Every Week, UN Warns’ The 
Guardian (7th July 2019) 
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disaster-happening-every-week-un-warns> accessed 19th November 2019. 
83 Cyclone Kenneth represents another example of climate change exacerbating 
extreme weather events and has been labelled the most powerful cyclone to ever hit 
Africa. M Le Page, ‘Cyclone Kenneth Is One of the Strongest Storms to Hit Mainland 
Africa’ New Scientist (26th April 2019) 
<https://www.newscientist.com/article/2200925-cyclone-kenneth-is-one-of-the-
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urgent. Maintaining uniformity with the rest of this chapter, the focus of this section 
will have to be on extreme weather events and how they might be framed as 
urgently requiring intervention. However, it is important to situate this research 
within the scientific camp that is unequivocal on the urgent nature of this threat, and 
so, first, it will be revealed that climate change represents an urgent threat generally. 
Second, the urgent nature of extreme weather events will be analysed alongside 
other narratives to determine if their evolution can provide a suitable frame for an 
urgent characterisation that will resonate with the permanent members.  
 
Climate change is an urgent threat. There is little doubt on this point from the 
scientific community and the IPCC held in 2018 that without ‘increased and urgent 
mitigation ambition in the coming years…global warming will surpass 1.5°C in the 
following decades, leading to irreversible loss…and crisis after crisis’.84 The report 
went on to find that climate change represents ‘an urgent and potentially irreversible 
threat to human societies and the planet’.85 The IPCC has been criticised for being 
too sedate with regard to its findings on climate change.86 Consequently, its use of 
the word urgent in this report is not an example of hyperbole or exaggeration. It 
should be interpreted as a reflection of the severe and urgent nature of the climate 
threat, that if allowed to continue unchecked will have a devastating impact on 
humanity and the planet. With this in mind, some in the scientific community have 
called for climate action to be framed around two principles: first, that climate 
change represents an ‘immediate and existential threat’; second, that ‘an emergency 
response is essential’.87 From the scientific perspective, there can be no argument on 
the urgent nature of the climate change threat. 
 
 
84 IPCC, ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C’ (2018), vi.  
85 Ibid., 79. 
86 D Spratt, I Dunlop, ‘What Lies Beneath’ (National Centre for Climate Restoration 
2018). 
87 D Spratt, I Dunlop, ‘What Lies Beneath’ (National Centre for Climate Restoration 
2018), 39. 
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A WMO study from 1970 to 2012 identified that weather-climate-and-water related 
disasters claimed the lives of 1.94 million people.88 The time span of this figure likely 
means the permanent members would not view these climatic impacts as urgent. 
However, many of these weather extremes may be afforded greater intensity as a 
direct result of climate change. For instance, heatwaves are expected to become 
more intense with climbing global temperatures, and by 2030 they are anticipated to 
cause the ‘additional annual deaths of 38,000 people’.89 The frequency of hurricanes 
appears to be linked to increasing temperatures.90 Warmer oceans are also able to 
supercharge hurricanes, making them more destructive.91 Almost all coastal cities 
will be ‘increasingly vulnerable to rising sea levels, floods and storm surges caused by 
climate change and extreme weather events’.92 Climatic impacts from extreme 
weather events are becoming increasingly urgent because of their frequency, 
intensity and impact on humanity. 
 
The continuation of emissions and the steady rise of global temperatures will 
increase the risk of extreme weather around the world.93 Consequently, the WMO 
findings should not be interpreted as a reflection of climatic impacts to come from 
extreme weather, but as the absolute minimum impact that will manifest in the 
 
88 WMO, ‘Atlas of Mortality and Economic Losses from Weather, Climate and Water 
Extremes (1970–2012)’ (2014). 
89 IPCC, ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C’ (2018), 452. 
90 S Seneviratne et al., ‘Changes in climate extremes and their impacts of the natural 
physical environment’ in C B Field et al. (eds), Managing the Risks of Extreme Events 
and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, A Special Report of Working 
Groups I and II of the IPCC (CUP 2019) 109, 160. 
91 S Gibbens, ‘How Warm Oceans Supercharge Deadly Hurricanes’ National 
Geographic (4th September 2019) 
<https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/environment-and-
conservation/2019/09/how-warm-oceans-supercharge-deadly-hurricanes> accessed 
1st December 2019. 
92 UNEP, ‘GEO6: Summary for Policymakers’ (2019), 6. 
93 R Pidcock, R Pearce, R McSweeney, ‘Mapped: How Climate Change Affects Extreme 
Weather Around the World’ (15th April 2020) 
<https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-how-climate-change-affects-extreme-
weather-around-the-world> accessed 29th July 2020. 
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future. It is hard to argue that there is not an urgent need to address the emissions 
problem in order to prevent the increasing harm that these events will have on 
humanity. There is also a temporal factor involved, and if we do not start reducing 
emissions immediately the chance of failing to meet the 1.5°C target is ‘significantly 
increased’, which will compound the escalating impact of extreme weather.94 The 
threat from climate change presents urgent challenges for the global community 
through the exacerbation of extreme weather events. However, to be useful here, 
this urgent nature must be linked to other narratives in order to frame the climate 
threat in a way that resonates with the permanent members. The following 
paragraphs will consider the urgent nature of extreme weather events as linked to 
magnitude, scale and collective interest.   
 
Beginning with magnitude, we know from earlier in this chapter that the impact from 
extreme weather is able to cross the threshold required to trigger intervention, at 
least according to the numerical thresholds identified in regard to terrorism and the 
2014 Ebola outbreak. The magnitude of harm emanating from extreme weather 
events should be able to instil a sense of urgency. However, despite significant 
extreme weather magnitudes being visible within their own territories, the 
permanent members have made no move to securitise these threats.95 Even 
dramatic events like Hurricane Katrina were unable to generate any sense of urgency 
despite more than 1200 deaths.96 It might be the case that this death toll was within 
that which can be expected where hurricanes are concerned, suggesting for an 
extreme event to be successful in attracting permanent member attention, it may 
have to reach magnitudes well in excess of its usual impact. This was the case in 
regard to the securitisation of terrorism and Ebola. In both these cases the 
intervention was preceded by a magnitude never before seen. Where magnitude is 
 
94 IPCC, ‘Global Warming of 1.5°C’ (2018), 358. 
95 See examples discussed earlier in regard to the 2003 heatwave in Europe and the 
2010 heatwave in Russia. 
96 S Gibbons, ‘Hurricane Katrina, Explained’ National Geographic (16th January 2019) 
<https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/natural-
disasters/reference/hurricane-katrina/> accessed 29th July 2020. 
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concerned the permanent members will remain in a state of apathy, until the 
urgency of the threat is reflected through a magnitude of previously unseen 
proportions.97  
 
Moving to scale, the proliferation example indicates that where a dramatic shift in 
the reach of a threat takes place the permanent members can be convinced of the 
need to securitise. The inclusion of non-state actors exponentially increased the 
transnational scale of the threat, and this generated a sense of urgency when linked 
to terrorism. Where extreme weather events are concerned the scale of the threat 
has undergone no obvious change. Climate change is increasing the reach of threats 
and guaranteeing that more borders are crossed. But essentially the cause of the 
harm is still the same climatic forces as before, they are simply more pronounced 
now. This will make it difficult for the permanent members to identify a change in 
circumstance that has led to an increased scale either locally, transnationally or 
internationally. The threat from extreme weather events in 2020 will likely be 
interpreted as no different from that which was visible in 1970. Even taking a 
thematic interpretation of the threat will likely produce no change in perspective 
because extreme weather events have always existed globally. Consequently, there 
is little scope to argue that an increasing scale will instil a sense of urgency.  
 
The last threshold marker that might evolve to advance a sense of urgency is 
collective interest. In regard to the Ebola outbreak, the permanent members became 
aware that the situation was progressing beyond just a health crisis, to a social and 
political catastrophe that would have repercussions on the viability of the states in 
question. In turn this may have had a destabilising effect on the region, ultimately 
 
97 Even where an event exhibits unseen power and only chance prevented a vast 
magnitude, the permanent members remain unable to identify a potential threat, 
see: S Gibbens, ‘How Warm Oceans Supercharge Deadly Hurricanes’ National 
Geographic (4th September 2019) 
<https://www.nationalgeographic.co.uk/environment-and-
conservation/2019/09/how-warm-oceans-supercharge-deadly-hurricanes> accessed 
1st December 2019. 
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resulting in the virus becoming more widespread and potentially reaching further 
into the international community. As such, the need to respond and prevent these 
cascading consequences was present in the minds of the permanent members. 
Where climate change is concerned there is potential for repercussions from an 
extreme weather event to have collective interest ramifications.  
 
Extreme events such as droughts, floods, and food and water shortages might appear 
at first glance to be domestic problems. Nevertheless, these climate-change-induced 
insecurities cause problems at the level of the international community because of 
their impacts on regional and international stability.98 As climatic harm manifests, 
migration becomes a more frequent response.99 Internal territories and neighbouring 
states may start to experience pressures, which could cause an increase in regional 
tension.100 Human security issues may advance through the implementation of 
measures to stop mass migration.101 This might manifest through immediate violence 
at international frontiers. It is also possible that states may begin to initiate 
aggressive policies to secure greater access to essential natural resources in order to 
protect their own populations.102 Extreme weather events may destabilise states 
causing economic instability, facilitating a descent into chaos that could force further 
migration and regional tension.103 Thus, although at first glance climatic implications 
appear to be human-security-centric or domestic in nature they may rapidly link to 
state instability, leading to international insecurity.  
 
98 IPCC, ‘Climate Change and Land: Summary for Policy Makers’ (2019). 
99 C Farbotko, H Lazrus, ‘The First Climate Refugees? Contesting Global Narratives of 
Climate Change in Tuvalu’ (2012) 22 Global Environmental Change 382. 
100 Ibid. 
101 O Brown, R McLeman, ‘A Recurring Anarchy? The Emergence of Climate Change 
as a Threat to International Peace and Security’ (2009) 9 Conflict, Security and 
Development 289. 
102 P H Gleick, ‘Water and Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security’ 
(1993) 18 International Security 79; UNEP, ‘GEO 6: Healthy Planet Healthy People’ 
(2019). 
103 WMO, ‘Atlas of Mortality and Economic Losses from Weather, Climate and Water 
Extremes (1970–2012)’ (2014). 
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With these consequences in mind it is possible to argue that climate change will have 
collective insecurity repercussions, and so a sense of urgency could develop as an 
extreme event unfolds. This offers the most viable way to argue that another 
narrative could advance to generate the required sense of urgency from the 
permanent members. It is also likely that in such a setting the magnitude and scale of 
a threat would become relevant in the same way they contributed to the permanent 
members reading the Ebola outbreak as a threat to peace. Again, we can see that the 
narratives do not operate independently but are closely linked to one another. In the 
context of climate change a sense of urgency is most easily extrapolated from the 
collective interest implications involved, providing the most viable way in which to 
frame this pending catastrophe as in need of an urgent response from the UNSC.  
 
VII. Application of Frame 
 
This chapter has argued that the most suitable way to frame climate change as a 
threat to peace is through the exacerbating impact it has on extreme weather events 
and the intensified consequences that will follow. By doing so the thresholds and 
triggers that underpin the securitisation narratives are met. This finding does not 
mean the permanent members will suddenly be convinced of the need to securitise 
climate change. Instead, questions are raised concerning how the UNSC will know 
when the thresholds and triggers are met, and what good does this knowledge do to 
advance the climate security agenda. 
 
Climate change is a self-evident threat; it is happening.104 In the same way conflict is 
visible, the impact of climatic-induced extreme weather is plain to see. If an extreme 
weather event takes place that is able to draw on the narratives presented here, 
then it is possible that the UNSC will be able to identify the threat as in need of 
securitisation. This is precisely what happened in response to the September 11th 
 
104 D Spratt, I Dunlop, ‘What Lies Beneath’ (National Centre for Climate Restoration 
2018). 
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attacks and the 2014 Ebola outbreak. In both cases observable global events 
attracted the attention of the UNSC and implicitly crossed the thresholds and 
triggers, allowing the permanent members to unite behind a securitisation agenda. 
An extreme weather event of unseen proportions will be visible, likely triggering the 
thresholds for securitisation. It is hoped that the permanent members would 
respond according to their own past rationales of securitisation and activate Article 
39. However, we know the UNSC does not behave according to a strict rule of 
precedent and so waiting in hope for an event to unite the permanent members is 
potentially unhelpful and may even be counterproductive. As such, this last section is 
not about the UNSC recognising when the thresholds and triggers have been met. 
Instead, the knowledge acquired on what underpins the securitisation of threats 
should be mobilised to advance the climate security agenda. 
 
The Director-General of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has in 
the past appeared before the UNSC to argue the threat posed by climate change.105 
The statement made was scientifically accurate but lacked understanding of how 
threats had been securitised previously. Mr Steiner referred to the IPCC’s Fourth 
Assessment Report as ‘uncontested in terms of the international peer review’ and 
argued that climate change was ‘overtaking the rather conservative scenarios’ 
previously predicted.106 He went on to talk about the ‘linear warming’ that has 
occurred over the past five decades, before stating that ‘natural disasters are 
fundamentally disruptive events’.107 His arguments were sedate, unable to invoke a 
sense of collective urgency that drew on previous securitisation logics. Subsequently, 
the permanent members were not moved to securitise climate change.  
 
Using the knowledge generated here, arguments could be framed to draw on the 
securitisation narratives and frame climate change in a way that resonates more 
clearly with the permanent members and their logics of security. Experts appearing 
 
105 UNSC Verbatim Record (20th July 2011) UN Doc S/PV/6587. 
106 Ibid., 3. 
107 Ibid., 4, 5.  
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before the UNSC is not without precedent and in 2014 evidence to support the 
securitisation of Ebola was submitted by several relevant actors.108 Dr Chan, then 
Director-General of the WHO, specified that ‘Everything now is unprecedented. 
Everything now is happening faster than ever before’109 and ‘with such a degree of 
suffering and such a magnitude of cascading consequences’.110 Dr Chan drew on 
magnitude, stating that ‘5500 people have been infected. Well over 2500 have 
died’.111 The outbreak was described as ‘a threat to national security well beyond the 
outbreak zones’.112 Dr Chan also highlighted that ‘hunger has become an even 
greater concern than the virus’,113 further arguing that ‘we must catch up in the most 
urgent and pragmatic way possible’.114 These narratives reflect the lines of reasoning 
used by the permanent members in their own submissions to securitise international 
security threats. The influence these arguments had on them in this instance is not 
clear, but the parallel lines of justification employed does suggest that the 
permanent members can at least be guided by expert submissions if arguments are 
presented in the right way.115  
 
Appearing before the UNSC and framing climate change according to the narratives 
and their underpinning thresholds presents a novel route in which to further the 
securitisation of this threat. If a UNEP representative was to come before the UNSC 
and draw on climate-related extreme weather in the manner argued throughout this 
chapter, it may have much greater impact than was cultivated in 2011.116 It may help 
 
108 Several health experts participated in the meeting, but for the purposes here only 
Director-General Chan has been used to exemplify how they may argue for the 
securitisation of a threat before the UNSC.  
109 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc/S/PV/7268, 5. 
110 Ibid., 5. 
111 Ibid., 5. 
112 Ibid., 5. 
113 Ibid., 5. 
114 Ibid., 5. 
115 Considering the impact outside experts have on the securitisation of threats is a 
future line of research that could be explored. 
116 This is when Director-General Steiner first appeared before the UNSC: UNSC 
Verbatim Record (20th July 2011) UN Doc S/PV/6587. 
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the permanent members to realise that the triggers for intervention already exist, 
prompting them to unite behind a securitisation agenda. Nonetheless, the UNEP 
might be successful in framing climate change according to the securitisation 
narratives but that does not mean Article 39 will follow as a pre-emptive precaution. 
It is accepted that this is unlikely, and the onset of a sizable climatic disaster will 
probably be necessary for the permanent members to respond through Article 39. 
When such a disaster strikes, the world and the UNSC will watch the inevitable 
unfold. 
 
In such an instance the narratives identified here may still be useful. Following the 
September 11th attacks, the USA embarked upon a course to securitise terrorism,117 
demonstrating that a single permanent member can drive forward the securitisation 
of an issue, convincing its counterparts of the need to activate Article 39. The UK has 
been an advocate of climate security since 2007, driving debate and arguing for its 
securitisation.118 The frame identified here could be useful if the UK, or any other 
permanent member, decided to try and convince the others of the need to securitise 
climate change. By drawing on this frame, such an argument would be rooted in the 
practice of the permanent members and may have greater impact than previous 
attempts at securitisation. There is also no reason that other members of the wider 
UNSC could not use this argument to try and achieve securitisation or convince the 
permanent members to embark upon this pathway. It is here, in the context of 
practical application, that this thesis has most utility and should be employed by 
those seeking to find ways to convince the permanent members of the need to 
securitise climate change.  
 
VIII. Concluding Remarks  
 
 
117 K Stiles, ‘The Power of Procedure and the Procedures of the Powerful: Anti-Terror 
Law in the United Nations’ (2006) 43 Journal of Peace Research 37. 
118 F Sindico, ‘Climate Change: A Security (Council) Issue?’ (2007) 1 (1) The Carbon 
and Climate Law Review 29. 
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Those who wish to see climate change brought within the scope of Article 39 have so 
far failed to present arguments capable of moving the permanent members towards 
this objective.119 One of the core motivations of this thesis was to address this deficit 
and present an argument that would help to realise this ambition. This chapter set 
out with the knowledge of how the permanent members justify uniting in the face of 
international security threats and respond through Article 39. Applying this to 
climate change has allowed a number of arguments to be presented that stem from 
the securitising arguments of the permanent members and so might help to push the 
climate security agenda forward. 
 
Looking at the narratives that have prompted past intervention, climate change was 
carefully framed in a way that would best resonate with the permanent members. 
Focussing on extreme climatic events, it has been shown that climate change exhibits 
the requisite magnitude and transnational scale to attract their attention. It also 
represents an indiscriminate collective interest threat that must be responded to at 
the international level, in large part because the intended responses have been 
rendered insufficient by an advancing magnitude. There is a sense of urgency, that 
stems from climate change itself, but also springs from the collective insecurity 
implications present from extreme weather events. Importantly, it has become clear 
that these narratives operate in connection with one another and are of little use on 
their own. Applying them holistically climate change can be framed as an Article 39 
international security threat in a way that might be useful to help convince the 
permanent members of the need to intervene. Applying this knowledge pre-
emptively experts may be able to push forward the climate security agenda before 
the UNSC. However, it is recognised that such an argument is most likely to gain 
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Crafting a Response to Climate Change 
 
‘The Council could work in parallel with the climate regime, and support and 




This chapter seeks to consider what function the UNSC could undertake were it to 
securitise climate change. Discussion exists on its suitability to enter the climate 
change arena, both in and outside the UNSC. This must inform the discourse here to 
help forge a defensible pathway towards a positive climate resolution. It will be 
argued the UNSC could be mobilised to provide a complementary function to 
international climate law, capitalising on its benefits without swaying too closely to 
its negative qualities. To make this case, four questions will be addressed: what are 
the arguments against UNSC intervention; what is the position of each permanent 
member; what would a complementary role for the UNSC look like; and would it be 
effective? 
 
II. Arguments Against Intervention 
 
The following is a brief review of arguments that may be raised against resorting to 
the UNSC to address the climate crisis. It reveals the different types of potential 
response that might be available to the UNSC if it decided to activate Article 39 in the 
context of climate change. Since 1992 there has been discussion on the prospect of 
the UNSC involving itself in the matter of environmental harm.2 Overtime this has 
 
1 A Boyle, J Hartmann, A Savaresi, ‘The United Nations Security Council’s Legislative 
and Enforcement Powers and Climate Change’ in S Scott, C Ku (eds) Climate Change 
and the UN Security Council (1st edition, EE 2018) 101, 116. 
2 C Tinker, ‘Environmental Security in the United Nations: Not a Matter for the 
Security Council’ (1992) 59 Tennessee Law Review 787. 
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evolved to focus specifically on a role for the UNSC in climate change.3 A common 
context to these discussions is the assertion that the traditional mechanisms for 
addressing climate change are proving unable to stem the problem.4 Once 
established, arguments diverge on the point of involving the UNSC, with debate 
surrounding the manner of intervention and some opposing this move altogether. 
This section illustrates these arguments, with the intention of allowing them to be 
factored into the third section of this chapter that will advocate a UNSC response to 
climate change. 
 
The UNSC was designed with a particular character and competence that may not 
lend itself to the type of response climate change requires.5 It was initially designed 
to handle matters of a conventional conflict nature.6 Its mandate was informed by 
the events of WWII, which led to its remit being couched in terms linked to conflict 
and military situations, albeit with the flexibility to evolve.7 Commentators have 
subsequently contemplated that involvement in climate change may be through the 
lens of military intervention.8 This leads to a clash between the UNSC’s traditional 
remit and climate change, which is not in essence of military character. Such a 
response would be inappropriate and the application of force to the resolution of 
climate change remains ambiguous. Trina Ng highlights that there is a ‘glaring 
incongruity between environmental measures and armed military action’.9 Yet, 
 
3 S Scott, R Andrade, ‘The Global Response to Climate Change: Can the Security 
Council Assume a Lead Role?’ (2012) 18 (2) Brown Journal of World Affairs 215. 
4 B Boer, ‘The Globalisation of Environmental Law: The Role of the United Nations’ 
(1995) 20 Melbourne Law Review 101; S Cousins, ‘UN Security Council: Playing a Role 
in the International Climate Change Regime’ (2013) 25 Global Change, Peace and 
Security 191. 
5 G Kirk, ‘The Enforcement of Security’ (1946) 55 Yale Law Review 1081. 
6 F Kirgis, ‘The Security Council’s First Fifty Years’ (1995) 89 (3) The American Journal 
of International Law 506. 
7 See Chapter Three. 
8 L Elliot, ‘Imaginative Adaptations: A Possible Environmental Role for the UN Security 
Council’ (2003) 24 Contemporary Security Policy 47. 
9 T Ng, ‘Safeguarding Peace and Security in our Warming World: A Role for the 
Security Council’ (2010) 15 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 275, 297. 
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because of the manner of its constitution once Article 39 has been activated the 
UNSC has access to Article 42 responses.10 A military-based reaction to climate 
change is a theoretical possibility, leading some to immediately discount the UNSC as 
a viable response option to climate change, or at least omit force from discussion, 
which is problematic because nothing excludes it from UNSC deliberation.11 
 
Force comes with unintended impacts on the environment. Again Ng leads on this 
problem and says, ‘military action is a blunt instrument that could ironically do more 
harm than good’.12 Research supports this assertion in the climate context, and the 
US Air Force is able to generate a gigantic amount of greenhouse gas emissions.13 
Conventional military responses like ground interventions also have detrimental 
environmental impacts.14 The destruction of land and forests in the achievement of 
military objectives will negate any potential benefit being sought. The activation of 
Article 42 comes with grave physical implications for the environment that challenge 




10 Nothing in Article 39 limits the UNSC’s access to measures involving force via 
Article 42. Charter of the United Nations (24th October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Articles 39, 
42. 
11 C Voigt, ‘Security in a “Warming World”: Competences of the UN Security Council 
for Preventing Dangerous Climate Change’ in C Bailliet (ed) Security: A 
Multidisciplinary Normative Approach (1st edition, Brill Publishers 2009) 291. 
12 T Ng, ‘Safeguarding Peace and Security in our Warming World: A Role for the 
Security Council’ (2010) 15 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 275, 297. 
13 N Crawford, ‘Pentagon Fuel Use, Climate Change, and the Costs of War’ (2019) 
Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs 1. 
14 Anonymous, ‘Protect Environment From Wars and Conflicts, UN Urges on 
International Day’ (UN, Global Perspective Human Stories, 6th November 2017) 
<https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/11/570062-protect-environment-wars-and-
conflicts-un-urges-international-day> accessed 30th October 2019. 
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In addition, the use of force has negative implications for state relations.15 It means 
an end to dialogue and cooperation. Environmental challenges more than any other 
bind us together; closing down cooperative avenues in the pursuit of unilateral 
measures of force is detrimental to the humanist ideals that the UN is founded on.16 
Force also comes with the very real prospect that a loss of life will follow. The basis 
for preserving the environment and responding to climate change is to ensure that 
humanity can continue to inhabit the earth. Taking life to ensure the continuance of 
life is infinitely problematic. The prospect of the UNSC authorising the use of force to 
implement any environmental mandate should be judged as altogether unsuitable. 
As Murphy puts it, the ‘threat of harm does not hurt enough for the use of force’.17 
This sentiment should remain central when evaluating UNSC involvement and force 
should always be removed from consideration.  
 
Arguments shift to the possibility of sanctions as a means to curb climate harm.18 
Under Article 41 the UNSC has access to a broad array of tools that it could use to 
penalise a state for climate change inducing activities.19 To exemplify this, in the case 
of Brazil, which is embarking upon a project of forest destruction that will have an 
exacerbating impact on climate change, sanctions could be activated to coerce the 
administration to cease its current policy of deforestation. This type of response 
represents an obvious enforcement capability of the UNSC and allows the argument 
 
15 Voigt points out that environmental law is based heavily on multilateralism. C 
Voigt, ‘Security in a “Warming World”: Competences of the UN Security Council for 
Preventing Dangerous Climate Change’ in C Bailliet (ed), Security: A Multidisciplinary 
Normative Approach (1st edition, Brill Publishers 2009) 291. 
16 D Brommesson, H Fernros, ‘The Feasibility of an Expanded Regime on the Use of 
Force: The Case of the Responsibility to Protect’ (2013) 16 Journal of International 
Relations and Development 138. 
17 M Murphy ‘Achieving Economic Security with Swords as Ploughshares: The 
Modern Use of Force to Combat Environmental Degradation’ (1999) 38 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 1181, 1218. 
18 B Reilly, ‘Clear and Present Danger: A Role for the United Nations Security Council 
in Protecting the Global Environment’ (1996) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 
763. 
19 Charter of the United Nations (24th October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Article 41. 
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it offers something currently absent from ICL.20 There are numerous problems with 
this line of argument. The adoption of sanctions for climatic reasons would probably 
mean that nearly all states would have to be targeted, as very few operate a zero-
carbon economy. Only targeting those states with extreme policies such as Brazil 
could circumvent this criticism. This comes with the problem of how to decide who is 
a serious climate offender and who is not. Would a distinction be made between 
those states with high emissions or those states adopting environmentally 
destructive policies that exacerbate climate change in other ways? There is no clear 
answer here and the application of sanctions comes with immense logistical 
difficulties. It is also inevitable that those subject to sanctions will argue the inequity 
of the application to them and not to others.21 
 
Punitive sanctions will not help to build cooperative responses. They will prompt the 
entrenchment of positions, as was the case in regard to the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea that simply absorbed the sanctions as best it could and continued 
its WMDs programme.22 Even if sanctions could encourage government authorities 
around the world to cease destructive activities such as logging and burning, they 
would likely not encourage significant economic alterations to reduce emissions. 
Infrastructural changes will be costly and difficult and if they are not undertaken 
universally but at the point of sanctions this will create ‘geopolitical tensions’.23 Such 
tensions will be further exacerbated if sanctions have a negative impact on human 
 
20 Szasz argues economic pressures under Article 41 might be effective in regard to 
the environment. P Szasz, ‘Restructuring the International Organizational 
Framework’ in E Weiss (ed) Environmental Change and International Law (UN 
University Press 1992) 360. 
21 R Bereketeab, ‘The Morality of the U.N. Security Council Sanctions Against Eritrea: 
Defensibility, Political Objectives, and Consequences’ (2013) 56 African Studies 
Review 145. 
22 B Habib, ‘The Enforcement Problem in Resolution 2094 and the United Nations 
Security Council Sanctions Regime: Sanctioning North Korea’ (2016) 70 Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 50. 
23 J Boulden, A Charron, ‘Evaluating UN Sanctions’ (2010) 65 International Journal 1, 
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rights24 or humanitarian conditions.25 Sanctions as a response to climate changing 
activities may appear to come with consequences of a less hard nature than the use 
of force, but they come with equally detrimental impressions that may harm the 
global effort towards the resolution of climate change. The immediate advantages of 
bringing the UNSC into climate change offer some significant side effects that cannot 
be ignored. 
 
Related to the above concerns, if the UNSC declares that climate change is a threat 
to international peace and security the possibility arises that the internal affairs of 
states could become the subject of international scrutiny.26 There might be a slim 
argument that points to Article 2(7) of the UN Charter as precluding this, but, the 
reality is, once the legal hurdle of Article 39 has been overcome international peace 
and security can be maintained or restored according to the discretion of the UNSC.27 
Some argue this will allow the opportunity for mischief in the internal affairs of 
states.28 In theory this remains a possibility. If the UNSC were to take such a stance it 
would seriously damage its legitimacy and bring into question why member states 
participate in the UN system.29 It is worth pointing out that in the age of global 
communications there is very little that can be hidden from the world, meaning any 
mischief masquerading as environmental protection would be exposed to public 
 
24 T Biersteker, ‘Targeted Sanctions and Individual Human Rights’ (2010) 65 
International Journal 99. 
25 M Doxey, ‘Sanctions Through the Looking Glass’ (2000) 55 International Journal 
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28 L Malone, ‘Green Helmets: A Conceptual Framework for Security Council Authority 
in Environmental Emergencies’ (1996) 17 Michigan Journal of International Law 515. 
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scrutiny.30 It is also possible that any such move would prompt a veto, allowing the 
permanent members to check the intentions of one another and preclude 
intervention on illegitimate grounds.31 
 
It is impossible to rule out that the UNSC would act under Articles 41 and 42 of the 
UN Charter, if it intervened in the climate threat. Theoretically there is nothing to 
prevent this. However, the political nature of the UNSC and the difference of 
perspective on issues means that there is a check and balance to its operations. The 
veto power gives the permanent members a means in which to prevent action being 
taken on contentious matters, and some have argued this gives the veto 
contemporary utility.32 Given the difference in perspective of the permanent 
members on the climate threat, it is unlikely that an extreme intervention activating 
Articles 41 or 42 would be possible. The far more likely outcome is a compromised 
and carefully crafted resolution that avoids any direct interference in the sovereign 
autonomy of all states. Consequently, it is the claim here that there is a minimal risk 
of the UNSC adopting a resolution that is punitive through the use of sanctions or 
force.   
 
Legitimate interference may still cause disagreement if it is orientated towards 
policies that have development repercussions. Developing states may object to those 
that caused climate change in the first instance dictating internal state policy through 
the UN system.33 The neoliberal and potentially colonial connotations of such a step 
 
30 Ibid. Whether or not this would sway the permanent members is debatable. 
31 T Paige, Petulant and Contrary: Approaches by the Permanent Five Members of 
the UN Security Council to the Concept of ‘Threat to the Peace’ Under Article 39 of 
the UN Charter (1st edition, Brill Nijhoff 2019). 
32 T Paige, Petulant and Contrary: Approaches by the Permanent Five Members of the 
UN Security Council to the Concept of ‘Threat to the Peace’ Under Article 39 of the UN 
Charter (1st edition, Brill Nijhoff 2019). 
33 J Dehm, ‘Carbon Colonialism or Climate Justice? Interrogating the International 
Climate Regime from a TWAIL Perspective’ (2016) 33 Windsor Yearbook of Access to 
Justice 129. 
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may exacerbate rifts among the international community.34 The G77 already 
represents a collection of states that do not believe the UNSC is an appropriate 
forum for climate change because of the shared responsibility model that might 
follow.35 Shared responsibility undermines common but differentiated responsibility, 
reinforcing a divide between the developed and the developing. Climate change is 
already subject to division, and so any intervention from the UNSC should be aimed 
at reducing these tensions, not inflaming them further.36 It is difficult to view the 
involvement of the UNSC in climate change as a straightforward matter that can 
avert these concerns, which is partly why there is reluctance to traverse this 
pathway. Any intervention the UNSC does take will have to be carefully balanced and 
constructed to minimise the exacerbation of these anxieties. 
 
A further apprehension relates to the inherent character of the UNSC and how this 
may lead to serious problems of inequity.37 The UNSC does not embody an 
institution of equal nations, instead reflecting the hegemonic power balance of 
1945.38 The permanent members hold a position of great authority. Their 
permanency allows them to control the UNSC and steer its agenda, compounded by 
their ‘tendency to use secretive exclusionary deliberations’.39 Moreover, although 
ten other states join formal proceedings, evidence suggests it takes at least six 
months for these non-permanent members to grasp how the UNSC operates, 
 
34 D Hursh, J Henderson, D Greenwood, ‘Environmental Education in a Neoliberal 
Climate’ (2015) 21 Environmental Education Research 299. 
35 A Vihma, Y Mulugetta, S Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, ‘Negotiating Solidarity? The G77 
Through the Prism of Climate Change Negotiations’ (2011) 23 Global Change, Peace 
and Security 315. 
36 B Bolin, ‘The Kyoto Negotiations on Climate Change: A Science Perspective’ (1998) 
279 Science 330. 
37 H Bachram, ‘Climate Fraud and Carbon Colonialism: The New Trade in Greenhouse 
Gases’ (2004) 15 Capitalism Nature Socialism 5. 
38 J Alvarez, ‘Hegemonic International Law Revisited’ (2003) 94 (4) The American 
Journal of International Law 873. 
39 K Conca, ‘Is There a Role for the UN Security Council on Climate Change’ (2019) 61 
Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 4, 10. 
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meaning a quarter of their experience is spent learning how to engage effectively.40 
It is not difficult to see the advantage that permanency affords these five states, and 
how the balance of the UNSC is tilted in their favour.  
 
The permanent members’ veto power also means they are able to protect 
themselves against unwanted UNSC involvement, safeguarding their own interests.41 
The veto is an absolute prerogative, subject only to the minor restriction that the 
permanent members may not wish to be seen as obstructing action on the world 
stage.42 This limitation extends only as far as the mood engulfing the international 
community at the time. Veto use did subside somewhat in the cooperative spirit of 
the 1990s and early 2000s,43 but instances remained where it continued to be 
employed.44 Also, even if the veto is not used this does not mean the threat of its use 
is absent, and in some cases corridor discussions at the UN result in resolutions being 
altered or removed altogether in response to a pending veto.45 The permanent 
members find themselves in a position of authority that allows them to assume a 
hegemonic position over the proceedings of the UNSC.46 
 
 
40 S Scott, ‘The Attitude of the P5 Towards a Climate Change Role for the Council’ in S 
Scott, C Ku (eds) Climate Change and the UN Security Council (1st edition, EE 2018) 
209. 
41 Charter of the United Nations (24th October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Article 27. 
42 In instances of atrocities against humanity the UK and France have said they will 
never use the veto to block UNSC action. Anonymous, ‘The Veto’ (Security Council 
Research Report, October 2015) <www.securitycouncilreport.org> accessed 30th 
October 2019. 
43 E Luck, UN Security Council Practise and Promise (1st edition, Routledge 2006). 
44 Draft Resolution (11th July 2008) UN Doc S/2008/447, vetoed by Russia and China. 
45 S Scott, ‘The Attitude of the P5 Towards a Climate Change Role for the Council’ in S 
Scott, C Ku (eds), Climate Change and the UN Security Council (1st edition, EE 2018) 
209. 
46 Some argue that the veto is actually useful to balance the permanent members’ 
interests, see: T Paige, Petulant and Contrary: Approaches by the Permanent Five 
Members of the UN Security Council to the Concept of ‘Threat to the Peace’ Under 
Article 39 of the UN Charter (1st edition, Brill Nijhoff 2019). 
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If climate change were to come before the UNSC this hegemonic nature may 
preclude a universal policy and instead shield the permanent members from 
intervention, if they allowed the adoption of a climate change resolution at all.47 The 
history between the UNSC and climate change indicates this power imbalance, and 
some debates have taken place according to the demand of China that no official 
‘outcome documents nor follow-up actions’ transpire.48 Although this request has to 
some extent been ignored, evidenced through the many subsequent debates before 
the UNSC, it does exhibit how the permanent members are prepared to exercise 
their power to reflect their domestic perspective.49 This is unlikely to change and 
Russia particularly continues to adopt a recalcitrant attitude towards climate change 
on the UNSC’s agenda.50 This is a significant problem not only because some of the 
permanent members are serious climate offenders, but also in terms of international 
equity and cooperation it could damage multilateral efforts and reinforce divisions 
based on power. If the UNSC introduces a resolution that is skewed by the 
perspective of a permanent member it could cause greater international 
disagreement. 
 
International climate law has predicated itself heavily on the need to generate 
cooperative action that all states can partake to solve the problem.51 The common 
but differentiated responsibility model is designed specifically to generate a 
cooperative spirit and link humanity together in this problem.52 Involvement of the 
UNSC and a destruction of cooperation in place of a hegemonic regime would place 
the efforts of the last 30 years in jeopardy and take the international community in a 
 
47 S Cousins, ‘UN Security Council: Playing a Role in the International Climate Change 
Regime’ (2013) 25 Global Change, Peace and Security 191. 
48 UNSC Verbatim Record (17th April 2007) UN Doc S/PV/5663, 13. 
49 UNSC Verbatim Record (20th July 2011) UN Doc S/PV/6587; UNSC Verbatim Record 
(30th July 2015) UN Doc S/PV/7499; UNSC Verbatim Record (25th January 2019) UN 
Doc S/PV/8451. 
50 UNSC Verbatim Record (25th January 2019) UN Doc S/PV/8451. 
51 This was evident in the UNFCCC and is reinforced through the Paris Agreement. 
52 United Nations, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992 (14th June 
1992) 31 ILM 874, Principle 7. 
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direction that is not useful or desirable.53 Even though the climate framework is 
fundamentally inadequate to solve the problem of emissions, it does exhibit a 
positive effort to generate multilateral responses.54 Climate change provides an 
opportunity for the international community to strengthen and develop relationships 
to overcome the common endeavours of humanity.55 It is perhaps the first truly 
global problem that no state can escape, and for this reason it could act as the 
touchstone for future action on similar threats. Involving the UNSC specifically to 
take a more unilateral approach designed to subvert the failings of ICL would negate 
this potential and the cooperation achieved so far. Any UNSC intervention has to be 
tailored to ensure that it does not set back international relations, but helps to 
encourage them. 
 
To recap, the involvement of the UNSC in climate change is not a one-way street. 
Instead there exist a number of legitimate arguments that temper the prospect of 
Article 39 being activated. These arguments can be summarised as: an inappropriate 
mandate that is too punitive; a unilateral approach that moves away from 
multilateralism; and a hegemonic character that may allow abuse and set back 
international cooperation.  
 
III. Perspectives of the Permanent Members 
 
The purpose of this section is to make it clear where the permanent members 
currently sit in their individual interpretations of climate change. Evidently the 
absence of an Article 39 resolution means that the narratives, triggers and thresholds 
of intervention present in past international security threats have not yet manifested 
in a way that has been able to resonate with the permanent members. Climate 
 
53 C Tinker, ‘Environmental Security in the United Nations: Not a Matter for the 
Security Council’ (1992) 59 Tennessee Law Review 787. 
54 J Brunnee, ‘International Environmental Law: Rising to the Challenge of Common 
Concern’ (2006) 100 ASIL 307. 
55 J Lubchenco, ‘Entering the Century of the Environment: A New Social Contract for 
Science’ (1998) 279 Science 491. 
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change has yet to be securitised. When the narratives do manifest in the manner set 
out here it is possible that the permanent members will alter their perspectives on 
intervention via Article 39. It is nonetheless likely that even a significant climate 
disaster will not wash away all previous positions on the matter and so it is useful to 
understand precisely what each permanent member thinks. This section does not 
undermine the narratives argument that is central to this thesis, it simply reflects the 
UNSC’s current position on the matter and uses it as a guide to judge what sort of 
climate resolution may be viable.  
 
Alongside the concerns of those who comment on the UNSC, the permanent 
members also present arguments on climate change making its way onto the agenda. 
Scott contends their perspective is fundamental because of the dominance they 
exercise over the UNSC.56 This dominance has been centralised in this thesis and the 
theory of securitisation has provided a lens to try and utilise it. This project has 
operated on the premise the permanent members are equal, justified by Article 27 of 
the UN Charter that creates a level playing field among them.57 However, Scott 
introduces the idea that within the permanent members there exists a hierarchy, 
atop of which sits the USA, which has utilised its power to bring innovation to the 
UNSC through the introduction of the international criminal tribunal and Resolution 
1373.58 This poses the possibility that a single permanent member might be able to 
take a lead on climate change and encourage securitisation. This section aims to 
understand what the permanent members will and will not tolerate in regard to the 
securitisation of climate change and whether or not there exists any leadership 
potential that could be harnessed. To do this, each permanent member will be 
examined to determine their perspective, looking at their long-term engagement 
 
56 S Scott, ‘The Attitude of the P5 Towards a Climate Change Role for the Council’ in S 
Scott, C Ku (eds), Climate Change and the UN Security Council (1st edition, EE 2018) 
209. 
57 Charter of the United Nations (24th October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Article 27. 
58 S Scott, ‘The Attitude of the P5 Towards a Climate Change Role for the Council’ in S 
Scott, C Ku (eds), Climate Change and the UN Security Council (1st edition, EE 2018) 
209. 
 197 
with the subject of climate change before the UNSC and where they position 
themselves in 2020. 
 
The position of the UK is that climate change constitutes a matter for the UNSC.59 In 
2007 it spearheaded the UNSC’s first climate change meeting, linking the 
maintenance of international peace and security to the ‘building of a shared 
understanding of what an unstable climate will mean for our individual and collective 
security’.60 In 2011 the UK stressed that a climate change response was not limited to 
an either/or situation in terms of the UNSC intervening, instead indicating that it 
could play a complementary role alongside the climate change framework.61 Scott 
characterises the UK’s position in 2015 as further advanced than any of its 
counterparts when linking climate change to the manifesting security implications, 
showcasing its resolve to lead the discourse.62 In 2019 the UK was slightly less explicit 
in its characterisation of climatic harm, but still argued the UN needed to enhance its 
approach to climate security before concluding ‘there is no doubt climate-related 
security challenges are real’.63 This shows the UK’s steadfast position on the matter, 
and acts as a direct rebuke to Russia, which at the same meeting cast doubt on the 
climate security nexus (to be examined below). The UK is prepared to challenge its 
permanent colleagues in the defence of its perspective that climate change belongs 
on the UNSC’s agenda.  
 
The UK supports a complementary role for the UNSC and seems to have an indication 
of what this might look like. It specifically highlighted the need for a holistic response 
that links the different climate initiatives together, encourages greater information 
 
59 F Sindico, ‘Climate Change: A Security (Council) Issue?’ (2007) 1 (1) The Carbon and 
Climate Law Review 29. 
60 UNSC Verbatim Record (17th April 2007) UN Doc S/PV/5663, 18. 
61 UNSC Verbatim Record (20th July 2011) UN Doc S/PV/6587. 
62 S Scott, ‘The Attitude of the P5 Towards a Climate Change Role for the Council’ in S 
Scott, C Ku (eds), Climate Change and the UN Security Council (1st edition, EE 2018) 
209. 
63 UNSC Verbatim Record (25th January 2019) UN Doc S/PV/8451, 15. 
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sharing, and facilitates resilience investment.64 The UK does not lean towards 
mitigation or adaptation, remaining ready to support any movement the UNSC can 
make.65 The prospect of the UK taking an independent leadership role has been 
possible with regard to soft outputs, but it has been unable to convince the other 
permanent members to adopt a bespoke resolution, likely a reflection of its position 
towards the lower end of Scott’s hierarchy.66 Nevertheless, it is a positive force on 
the UNSC and is unafraid to lead the debate. 
 
In 2007 France asserted the UNSC was not the number one forum for climate change 
to be addressed in, but ‘threats to international security caused by global warming’ 
could not be ignored.67 This represents an implicit belief that climate change could 
be a threat to international peace and security. France also introduced a link 
between climate and conflict making it less clear whether it was prepared to 
recognise climate change as a threat to peace in its own right or whether it would 
have to be attached to conflict. In 2011 the French position became unambiguous 
with its submission that climate change was a threat multiplier having implications 
across a number of areas including food and water insecurity as well as conflict.68 
France went on to say that the UNSC must assume a responsibility to support the 
climate change conferences in Durban and Rio, indicating a similar belief to the UK 
that it could see a complementary role for the UNSC.69  
 
 
64 UNSC Verbatim Record (25th January 2019) UN Doc S/PV/8451. 
65 As will be advanced later in this chapter, mitigation refers to actions that would 
seek to stop or reverse climate change, and adaptation focusses on preparing for 
climate change consequences. 
66 Scott situates the USA at the pinnacle of the UNSC, followed by Russia and China, 
placing the UK and France at the lower end. S Scott, ‘The Attitude of the P5 Towards 
a Climate Change Role for the Council’ in S Scott, C Ku (eds), Climate Change and the 
UN Security Council (1st edition, EE 2018) 209.  
67 UNSC Verbatim Record (17th April 2007) UN Doc S/PV/5663, 11. 
68 UNSC Verbatim Record (20th July 2011) UN Doc S/PV/6587. 
69 Ibid. 
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By 2018 France accepted that climatic harm was jeopardising international peace and 
security and there was a collective responsibility case to be heard that would allow 
the UNSC to intervene without undermining the UNFCCC, reinforcing its focus on a 
complementary function.70 In the 2019 debate it argued to bring all of the different 
climate think tanks and organisations ‘together in a central place and give them a 
voice’.71 This indicates a belief that the current framework is too fragmented, which 
the UNSC could help to streamline by building ‘consensus on the links between 
climate and security’.72 France is firmly of the belief that the UNSC has a role to play, 
appearing to have a complementary function in mind reflecting the context of the 
current framework and its shortcomings.  
 
Scott refers to the position of France as ‘balanced and consistent’, which is reflective 
of the steady line it has traversed since 2007, allowing the claim it would likely 
support a climate resolution.73 In terms of response, France appears to support an 
intervention from the UNSC on a complementary basis, reflecting a similar stance to 
the UK. These two permanent members are of similar ambition with regard to 
climate change and the UNSC, offering the possibility of combined leadership, which 
may help to circumnavigate their positions as the less influential of the permanent 
members. 
 
In 2007 the USA adopted the position that climate change fell into the ambit of 
sustainable development, but did not explicitly rule out UNSC intervention.74 By 2011 
the security implications of climate change were evident in its submissions, and the 
USA began to see the links between climate change and international peace and 
security, stating the UNSC has an ‘essential responsibility to address the clear-cut 
 
70 UNSC Verbatim Record (11th July 2018) UN Doc S/PV/8307. 
71 UNSC Verbatim Record (25th January 2019) UN Doc S/PV/8451, 19. 
72 Ibid. 19. 
73 S Scott, ‘The Attitude of the P5 Towards a Climate Change Role for the Council’ in S 
Scott, C Ku (eds), Climate Change and the UN Security Council (1st edition, EE 2018) 
209, 215. 
74 UNSC Verbatim Record (17th April 2007) UN Doc S/PV/5663. 
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peace and security implications of a changing climate’.75 This attitude was still 
prevalent in 2015 when the USA indicated its belief that the links between climate 
and security should be enough to motivate UNSC intervention.76 In both 2011 and 
2015 the USA was keen to emphasise the UNFCCC as the central response 
mechanism, aligning itself with the UK and France that any function of the UNSC 
would be complementary. The strength of conviction towards a UNSC role has 
lessened somewhat under the administration post-2016 and although the USA does 
not explicitly rule out this possibility it does appear to be returning climate change to 
the category of sustainable development. Its position is subject to fluctuations linked 
to its domestic political circumstance at the time. 
 
Nonetheless, the USA continues to support a role in climate adaption, and in 2019 it 
said the UNSC ‘should play an especially important role in this common effort to 
assist with [climate] disaster preparedness and response’.77 There is little objection 
from the USA in bringing climate change onto the agenda of the UNSC, but the 
manner of response will be crucial. The USA will take a keen interest in making sure 
any climate change response does not interfere with its own priorities, likely 
meaning a strong mitigation resolution is out of the question. Any leadership 
potential from the USA will only transpire under certain circumstances, which are not 
present given the current government. It offers less potential than both France and 
the UK as a climate advocate before the UNSC, but if convinced of a way forward it 
could be an instrumental force to help tilt the balance of argument. 
 
The Chinese stance on climate change before the UNSC is one of transition. When 
the debate first began in 2007 China was clear that it did not believe the UNSC to be 
an appropriate forum and held that ‘Discussing climate change in the Security 
Council will not help countries in their efforts towards mitigation’.78 Instead focus 
was placed on the UNFCCC and the foundation of common but differentiated 
 
75 UNSC Verbatim Record (20th July 2011) UN Doc S/PV/6587, 7. 
76 UNSC Verbatim Record (30th July 2015) UN Doc S/PV/7499. 
77 UNSC Verbatim Record (25th January 2019) UN Doc S/PV/8451, 21. 
78 UNSC Verbatim Record (17th April 2007) UN Doc S/PV/5663, 13. 
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responsibility. China believes other UN agencies are more appropriately placed to 
respond than the UNSC due to its lack of expertise. In 2007 it was insistent that no-
follow up or outcome document should be created, and it aligned itself with the G77 
arguing that climate change was a sustainable development issue.79  
 
In 2015 China was much more receptive to discussing the climatic security of small 
islands developing states (SIDS), though carefully avoided language that would 
reflect Article 39 too closely.80 In the most recent 2019 discussion China was more 
explicit in regard to the security implications of climate change, although it continued 
to advocate for other UN agencies to take the lead, particularly highlighting the 
UNFCCC.81 However, no longer did China include a clear rebuttal of the UNSC 
involving itself in climate change. Instead it argued that it is necessary to ‘uphold 
multilateralism and foster a sense of community’, which is still directing attention 
away from the UNSC, but in a much less direct manner,82 indicating a softened 
position that may continue to alter as the threat exacerbates.83  
 
China may be reluctant to engage the UNSC because of concerns as to what it can 
bring to the task that other institutions are not already contributing. No doubt it is 
also concerned by the prospect of interference with its internal activities, though this 
should be less a consideration as the veto power will allow any directly impacting 
provisions to be negotiated out.84 It is likely to veto any attempt to introduce 
mitigation efforts through the UNSC if they are framed as hard law. China is unlikely 
 
79 A Vihma, Y Mulugetta, S Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, ‘Negotiating Solidarity? The G77 
Through the Prism of Climate Change Negotiations’ (2011) 23 Global Change, Peace 
and Security 315. 
80 UNSC Verbatim Record (30th July 2015) UN Doc S/PV/7499. 
81 UNSC Verbatim Record (25th January 2019) UN Doc S/PV/8451. 
82 Ibid., 15. 
83 Both the UNEP and WMO record climatic impacts manifesting inside China, see 
Chapter Three. 
84 China did this in regard to Resolution 1540 by negotiating with the USA to leave 
out an interdiction provision. See J Yoo, G Sulmasy, ‘The Proliferation Security 
Initiative: A Model for International Cooperation’ (2006) 35 Hofstra Law Review 405. 
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to adopt a leadership position, but if convinced that the response was not going to 
be obligatory or interfere with the autonomy of states it might be inclined to support 
a complementary role to strengthen the UNFCCC regime. 
 
The position of Russia is the most entrenched, having changed very little from 2007 
to 2019. In the first meeting Russia pointed out the UNSC should stick to ‘questions 
that directly relate to its mandate’, which is a very duplicitous position to take 
considering that Russia has supported the expansion of the UNSC’s mandate into 
areas such as terrorism, proliferation and humanitarian protection.85 In 2011 Russia 
expressed that it was ‘sceptical about the repeated attempts that have been made to 
place on the agenda of the Security Council the issue of the threat posed by climate 
change’ and reaffirmed its belief that the debate in question should not have taken 
place.86 In 2018 Russia said that it was ‘disappointed’ about yet another climate 
change and UNSC discussion.87 In 2019 it continued to stress its belief the UNSC was 
not equipped with the expertise or tools to respond to climate change risks, before 
questioning ‘if they exist and if they are real’.88  
 
The position of Russia is the most difficult to overcome. In direct contradiction to 
France and the UK, Russia seeks to rule out all potential roles for the UNSC in climate 
change irrespective of whether they are oriented as adaptation or mitigation. If 
Russia believes there is any possibility of interference with its internal policy it will 
activate its veto power. In the face of global momentum and absent any support 
from the other permanent members it may be possible that Russia would abstain 
from a vote as opposed to activating its veto. Any resolution would have to avoid a 
hard character or risk a certain Russian veto, and it is likely the remaining permanent 
members would have to be united in this endeavour to create the requisite pressure. 
 
 
85 UNSC Verbatim Record (17th April 2007) UN Doc S/PV/5663, 17. 
86 UNSC Verbatim Record (20th July 2011) UN Doc S/PV/6587, 13. 
87 UNSC Verbatim Record (11th July 2018) UN Doc S/PV/8307, 15. 
88 UNSC Verbatim Record (25th January 2019) UN Doc S/PV/8451, 17. 
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As the above examination shows, difficulties exist in bringing climate change onto 
the agenda of the UNSC and some of the permanent members may take a reluctant 
stance to any such move. On the other hand some permanent members are 
prepared to lead this task and have been doing so for twelve years. The positive 
influence that comes from the UK and France might help them to galvanise the USA 
and China into action. Russia would likely seek to block such a move, but this should 
not be seen as a terminal obstacle. The recalcitrance of Russia offers no more of a 
challenge than that already being experienced by ICL that has to contend with each 
and every party member exercising their own autonomy and possessing the ability to 
walk away from negotiations. The challenge is to find a response that can attract 
most of the permanent members and so generate pressure on Russia to at least let a 
resolution pass. 
 
Each permanent member pointed to the role of the UNFCCC as the primary response 
mechanism to climate change and so there exists a point of unity to start from. Even 
those keen on UNSC involvement continue to centralise the UNFCCC, and so any 
intervention should complement this framework. There is little point in suggesting 
the UNSC take a leading role to tackle this problem through the creation of new rules 
and obligations. Its response should be aimed at supporting ICL. Taking this route will 
extinguish some of the criticisms against involving the UNSC, such as a lack of 
expertise, and play to the arguments of the permanent members that the UNFCCC 
should be central.  
 
This also replicates the intention behind some of the UNSC’s past interventions. In 
the case of each international security threat the UNSC took steps to help reinforce 
the intended responses. At no point did it seek to replace international law as the 
primary means in which to address the common concerns of states. Even Resolution 
1540 that introduced new obligations did not seek to replace the non-proliferation 
regime, but intended to add to it. The permanent members must be convinced of the 
need to offer the same type of complementary response in the context of climate 
change. Taking this approach could help to avoid a veto whilst allowing the UNSC to 
offer a response to reinforce the presently inadequate international climate law. 
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IV. Crafting a Climate Resolution 
 
Any envisioned response to climate change must balance the needs of the climate 
framework against the interests of the permanent members, and those that view the 
UNSC as an improper forum for climate action. A failure to achieve this balance will 
mean, either, that intervention lacks utility, or it will fail to generate universal 
backing and likely prompt a veto. This section will advocate a complementary 
function for the UNSC in the climate response agenda, which means that 
intervention will not seek to redirect efforts away from its current mechanisms. It 
will be contended that the UNSC should work alongside the UNFCCC by aiding the 
achievement of its objectives, specifically those found in the Paris Agreement.  
 
A complementary function is the most likely to be realised in the current culture of 
the UNSC, and so, as this thesis intends to offer practical steps to contemporary 
obstacles it is the most realistic option to pursue. The following subsections will 
explore what this complementary function might look like and how it would be 
useful to the climate framework. It will be structured according to: level of 
intervention; hard or soft character; and focus of a climate resolution. 
 
A. Level of Intervention 
 
Scott introduced four levels of possible intervention: rejection of engagement; non-
responses (meaning a response to climate change under the guise of a more 
traditional heading such as conflict resolution); measured non-binding responses 
under Chapter VI of the UN Charter; and extreme binding responses under Chapter 
VII of the Charter.89 These four levels will be analysed to decide which is the most 
suitable to facilitate the UNSC adopting a complementary function to the climate 
framework. Although it is clear that this thesis decided from the very beginning to 
 
89 S Scott, ‘Implications of Climate Change for the UN Security Council: Mapping the 
Range of Potential Policy Responses’ (2015) 91 (5) International Affairs 1317. 
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centralise an Article 39 intervention, it is important to consider the other options as 
they help to accentuate why UNSC involvement at this level is so important in the 
context of climate change. 
 
Rejection of UNSC engagement now appears unlikely. Since the first climate debate 
in 2007 there has been irregular but continual discussion, with the most recent 
debate taking place in January 2019 under the Presidency of the Dominican 
Republic.90 The adoption of Presidential Statements 2011/15 and 2018/3, combined 
with Resolutions 2349, 2408, 2423 and 2429 all containing the words ‘climate 
change’, indicate the UNSC has started its slow journey to intervention.91 The 
rotating presidency will allow for further action, because, as the 2019 example 
proves, those states experiencing severe climatic impacts will not let the subject fade 
into obscurity.92 There is little scope to reject UNSC engagement at this point and, as 
climatic impact increases, the position of operating from the side-lines will become 
less tenable. Focus should be on selecting the most suitable direction forward as 
opposed to resisting this course altogether. 
 
Intervention on the level of non-response is also underway. Although not explicitly 
referenced, the signature of climate change may sit underneath conflicts that have 
been subject to resolutions.93 This possibility is debatable in regard to some conflict 
 
90 UNSC Verbatim Record (25th January 2019) UN Doc S/PV/8451. 
91 UNSC Presidential Statement 2011/15 (20th July 2011) UN Doc S/PRST/2011/15; 
UNSC Presidential Statement 2018/3 (30th January 2018) UN Doc S/PRST/2018/3; 
UNSC Res 2349 (31st March 2017) UN Doc S/Res/2349, Operative para 26; UNSC Res 
2408 (27th March 2018) UN Doc S/Res/2408, Preamble para 19; UNSC Res 2423 (28th 
June 2018) UN Doc S/Res/2423, Preamble para 28, Operative para 68; UNSC Res 
2429 (13th July 2018) UN Doc S/Res/2429, Preamble para 21, Operative para 47. 
92 This was precisely what happened when the Dominican Republic assumed the 
Council presidency, leading to a climate meeting on 25th January 2019. UNSC 
Verbatim Record (25th January 2019) UN Doc S/PV/8451. 
93 J Selby, O Dahi, C Frohlich, M Hulme, ‘Climate Change and the Syrian Civil War 
Revisited’ (2017) 60 Political Geography 232; UNSC Res 2118 (27th September 2013) 
UN Doc S/Res/2118 was adopted in regard to the use of chemical weapons in the 
Syrian civil war. 
 206 
situations,94 but there can be little doubt that in some more recent cases climate 
change has been a factor recognised by the UNSC: 
 
‘Recognizing the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural 
disasters, among other factors, on the stability of Mali, including through drought, 
desertification, land degradation and food insecurity’95 
 
‘Recognizing the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural 
disasters, among other factors, on the situation in Darfur, including through drought, 
desertification, land degradation and food insecurity’96  
 
Neither of these statements centralises climate change as the cause of the conflict in 
Mali or Darfur, but they evidence a softening of the UNSC’s position towards the 
connection climate change can have on the creation or exacerbation of a conflict. 
Responding to these situations, with a broad recognition that climatic impacts could 
be addressed, climate change is subjected to a UNSC intervention, albeit via the 
traditional conduit of conflict. In relation to the Darfur situation the UNSC included 
within its operative paragraphs instructions for the UN and Sudan to ‘consider the 
adverse implications of climate change…in their programmes, including by 
undertaking risk assessments’.97 This direction to ‘consider’ might be relatively weak, 
but it evidences the progress of the permanent members to recognise the impact of 
climate change, and indicates the UNSC is operating on the level of non-responses by 
directing attention to climate change in situations of conflict. 
 
Non-response interventions allow the UNSC to sidestep the division that might occur 
if the words climate change appeared in a resolution absent conflict as the primary 
subject matter. Under this guise peacekeeping operations could be granted a 
 
94 K Conca, ‘Is There a Role for the UN Security Council on Climate Change?’ (2019) 61 
Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 4. 
95 UNSC Res 2423 (28th June 2018) UN Doc S/Res/2423, Preamble para 28. 
96 UNSC Res 2429 (13th July 2018) UN Doc S/Res/2429, Preamble para 21. 
97 UNSC Res 2429 (13th July 2018) UN Doc S/Res/2429, Operative para 47. 
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mandate to respond to the adverse effects of climate change. Elliot and later Conca 
et al. explored this possibility, finding that the integration of climate expertise into 
current operations would be logistically challenging due to the structure of the UNSC 
and its lack of connection to environmental agencies.98 The non-response option 
sounds useful, but its practical benefit is decreased through poor implementation. It 
is also unlikely to come to fruition any time soon, as despite first being discussed in 
2002 little progress has been made to implement this possibility.99  
 
The tangible benefit of the non-response option is limited, but this does not mean 
that softer advantages do not manifest. The inclusion of reference to climate change 
in a resolution continues to habituate the permanent members to its presence in the 
context of international peace and security. This slow integration of a subject is not 
without precedent. The advent of Resolution 1368 declaring with certainty that 
terrorism was within the meaning of Article 39 was not the first time the subject 
came before the UNSC. A number of resolutions leading up to 2001 brought 
terrorism closer to the scope of Article 39.100 The most significant example was 
Resolution 1269 that is similar in content to Resolution 1373, absent the activation of 
Article 39.101 The adoption of this resolution helped to forge a pathway for terrorism 
into the realm of Article 39. Had this pathway not been laid it is possible UNSC 
intervention on 12th September 2001 would have experienced much greater 
hesitance. The permanent members were experienced in handling the subject of 
 
98 L Elliot, ‘Expanding the Mandate of the UN Security Council to Account for 
Environmental Issues’ (2002) Working Paper, United Nations University, Shibuya, 
Japan; K Conca, J Thwaites, G Lee, ‘Climate Change and the UN Security Council: Bully 
Pulpit or Bull in a China Shop?’ (2017) 17 (2) Global Environmental Politics 1. 
99 L Elliot, ‘Expanding the Mandate of the UN Security Council to Account for 
Environmental Issues’ (2002) Working Paper, United Nations University, Shibuya, 
Japan. 
100 UNSC Res 748 (31st March 1992) UN Doc S/Res/748 was an early example of 
terrorism coming before the UNSC in the context of the Libyan non-compliance 
question; UNSC Res 1189 (13th August 1998) UN Doc S/Res/1189 was a more 
conventional terror situation coming before the UNSC in the latter half of the 1990s. 
101 UNSC Res 1269 (19th of October 1999) UN Doc S/Res/1269. 
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terrorism and had precedents to draw from. A similar journey may take place in 
regard to climate change and so these non-response interventions do have some 
value when adopting a long-term perspective.     
 
However, the problem with the non-response level of intervention is the UNSC will 
remain reactive, unable to progress to the point of addressing the progenitor causes 
of climate change. The non-response level of intervention deals only in climatic 
impact, not its causes. Entering at this level will mean there is no way for the UNSC to 
complement the central objectives of the UNFCCC. Optimism over centralising non-
response intervention is misplaced and the soft benefits noted above must be 
contextualised according to the need to generate more direct action at a much 
quicker pace. If the UNSC is to be of use to the climate framework it will have to take 
place within the next ten years and ideally as soon as possible.102 Intervention at the 
level of non-response cannot mitigate climate change in time, if at all. 
 
The next level of intervention to consider is Chapter VI of the Charter, which provides 
the UNSC authority to engage in dispute resolution and deliver guidance for the 
avoidance of a situation.103 This is useful if those involved are receptive to the UNSC’s 
participation and prepared to abide by its recommendations. However, Chapter VI 
remains limited to recommendations,104 which might add global pressure to a 
persistent climate offender but recalcitrance could easily override intervention, 
rendering UNSC engagement little more useful than the current model of 
international climate law. Chapter VI also comes with the reputation that it is the 
non-binding arm of the UNSC,105 and so fails to have the same influence afforded to 
 
102 IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, ‘Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and 
Vulnerability’ (2014). 
103 Charter of the United Nations (24th October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Chapter VI. 
104 S Ratner, ‘Image and Reality in the UN’s Peaceful Settlement of Disputes’ (1995) 6 
European Journal of International Law 426. 
105 R Higgins, ‘The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which UN Resolutions are Binding 
Under Article 25 of the Charter?’ (1972) 21 (2) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 270. 
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other attributes, which have the benefit of being linked more closely to the concept 
of security.106 Moreover, Chapter VI intervention maintains a reactive stance and it is 
difficult to see how recommendations could be introduced before the eruption of a 
climate-induced situation. There is little benefit to exploring Chapter VI as the level 
to intervene because it will not help to mitigate climate change. 
 
As Szasz notes, the binding nature of resolutions is most clearly visible ‘when taken 
under Chapter VII’.107 In contrast to this those decisions adopted under Chapter VI 
come with the reputation of being non-binding. This is supported by Rosand, who 
argues that for the UNSC to fulfil its role it was gifted the power to take ‘far-reaching 
decisions, which are binding on U.N. Member States’ courtesy of Chapter VII,108 again 
supporting the assertion that Chapter VI is cast as the non-binding arm of the UNSC 
because of the foil provided by Chapter VII. Moreover, the UNSC has rarely gone 
down the route of Chapter VI because it would require parties to a situation to agree 
to a settlement among themselves, something the existence of a dispute proves 
unlikely.109 In the climate context the onus is currently on states to agree a way 
forward and they resolutely fail to do this to the required level time and again. It is 
therefore unlikely that Chapter VI would be of any great help here.   
 
This leaves Article 39 as the last level of intervention to consider, which Scott 
believes is the more extreme end of the argument.110 The immediate benefit of 
intervention at this level is the potential for resolutions to be passed that are of 
 
106 S Ratner, ‘Image and Reality in the UN’s Peaceful Settlement of Disputes’ (1995) 6 
European Journal of International Law 426. 
107 P Szasz, ‘The Security Council Starts Legislating’ (2002) 96 (4) The American 
Journal of International Law 901, 901. 
108 E Rosand, ‘The Security Council as Global Legislator: Ultra Vires or Ultra 
Innovative?’ (2004) 28 Fordham International Law Review 542, 553.  
109 R Higgins, ‘The Place of International Law in the Settlement of Disputes by the 
Security Council’ (1970) 64 American Journal of International Law 1. 
110 S Scott, ‘Implications of Climate Change for the UN Security Council: Mapping the 
Range of Potential Policy Responses’ (2015) 91 (5) International Affairs 1317. 
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legislative character.111 Nowhere in the Charter is the UNSC granted the authority to 
introduce international law. Yet, the practical effect of the Charter presents a 
scenario almost identical to that of a legislator. Article 24 casts the UNSC as having 
responsibility to maintain international peace and security. Complete discretion is 
granted to it in the determination of threats and appropriate responses under Article 
39. Articles 25 and 48(1) bind UN members to carry out the decisions of the UNSC in 
the maintenance of international peace and security.112 It is difficult to differentiate 
between the role of the UNSC in achieving its primary purpose and that of a 
legislative institution.113 
 
Many resolutions have been adopted in the past absent a binding character.114 It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate the difference in uptake of the 
international community where a resolution is binding or non-binding. But it is 
nonetheless reasonable to assert that where Chapter VII resolutions have been 
adopted, they have had greater gravitas than their non-binding counterparts. For 
instance, binding Resolution 2177 on Ebola had far greater impact than Resolution 
1308 on HIV that was non-binding. Similarly, non-binding Resolution 1269 on 
 
111 Although in theory all resolutions are binding, those taken under Chapter VII are 
granted a greater level of significance and consequent uptake. D Joyner, ‘Legal 
Bindingness of Security Council Resolutions Generally, and Resolution 2334 on the 
Israeli Settlements in Particular’ (EJIL: Talk, January 2017) 
<https://www.ejiltalk.org/legal-bindingness-of-security-council-resolutions-
generally-and-resolution-2334-on-the-israeli-settlements-in-particular/> accessed 
26th November 2018. 
112 Charter of the United Nations (24th October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Articles 25 and 
48(1). 
113 The only substantive restriction on this power to introduce binding decisions is 
that they must concern the purposes of the UN in the maintenance of international 
peace and security. A procedural restriction could be considered the need for 
agreement among the permanent members.  
114 M Velasques-Ruiz, ‘In the Name of International Peace and Security: Reflections 
on the United Nations Security Council’s Legislative Action’ (2011) 18 Columbia 
International Law Review 13. 
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terrorism was much less impacting in terms of prompting states to join the anti-
terror conventions than Resolutions 1368 and 1373 that made this action obligatory. 
 
If the UNSC is to enter the climate arena usefully, it must do so with the intent of 
complementing ICL and plugging some of the gaps inherent to this discretion-based 
framework. It must adopt resolutions with mandates that possess legal character, 
able to inspire compliance. A Chapter VII intervention is particularly useful in this 
endeavour, considering its legislative capacity. That is not to suggest this thesis is 
advocating a binding legislative role for the UNSC, but this possibility must be opened 
up for reflection. If Article 39 is discounted the benefit of legislative capacity is 
removed, significantly reducing any scope the UNSC might have for introducing a 
complementary response that is able to support the ambition of Paris. 
 
There are further benefits inherent to Article 39. It signifies a gravitas that is 
unparalleled in international law, and it is often interpreted as representing a level of 
severity demanding attention.115 This can prompt those in positions of domestic 
power to respond with a sense of urgency, which is the principle benefit that comes 
from securitising any subject.116 It was precisely this sense of urgency that was 
intended when the UNSC intervened in terrorism and Ebola. The success of 
intervention in these instances implies that by tackling climate change through 
Article 39 the UNSC might generate a renewed momentum within the international 
community to respond with greater commitment. It might also have the effect of 
generating anxiety among those who do not wish to see this hegemonic institution 
enter the climate arena, prompting them to respond with more effort to their 
obligations under ICL to prevent further evolution of the UNSC’s mandate. It is 
difficult to argue that the benefit of Article 39 being activated is inconsequential. 
Combined with the accompanying legislative capacity, Article 39 must be the level at 
which the UNSC intervenes.  
 
115 J Dhanapala, ‘The United Nations’ Response to 9/11’ (2007) 17 Terrorism and 
Political Violence 17. 
116 B Buzan, O Waever, J de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1st 
edition, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 1998). 
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If Article 39 is not activated it may be taken as a sign that the UNSC is not handling 
the matter seriously.117 It will also preclude any access to Article 41, which may 
encourage this interpretation of indifference further. Article 39 must be activated if 
the UNSC is to adopt a resolution with the requisite character to inspire solutions to 
the problems of the climate framework. This traverses a pathway that some would 
deem inappropriate because of access to punitive measures and the potential 
domestic interference that this level of intervention allows.118 In the climate context 
this fear is unlikely to be realised because some of the permanent members remain 
steadfast that they will not move towards domestic interference,119 providing a 
check and balance procedure on the UNSC’s scope that probably precludes access to 
Articles 41 and 42.120 Moreover, these concerns lose significance when weighed 
against the threat of climate change and the drastic need for a way to improve the 
international response to this threat. To rephrase Murphy, the theoretical prospect 




117 This might have been the reason Resolution 1269 was unable to inspire 
international compliance with the anti-terror conventions. 
118 See Section I of this chapter. 
119 This has been the consistent position of China on a number of subjects, such as 
the Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe and Syria questions. UNSC Verbatim Record (25th 
September 1991) UN Doc S/PV/3009; Draft Resolution (11th July 2008) UN Doc 
S/2008/447; Draft Resolution (4th October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/612. 
120 T Paige, Petulant and Contrary: Approaches by the Permanent Five Members of 
the UN Security Council to the Concept of ‘Threat to the Peace’ Under Article 39 of the 
UN Charter (1st edition, Brill Nijhoff 2019). 
121 M Murphy ‘Achieving Economic Security with Swords as Ploughshares: The 
Modern Use of Force to Combat Environmental Degradation’ (1999) 38 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 1181. 
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The activation of Article 39 has been under explored in the past, and too often 
arguments project the idea that its use means one thing.122 In contrast to this 
viewpoint, different Article 39 resolutions can be analysed to exhibit how they 
provide varying types of response, which may allow those arguments against this 
move to be further extinguished. Without providing additional details as to what 
such a resolution would look like it is also impossible to know whether it would be 
supported by the permanent members or subject to a veto. At this stage of the 
argument all that has been determined is that Article 39 must be the level of 
intervention if the UNSC is to successfully complement ICL. The manner of that 
activation will be explored in the following subsections.  
 
B. Hard or Soft Character 
 
This subsection will explore the possibility of the UNSC adopting a hard or soft 
resolution in response to climate change. This distinction (hard and soft) refers to 
how binding the language of a legal instrument is. It was determined above that any 
climate resolution has to be at the level of Article 39, which means it comes with a 
certain gravitas. However, the language of a resolution can vary significantly and 
alter the extent to which its character is binding or advisory. This subsection will look 
at where on this continuum a climate resolution should be pitched. The primary 
focus will be on Resolutions 1373 and 2177 as they represent successful resolutions 
with distinctly different characters. Resolution 1540 will not feature heavily here 
because its character is very similar to Resolution 1373 and to repeat discussions 




122 B Reilly, ‘Clear and Present Danger: A Role for the United Nations Security Council 
in Protecting the Global Environment’ (1996) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 
763. 
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Resolution 1373 targets the abstract threat of international terrorism, not absent 
factual justification but certainly not linked to a finite scenario.123 All UN members 
were required to implement actions, including but not limited to criminalising 
terrorism, asset freezing and preventing the commission of terrorism via information 
exchange.124 The language of Resolution 1373 was binding, with examples including: 
‘states shall’; ‘refrain from’; ‘take the necessary steps’; and ‘freeze without delay’.125 
It did not contain any ambiguity as to how the UN community was to respond. 
Definite measures had to be adopted and in some cases they were intrusive to 
nation states, but no deviation from the mandate of Resolution 1373 was permitted. 
In simple terms its character was reflective of hard law.  
 
The success of Resolution 1373 is first evident in its creation. Despite far-reaching 
obligations, it was able to pass through the UNSC without disagreement, although 
the lack of any content in the verbatim record means it is impossible to identify if any 
opposition was verbalised.126 Importantly, it managed to avoid provoking a veto and 
came into existence extremely quickly.127 The response from the UN community was 
resounding and led to the biggest depository of anti-terror information, adding a 
quantifiable element of success.128 However, it is important to recognise that there 
have been varying levels of uptake and some states have reported difficulty in 
meeting their obligations under Resolutions 1373.129 However, Ward notes that 
 
123 J Dhanapala, ‘The United Nations Response to 9/11’ (2007) 17 (1) Terrorism and 
Political Violence 17. 
124 UNSC Res 1373 (28th September 2001) UN Doc S/Res/1373, Operative paragraph 
1. 
125 Ibid., Operative paras 1, 1(c), 2(a) and 2(b). 
126 UNSC Verbatim Record (28th September 2001) UN Doc S/PV/4385. 
127 I Roele, ‘Disciplinary Power and the UN Security Council Counter Terrorism 
Committee’ (2014) 19 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 49. 
128 Cortright notes that post-Resolution 1373 there was a resounding uptake of 
international anti-terror conventions, signalling compliance with the UNSC’s 
mandate of Resolution 1373. D Cortright, ‘Can the UN battle terrorism effectively?’ 
(2005) 133 (2716) USA Today 62. 
129 H Kramer, S Yetiv, ‘The UN Security Council’s Response to Terrorism: Before and 
After September 11th 2001’ (2007) 122 (3) Political Science Quarterly 409. 
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although a number of states missed their first 90 day deadline for the submission of 
reports, ‘most had, without doubt, made every possible effort’.130 By the end of the 
first 18 month period 189 states had submitted at least one report with the Counter 
Terrorism Committee, signifying a broad level of state intent to engage with 
obligations under Resolution 1373.131  
 
The relative triumph of Resolution 1373 provokes an immediate hope that the UNSC 
could introduce a resolution in regard to climate change with the same substantive 
obligations and a parallel level of uptake, or at least attempted uptake, throughout 
the UN community. Resolution 1373 as a model for a climate resolution appears to 
be exactly what is required and could galvanise the international community into 
action.132 The adoption of this model would also subvert some of the criticism 
concerning the type of response the UNSC could provide. The 1373 model is not 
punitive, avoiding automatic sanctions on states and does not authorise direct 
recourse to force beyond self-defence.133 Its character is intended to facilitate a 
technical response to the threat as opposed to punishing states for not furnishing 
suitable anti-terror efforts. 
 
There is little doubt, however, that a climate resolution following the 1373 model 
would be viewed with scepticism by those developing states because of the binding 
character inherent to it and the obligations it might force upon them.134 A hard 
approach could prompt allegations of unfairness and neo-colonial aspiration from 
 
130 C Ward, ‘Building Capacity to Combat International Terrorism: The Role of the 
United Nations Security Council’ (2003) 8 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 289, 
299. 
131 Ibid.  
132 C Penny, ‘Greening the Security Council: Climate Change as an Emerging Threat to 
International Peace and Security’ (2007) 7 International Environmental Agreements 
35. 
133 Although self-defence is recognised in Resolution 1373 it does not dominate the 
substance of the text; instead focus is on preventative measures.   
134 E Rosand, ‘The Security Council as Global Legislator: Ultra Vires or Ultra 
Innovative?’ (2004) 28 Fordham International Law Review 542. 
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those without a place on the UNSC, and even from those on the Council but outside 
the permanent members. Following the 1373 model would likely provoke concern 
from the G77, forcing them to become more entrenched in their belief that climate 
change should remain outside the UNSC.135 This would limit any resolution’s uptake 
by states and reduce rates of compliance.136 Any damage to dialogue and 
cooperation should be avoided and so Resolution 1373 is an inappropriate fit for the 
climate context.  
 
The possibility of adopting a climate resolution tantamount to 1373 is further 
reduced because the permanent members would not countenance such binding 
provisions. Despite, in some instances, climate change triggering all of their 
thresholds for intervention, it is unlikely to provoke the requisite unity from them to 
go down the pathway of hard obligations, at least not until a climatic event creates a 
so far unseen level of harm. The UK and France might support such a move based on 
their relatively consistent recognition that climate change is a UNSC matter. Russia 
would oppose this move and use its veto to prevent a resolution of this character 
being adopted. China’s position has softened over the years but it still views climate 
change as a problem internal to states and requiring individual responses.137 The USA 
under its current administration has prioritised its economy and would seek to avoid 
any adoption of a text that would lead to action on its part, even the discretion 
orientated model of the Paris Agreement is too impacting on the American 
 
135 A Vihma, Y Mulugetta, S Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, ‘Negotiating Solidarity? The G77 
Through the Prism of Climate Change Negotiations’ (2011) 23 Global Change, Peace 
and Security 315. Even if states did not see the benefit of Resolution 1373 directly 
they made efforts to comply with it: C Ward, ‘Building Capacity to Combat 
International Terrorism: The Role of the United Nations Security Council’ (2003) 8 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 289. 
136 A Boyle, J Hartmann, A Savaresi, ‘The United Nations Security Council’s Legislative 
and Enforcement Powers and Climate Change’ in S Scott, C Ku (eds), Climate Change 
and the UN Security Council (1st edition, EE 2018) 101. 
137 This was broadly the position laid out in 2019 by China: UNSC Verbatim Record 
(25th January 2019) UN Doc/S/PV/8451. 
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Administration’s psyche.138 An Article 39 activation enclosed in a hard law resolution 
is out of the question. 
 
The second option is to populate an Article 39 resolution with soft language, 
exemplified through Resolution 2177. Its adoption was momentous because it was 
the first time a health crisis was able to activate Article 39, proving the UNSC is 
capable of stepping unexpectedly into new territory as long as the text of the 
intervention can be suitably crafted. Resolution 2177 was able to generate significant 
responses from the international community, proving this balance between Article 
39 and a soft linguistic structure has utility.  
 
The distinct nature of Resolution 2177 was immediately evident in the Preamble, 
where unlike its predecessor, Resolution 2176, it was able to identify Ebola as a 
threat to peace in its own right unrelated to other situational circumstances.139 The 
fifth paragraph of the Preamble held without qualification that ‘the unprecedented 
outbreak of the Ebola virus in Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security’.140 The lack of precision in regard to the geographic spread of the outbreak, 
only referencing the African continent, shows the UNSC was not limiting the scope of 
its intervention to precise circumstances. The basis for this recognition was likely the 
result of the expert briefings at the start of the meeting where the manner in which 
Ebola spreads was made clear to the UNSC, and its ability to cross borders was 
emphasised.141 It was argued that Ebola had to be addressed in a manner that 
reflected its specific characteristics, and not necessarily the traditional working 
methods of the UNSC. The permanent members were able to make this adjustment 
 
138 R Harrabin, ‘Paris Agreement: Trump Confirms US will Leave Climate Accord’ (BBC, 
24th October 2019) <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-50165596> 
accessed 29th October 2019. 
139 Resolution 2176 centralised the Liberia situation and added the Ebola crisis onto 
this, reflecting a manner of non-response intervention. UNSC Res 2176 (15th 
September 2014) UN Doc S/Res/2176. 
140 UNSC Res 2177 (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/Res/2177, Preamble para 5. 
141 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268. 
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to their approach, though inclusion of the word ‘unprecedented’ did likely appease 
some of them who wanted to ensure Ebola was not used to advance other previously 
discussed health issues, such as HIV.142 Despite this, the range of the UNSC’s 
ambition was clear when it called for the ‘immediate and coordinated international 
response to the Ebola outbreak’.143  
 
The subsequent Operative paragraphs were careful to strike a balance between 
generating an international response and not provoking a veto from one of the 
permanent members. Anything too similar to the rules-based approach of Resolution 
1373 would have been too ambitious. The language of Resolution 2177 is reflective 
of a desire not to encroach upon state autonomy but to ensure the international 
community understood what was required. The Operative paragraphs feature 
directives such as ‘encourages’ ‘calls on’ and ‘urges’, language that can easily be 
construed as diplomatic and not obligatory.144 This type of language is important in 
the climate context because it will allow states to retain their sovereign autonomy 
and not believe the permanent members are pushing them into a response. Equally 
the permanent members can retain the belief that there is no binding character 
inherent to the text. 
 
In contrast to the flexible language of directives, the content of the operative 
paragraphs was not tentative and instead provided clear instructions as to what was 
necessitated by the situation. The fifth Operative Paragraph asked Member States to 
provide ‘qualified, specialised and trained personnel and supplies’.145 The seventh 
Operative paragraph called for the delivery of ‘deployable medical capabilities such 
as field hospitals with qualified and sufficient expertise, staff and supplies, [and] 
 
142 HIV/AIDs was discussed by the UNSC in 2000 but not under Article 39, UNSC Res 
1308 (17th July 2000) UN Doc S/Res/1308. 
143 UNSC Res 2177 (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/Res/2177, Preamble para 13. 
144 In Resolution 2177 the directive ‘encourages’ features three times; the directive 
‘calls on’ features seven times; the directive ‘urges’ features twice. Ibid. 
145 Ibid., Operative para 5. 
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laboratory services’.146 Operative paragraph eight was concerned with capacity 
building and the ‘training of health workers at the national and international level’.147 
This linguistic balance meant that Resolution 2177 was clear in its expectation, but 
able to avoid interfering with state sovereignty and so sidestep any potential veto. It 
was also able to give the international community a clear sense of direction, 
something that would be useful in the climate context.148  
 
The manner in which Resolution 2177 sought to engage the international community 
is extremely positive. It avoided a punitive character and was able to facilitate a 
supportive role for those able states. The focus on health shows the UNSC can move 
away from military orientated situations. There is also no hegemonic character 
reflected in the text of Resolution 2177, it does not offer any inequity that would 
allow the developing world to take issue with it. The soft tone of its directives also 
means that it is not obligatory in nature, and so would not interfere with sovereign 
autonomy. It is able to avoid many of the arguments that were levelled at the UNSC 
in the beginning of this chapter.  
 
The chance of a climate resolution being adopted is greatly increased by following 
the model set through Resolution 2177. The USA and China might be able to support 
this move, or at least abstain from voting based on the fact it would not be forcing 
them to take internal actions. Even Russia’s recalcitrance would struggle to argue 
against such a resolution, and it may be hesitant to use its veto in the face of a united 
international community that included other permanent members. There is no 
guarantee that they would take a positive stance on a climate resolution designed 
with this soft character, but the possibility exists that with the right leadership and 
diplomacy they could unite behind a compromise.149 
 
146 Ibid., Operative para 7. 
147 Ibid., Operative para 8. 
148 The Paris Agreement fails to offer state parties any precise direction as to what 
they should do to mitigate climate change. 
149 The leadership and diplomatic efforts of the USA were crucial in the adoption of 
Resolutions 1373, 1540 and 2177. 
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The USA will not take on this role and neither will China or Russia. That leaves France 
and the UK, both of which have a much better record on climate change than the 
other permanent members. Combined with the newly stated aspiration of France 
and the UK to become carbon neutral by 2050, these two states offer leadership 
potential on the climate threat.150 They both have an economic capacity that will 
allow them to take on the administrative tasks of driving the UNSC forward and they 
could easily extend this to the implementation of its provisions. Any action on their 
part could also act as a foil to expose the restrictive stances of the other permanent 
members, inadvertently putting pressure on them to respond more urgently.151 If 
these two states can engage in a strong round of diplomacy they might be able to 
generate international support in the same way the USA has done so in the past. 
There are no guarantees, but there is hope that the UK and France could convince 
the other permanent members to support this move or at least abstain from voting. 
 
The question that remains is whether or not Resolution 2177 was able to achieve 
distributional benefits? In other words, can a soft Article 39 resolution solve the 
problem that it was intended to address? To comprehend the success of Resolution 
2177 we must begin with an understanding of the situation prior to its inception. The 
WHO, responsible for coordinating international health and responding to crises, 
was, in the context of Ebola, negligent from the start, right up until the point where 
then Director-General Chan decided to securitise the issue through appeal to the 
 
150 B Felix, ‘France Sets 2050 Carbon-neutral Target with New Law’ Reuters (27th June 
2019) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-energy/france-sets-2050-carbon-
neutral-target-with-new-law-idUSKCN1TS30B> accessed 30th October 2019; 
Anonymous, ‘UK Becomes First Major Economy to Pass Net Zero Emissions Law’ 
(Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 27th June 2019) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-becomes-first-major-economy-to-pass-
net-zero-emissions-law> accessed 29 October 2019. 
151 This is based on a similar logic applied to the veto use, which suggests permanent 
members are encouraged by one another. E Luck, UN Security Council Practise and 
Promise (1st edition, Routledge 2006). 
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UNSC.152 The WHO was late in identifying that the situation was in fact Ebola, taking 
nearly four months from the first case in late December 2013 to confirmed 
identification on 23rd March 2014.153 Although this could be defended on the 
grounds that disease identification takes time, the follow-up failing of the WHO to 
not declare a public health emergency of international concern until 8th August 2014 
is indefensible.154 Its sluggish handling of the situation meant there was a lack of 
resources on the ground to stem the spread and consequently Ebola intensified in 
those states most affected, becoming an epidemic.155 
 
The link between the UNSC passing Resolution 2177 and the up-scaled response on 
the ground is difficult to quantify with precision because the UNSC itself was not 
responsible for delivering the increase in resources. However, in July and August 
2014 those states most affected were consistently low on resources, experiencing an 
ever-exacerbating situation. Given that from September 2014 onwards this situation 
began to improve, the involvement of the UNSC can reasonably be attributed as the 
cause of this renewed response. The WHO references how the ‘international 
community responded to the appeals for help from the UN’.156 Examining the 
circumstances pre-and post-UNSC intervention it will be shown that Resolution 2177 
 
152 Dr. Chan appeared before the UNSC at meeting 7268, UNSC Verbatim Record (18th 
September 2014) UN Doc/S/PV/7268. 
153 Anonymous, ‘Origins of the 2014 Ebola Epidemic’ (WHO, Emergencies 
preparedness, response, January 2015) <http://www.who.int/csr/disease/Ebola/one-
year-report/virus-origin/en/> accessed 25th July 2018. 
154 The WHO has the power to declare a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern under Article 12 of the International Health Regulations. Anonymous, 
‘Statement on the 1st Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee on the 2014 Ebola 
Outbreak in West Africa’ (Media Centre, WHO Statement, 8th August 2014) 
<http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/Ebola-20140808/en/> 
accessed 25th July 2018. 
155 Anonymous, ‘Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak – West Africa’ (WHO, Disease 
Outbreak News, 4th September 2014) 
<http://www.who.int/csr/don/2014_09_04_Ebola/en/> accessed 25th July 2018. 
156 Anonymous, ‘Partners in the Ebola Response’ (WHO, Emergencies preparedness, 
response) <http://www.who.int/csr/disease/Ebola/partnerships/en/> accessed 11th 
October 2018. 
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was vastly successful in galvanising the international community from a condition of 
indifference to one of positive action. 
 
Throughout most of 2014 the Guinea healthcare system was not equipped to 
respond with urgency to the suspected cases of Ebola.157 After heavy support and 
investment from the international community Guinea was able to introduce rapid 
detection and epidemiological investigation teams to operate and stem the 
spread.158 In August 2014 Liberia was suffering a distinct lack of Ebola Treatment 
Units (ETUs) with only two in operation, holding a total of forty beds.159 There was 
also a deficit of trained healthcare and hygiene professionals, as well as a lack of PPE 
and chlorine disinfectant, all of which contributed to Ebola spreading.160 By 8th 
November 2014 there were nine fully equipped and staffed ETUs in Liberia and 697 
beds available, representing a sharp incline in resources.161  
 
In Sierra Leone the number of beds introduced between September 2014 and 
January 2015 totalled 2,971 across twelve districts.162 Kurcharski et al. estimate this 
prevented 57,000 cases of Ebola, averting 40,000 deaths based on a 70% mortality 
rate.163 In terms of safe burial teams trained in handling bodies infected with Ebola 
 
157 Anonymous, ‘Ground zero in Guinea: the Ebola Outbreak Smoulders – Undetected 
– For More Than 3 Months’ (WHO, Emergencies preparedness, response, June 2014) 
<http://www.who.int/csr/disease/Ebola/Ebola-6-months/guinea/en/> accessed 11th 
October 2018. 
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<http://www.who.int/en/news-room/feature-stories/detail/liberia-and-guinea-
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Health Priority, Liberia Mid-2014’ (2015) 21 (4) Emerging Infectious Diseases 578. 
160 Ibid. 
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162 A Kurcharski et al., ‘Measuring the Impact of Ebola Control Measures in Sierra 
Leone’ (2015) 112 (46) PNAS 14366. 
163 Ibid. 
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the number went from less than ten in Liberia in August 2014, to more that fifty-four 
by 6th October 2014.164 Looking at the laboratory testing of Ebola specimens, the 
number of weekly tests in July 2014 was less than fifty due to a lack of facilities and 
staff; but by late September this number had increased to seven hundred, indicating 
another sharp rise in the facilities and capacity to carry out such activities.165   
 
These snapshot figures and their timing are used here to argue that the only reason 
for this up-scale in the response was because of a massive increase in WHO 
capability as a result of greater international support, and wider state support 
provided directly to those suffering.166 Up until the point of the UNSC securitising the 
situation the international community had largely failed to respond. The increased 
resources and overall responses indicate that although Resolution 2177 was not 
based on hard obligations it was able to percolate through to the international 
community and stimulate action. Without this intervention it is doubtful whether 
Ebola would have been brought under control in the timeframe achieved, if at all.  
 
The UNSC’s securitisation of Ebola through Resolution 2177 was pivotal in generating 
the required international response, which then translated to a significant ground-
level fightback. The soft character of Resolution 2177 housed within the confines of 
Article 39 was highly successful and so there is scope to claim that the securitisation 
of a subject in this way comes with distinct benefits even when hard obligation is 
absent. There is no reason to believe that similar distributional benefits would not 
manifest in the context of climate change, were the same type of resolution adopted. 
The argument even exists that the Ebola outbreak of 2014 was not in reality the 
international emergency that it was constructed to be, allowing the possibility that 
the globally understood climate catastrophe could generate even greater 
 
164 T Nyenswah et al, ‘Ebola Epidemic – Liberia, March – October 2014’ (2014) 63 (46) 
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166 The UK, for instance, provided beds directly to Sierra Leone between September 
2014 and January 2015. 
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international engagement than was seen in this example.167 The securitisation of 
climate change via the balanced model of an Article 39 resolution crafted with soft 
language offers the most viable way to proceed. In the attempt to balance the 
interests of the climate framework against those of the permanent members, this 
approach to drafting a climate resolution will be taken forward in the final subsection 
of this chapter.  
 
C. Focus of a Climate Resolution 
 
This subsection will explore the focus of a climate resolution through the context of a 
complementary function. The intention is not to advocate a perfect intervention that 
will see the UNSC solve the climate problem, but to offer a possible response that 
might improve the apathetic status quo. It will begin by drawing a distinction 
between adaptation and mitigation. Attention will then turn to the content of a 
climate resolution, before looking at what it should not include.  
 
Adaptation means taking steps to cope with climatic impact.168 It is the ‘process of 
adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects’.169 The idea of adapting to 
climatic impact was introduced in 1992 through the UNFCCC, which called for states 
to ‘Cooperate in preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change’.170 It did 
not assume a central position at the time because efforts prioritised mitigation.171 
There is now a vast concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and 
climatic impacts are being felt around the globe, the need to adapt to the immediate 
 
167 C McInnes, ‘Crisis! What Crisis? Global Health and the 2014–15 West African 
Outbreak’ (2015) 37 Third World Quarterly 380. 
168 J Laukkonen et al., ‘Combining Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation 
Measures at the Local Level’ (2009) 33 Habitat International 287. 
169 IPCC, ‘Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate 
Change Adaptation’ (2012), 5. 
170 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9th May 
1992, entered into force 21st March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107, Article 4(e). 
171 L Verchot et al., ‘Climate Change: Linking Adaptation and Mitigation Through 
Agroforestry’ (2007) 12 Mitigation, Adaptation and Strategic Global Change 901. 
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circumstances has become more readily recognised. As one research team put it, the 
‘realization of the inevitability of climate change has reinvigorated adaptation 
research’.172  
 
The nature of the UNSC fits well with adaptation because to some extent they are 
both reactive. Adaptation does not intend to introduce pre-emptive measures, 
instead focussing on the occurrence of a climatic situation. The UNSC has throughout 
most of its history been reactive, and by responding to developing situations it 
usually (but not exclusively) deals with international peace and security after a 
disturbance has taken place.173 Three broad options for an adaptation response exist: 
creating early warning systems; 174 responding to climatic emergencies;175 and 
broadening the mandate of peace missions.176 Although there is merit to arguing that 
these responses will have a soft impact in terms of habituating the permanent 
members to handling climate change, the reality remains that they will achieve 
nothing in relation to the principal gaps found within international climate law. A 
UNSC intervention via adaptation will not stop the problem of climate change and 
will only be able to address the recurring consequences. Focussing on adaptation 
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would be better situated at the level of a non-response intervention, and to some 
extent, as Resolutions 2423 and 2429 show, the UNSC might already be treading this 
path, rendering little need to further advance it here.177 Adaptation remains an 
important task, but we must be focussed on stopping climate change, not merely 
adapting to it, and for this reason its relevance to this thesis ends here. 
  
Mitigation refers to strategies that ‘aim to reduce the impact of climate change’.178 
Mitigation also has the UNFCCC as its point of origin, holding parties should take 
action to ‘prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse 
effects’.179 The UNFCCC goes on to promote ‘measures to mitigate climate change by 
addressing anthropogenic emissions’.180 This latter provision reflects the cornerstone 
of the framework that has attempted to reduce global emissions and halt climate 
change. A mitigation role for the UNSC is less akin to its typical pattern of behaviour. 
It would require the UNSC to respond thematically, which it has only done on a small 
number of occasions, most notably through the introduction of Resolutions 1373 and 
1540. The existence of these resolutions provides enough precedent to show the 
permanent members can take a forward-thinking approach and centralise pre-
emptive responses, allowing the possibility that climate mitigation is not out of the 
question. 
 
The UNSC is becoming more practised in handling climate change and although no 
substantial link to Article 39 has been made, the decision to include more frequent 
reference to it shadows the experience of other subjects now within its remit.181 To 
 
177 UNSC Res 2423 (28th June 2018) UN Doc S/Res/2423; UNSC Res 2429 (13th July 
2018) UN Doc S/Res/2429. 
178 J Laukkonen et al., ‘Combining Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation 
Measures at the Local Level’ (2009) 33 Habitat International 287, 288. 
179 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (adopted 9th May 
1992, entered into force 21st March 1994) 1771 UNTS 107, Article 3(3). 
180 Ibid., Article 4(1)(b). 
181 Resolution 2349 recognised the ‘adverse effects of climate change and ecological 
changes among other factors on the stability of the region’, UNSC Res 2349 (31st 
March 2017) UN Doc S/Res/2349, Operative para 26; Resolution 2408 provides a 
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take the next step and recognise climate change as within the scope of Article 39 
would be bold, but not unprecedented.182 It is argued here that a climate change 
resolution should begin by including a Preambular paragraph that pronounces: the 
Security Council determines that the threat of climate change and its consequences 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security. If it can centralise climate 
change as a threat to international peace and security in this way a resolution will 
come with the requisite gravitas to draw international attention and elevate climate 
change to the highest security platform, capitalising on the benefits of securitisation 
and, importantly, opening up further options for the UNSC to pursue. 
 
The UNSC would have the option to introduce new obligations or to reinforce 
existing ones. The complementary function argued for in this section would largely 
preclude the adoption of new climate obligations. Trying to introduce a new climate 
mandate would also invoke the discomfort of the permanent members that have all 
stated their support for the UNFCCC. Moreover, the activation of Article 39 argued 
above is already aspirational, if a draft resolution contained further far-reaching 
content it would surely invoke international condemnation and provoke a veto. The 
content of a climate resolution should be drawn from the UNFCCC, and 
predominantly the Paris Agreement. Taking the objectives of Paris and rehousing 
them in the pinnacle security apparatus of Article 39 could provide an injection of 
energy into ICL. This approach would not grant the UNSC a mandate beyond that 
which states have specifically agreed through convention, extinguishing some 
opposition to this move. 
 
 
direct recall to Presidential Statement 2011/15 where the UNSC expressed that the 
adverse effects of climate change may ‘aggravate certain existing threats to 
international peace and security’, UNSC Res 2408 (27th March 2018) UN Doc 
S/Res/2408 and UNSC Presidential Statement 2011/15 (20th July 2011) UN Doc 
S/PRST/2011/15, para 7; Resolution 2423 notes ‘the security implications of the 
adverse effects of climate change’, UNSC Res 2423 (28th June 2018) UN Doc 
S/Res/2423, para 68. 
182 Resolution 2177 evolved significantly from its predecessor Resolution 2176, to 
find the Ebola outbreak as a threat to peace in its own right.  
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The adoption of this approach should not mean the UNSC is bound to simply copy 
and paste the provisions of the Paris Agreement. A complementary role can be 
achieved by comparing the ambition of the Paris Agreement to the means with 
which it seeks to achieve its objective. A climate resolution could target the gap 
between the objective to hold temperatures below a 2.0°C increase and the INDCs 
that are proving unable to match this ambition. At the moment this obligation is 
discretion orientated, but the Paris Agreement is built on the intention for INDCs to 
match the ambition of the convention, and so an unintentional gap in the framework 
exists. The UNSC could introduce provisions that reflect the purpose of the 
Agreement by calling for states to submit ambitious INDCs that are able to match the 
objectives of Paris. This was the approach taken within Resolution 1540 that sought 
to use the objective of the non-proliferation regime to drive its provisions and plug 
the unintended gaps that had developed.183 Treading this line would allow a 
resolution to offer specific support to ICL, providing a tangible benefit beyond those 
inherent to securitisation. 
 
Taking this approach might invoke the argument previously made by some 
permanent members that the UNSC lacks the appropriate climate expertise. 
Populating a climate resolution might pose legitimate problems for the UNSC. To 
circumvent these possibilities the IPCC should be called upon to present before the 
UNSC on the threat of climate change and the intervention required to support the 
mitigation efforts of ICL. This would reflect the same function undertaken by the 
WHO in the lead up to Resolution 2177.184 Bringing the IPCC before the UNSC would 
not only provide an expert lead for members to follow, but it would also offer an 
outlet for IPCC findings. On 6th October 2018 the IPCC released a comprehensive 
 
183 Its gap-plugging intention was based not on the content of the non-proliferation 
regime but on its overriding objectives, which had been agreed and supported by 
state parties. UNSC Res 1540 (28th April 2004) UN Doc S/Res/1540. 
184 Dr Chan Director General of the WHO, Dr Nabarro Senior United Nations Systems 
Coordinator for Ebola, and Mr Niamah of Médecins Sans Frontiéres all provided 
expert briefings before the UNSC. UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN 
Doc/S/PV/7268. 
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report on the threat of climate change.185 It was able to generate significant global 
attention, appearing on the front pages of international newspapers.186 However, it 
had no means with which to stimulate uptake of its recommendations and is instead 
reliant on state parties heeding its message through implementation of their 
discretionary-based Paris commitments. The UNSC could offer the IPCC a forum in 
which to give its findings an injection of vigour, and the IPCC could offer the UNSC a 
sound factual base to draw from when populating its Preambular and Operative 
paragraphs. 
 
The linguistic construction of a climate resolution will be crucial to whether the 
permanent members decide to withhold their veto. It would have to be linguistically 
soft and directives such as ‘calls upon’, ‘encourages’ and ‘urges’ would be required at 
the start of each paragraph. The content of these paragraphs, however, does not 
have to remain vague and the UNSC could recommend specific actions. Examples 
could include: ‘the Security Council calls on all states to comply with their Paris 
Agreement obligations by committing to robust INDCs that match the 2°C objective’; 
‘the Security Council urges all states to take action appropriate to their 
circumstances; ‘the Security Council encourages the development of renewable 
energy sources’; ‘the Security Council urges states to find ways to reduce their 
carbon dependency and support others to do the same’. Adopting these or similar 
provisions, a climate resolution would be able to complement ICL without stepping 
beyond the mandate of that already agreed through convention. This balanced 
approach would send a powerful message from the UNSC, while not directly 
interfering with state priorities, thus increasing its chance of avoiding a veto. 
 
The next option is to consider if the UNSC can offer a role in terms of capacity 
building. The 2018 IPCC Report ends by highlighting the importance of strengthening 
 
185 IPCC Report, ‘Global Warming of 1.5 °C: Summary for Policy Makers’ (2018). 
186 J Watts, ‘We have 12 Years to Limit Climate Change Catastrophe, Warns UN’ The 
Guardian (8th October 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/env 
ironment/2018/oct/08/global-warming-must-not-exceed-15c-warns-landmark-un-
report> accessed 11th October 2018. 
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the capacities of all states, in particular those of developing states at the national and 
local levels.187 The UNSC has in the past proven itself extremely adept in facilitating 
global cooperation and capacity development on an international concern. The 
Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) and subsequent Counter Terrorism Executive 
Directive (CTED) have proven to be highly useful in helping to develop cooperation 
and capacity building among nation states. The CTED specifically has been 
responsible for sending expert officials to Member States to provide technical 
assistance in the achievement of Resolution 1373 obligations.188 The CTC is 
considered a success because of its transparent nature and ability to collect reports 
from all Member States in one place, creating what Cortright calls ‘the largest body 
of information about worldwide counterterrorism’.189 There is no reason why the 
UNSC cannot repeat this model and introduce a Counter Climate Change Committee 
charged with the exact same purpose.  
 
It is possible such a committee would only be able to reflect the current UNFCCC 
structures.190 It is also distinctly possible that a committee of this nature chaired by 
the right person could achieve a more succinct set of targets pertaining to 
information sharing and technology transfer than the already encumbered UNFCCC 
mechanisms are able to accomplish. Sir Jeremy Greenstock of the UK, who chaired 
the CTC, has been personally commended for his ‘effective and dynamic’ leadership, 
indicating the power of selecting the right person to chair such a Committee.191 
Smaller bodies with a more precise mandate can in certain instances achieve more 
than over-populated dispersed institutions trying to balance multiple priorities. A 
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Today 62, 62. 
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191 J Dhanapala, ‘The United Nations Response to 9/11’ (2007) 17 (1) Terrorism and 
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Counter Climate Change Committee could be charged with the discrete task of 
gathering capacity reports and sharing good practice. It might even have the effect of 
simplifying some of the overtly complex machinery of international climate law.192 
Again, nothing in the UNSC endeavouring to fulfil such a role would be offensive to 
those possessing the power of veto, and if past evidence is to be believed such a role 
could be highly useful to the climate change framework. However, the expertise of 
the UNSC to undertake such a role might be questioned by the permanent members 
and so any such committee would have to be carefully designed. 
 
Beyond the inclusion of provisions that intend to support the Paris Agreement, the 
possibility exists that Article 41 might be activated to introduce a sanctions regime to 
enforce compliance.193 As discussed earlier in this chapter, the implementation of 
sanctions comes with a number of problems. Their ability to improve a situation is 
debatable. They do not foster a sense of community or multilateralism. In the climate 
context it is not clear what sanctions would seek to achieve. Would they target states 
with particularly poor INDCs, in which case much of the international community 
would have to be targeted. Or would they target specific climate offenders, in which 
case half of the international community would have to be targeted. The content of 
sanctions would also struggle to help the climate framework because of their 
pressurising nature that might further set back the capacity of states to take climate 
action. To completely preclude the possibility of sanctions, it is almost certain that 
any resolution providing a means of enforcement via Article 41 would incur a veto 
from at least one of the permanent members. Therefore, although part of the 
benefit of Article 39 is to allow access to this measure, it must remain an abstract 
possibility not intended for implementation. It is also worth reinforcing that Article 
42 measures involving the use of force should be completely ruled out. If the UNSC is 
to engage climate change and complement the Paris Agreement, it must be through 
the guise of support and development avoiding all punitive measures. 
 
192 R Keohane, D Victor, ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2011) 9 (1) 
Perspectives on Politics 7. 
193 Charter of the United Nations (24th October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, Article 41. 
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There is no guarantee this complementary intervention would be supported by the 
permanent members, despite it reflecting their long-standing submissions of support 
for the UNFCCC without intruding on state autonomy. The UK and France would have 
to take on a leadership role, capitalising on their progressive stances. The onus would 
be on them to convince the other permanent members to unite behind the adoption 
of a resolution. They would need to compromise on the linguistic choices of the 
provisions to convince China and the USA that no internal obligations would be 
created. The negotiations that took place between the USA and China on the content 
of Resolution 1540 showcase that they can compromise even when their 
perspectives differ significantly.194 If the UK and France were successful in this task, 
pressure would mount on Russia to acquiesce to the resolution. Convincing Russia to 
take this course of action would be an uphill battle. Yet, it represents no greater 
challenge than that which is already being faced by ICL. There is no reason to 
discount this course of action because of the robust diplomatic hurdles that would 
have to be overcome. 
 
This model of response balances the arguments against involving the UNSC with 
those that advocate for a climate change intervention. The path charted is not a 
perfect response to the climate problem, but it offers some potential through the 
impact it may have on the international community. The activation of Article 39 
accompanied by some non-binding but precise provisions may have a significant 
influence on states. It is not punitive or hegemonic and must stay this way to avoid 
the legitimate concerns expressed earlier. Instead, it is based on a need to galvanise 
an international response to an international security threat. Reflecting on the 
current character of the UNSC and the desperate need to find a way to enhance the 
international response to climate change this route proposes a reasonable and 
balanced pathway forward. It offers a complementary approach to securitise climate 
 
194 M Asada, ‘Security Council Resolution 1540 to Combat WMD Terrorism: 
Effectiveness and Legitimacy in International Legislation’ (2008) 13 Journal of Conflict 
and Security Law 303. 
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change within the meaning of Article 39 that is steeped in pragmatism and 
possibility.  
 
V. The Effectiveness of a Complementary Resolution 
 
This last section intends to consider whether or not involving the UNSC in climate 
change through the advocated complementary response would be effective or not. It 
will apply the three standards of effectiveness introduced in Chapter Two (legal, 
behavioural, problem-solving), before offering reflections on why we must persist 
with this pathway.  
 
Beginning with legal effectiveness, this standard refers to the extent that a problem 
can be transplanted into a legal regime.195 The UNSC is not a legislator, but its output 
has been afforded a character akin to that of legislation through the UN Charter.196 It 
has also crafted resolutions tantamount to legislation.197 If the permanent members 
can be convinced to adopt a resolution on climate change then the legal standard 
will have been achieved. The near universal membership of the UN also means that 
every member state will have to abide by such a resolution, increasing the degree of 
legal effectiveness that could be attached to it. However, the legal standard is limited 
by its focus on the creation of law and does not consider the purpose for which that 
regime was created or the means in which it seeks to achieve it. For this, we need to 
consider other measures of effectiveness.  
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Behavioural effectiveness refers to the extent that a regime can alter the behaviour 
of those subjected to it towards meeting its stated objective.198 Applying this 
standard means much more focus is placed on the content of a climate resolution. 
There is little doubt that the tone of a climate resolution would be crucial to its 
adoption. The linguistic structure would have to be reflective of Resolution 2177 and 
avoid anything remotely similar to the hard character of Resolution 1373. This 
immediately brings into question the ability of a complementary resolution to alter 
the behaviour of those subjected to it. The possibility of obligations that mandate 
behavioural changes is one of the key arguments against involving the UNSC, and so 
it is almost certain that the provisions with a resolution would avoid language that 
impinges upon the autonomy of states.199 If the language of a resolution is going to 
be advisory in much the same way as the Paris Agreement is construed as containing 
soft provisions, does this preclude behavioural effectiveness?  
 
The short answer is we do not actually know what behavioural changes, if any, will 
follow a climate resolution. What we do know is that Resolution 2177 was carefully 
constructed to avoid hard obligations and, as demonstrated above, it was able to 
inspire a vast increase in international effort. In other words, it was able to 
encourage a renewed set of behaviours from the international community absent 
mandatory language. The securitisation of an issue through the world’s most 
elevated security institution may be enough to prompt state-level action irrespective 
of the mandatory or non-mandatory nature of the legal instrument. This possibility 
opens up lines of future research, and it would be useful to determine if there exists 
a difference in state uptake between those resolutions that necessitate action and 
those that hope to encourage behavioural alterations. It may be the case that the 
UNSC’s position as the world’s premier security institution would have an impact on 
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state action irrespective of a climate resolution’s construction, but this would have to 
be tested in further research. 
 
The problem-solving standard refers to the degree that a response can solve a 
problem.200 Would a complementary climate resolution offer more in this regard 
than is currently being achieved by the Paris Agreement? The answer is again 
unknown because we do not know how the international community will react to 
such a resolution. However, the Paris Agreement, even if implemented in full, is 
unlikely to resolve the climate crisis. As was shown in Chapter Two it is failing to slow 
the problem of emissions, necessitating that we consider more exceptional 
measures. Thus, even though it is unknown whether a complementary climate 
resolution would exhibit problem-solving effectiveness, there exists a potential that 
must be explored given the ineptitude of the current response. 
 
However, even where the UNSC takes a hard approach, like that seen in response to 
terrorism and proliferation, its ability to solve problems may be questioned. 
Terrorism persists despite Resolution 1373.201 Resolution 1540 was unable to inspire 
unanimous compliance because some states simply did not have the capacity to 
meet the requirements set out.202 This brings into question whether the UNSC is 
suitably effective at solving problems. Despite the continued existence of terrorism, 
the level of impact it has been able to achieve per attack has not replicated that seen 
in 2001. The proliferation of WMDs by non-state actors to terror groups has been 
greatly disrupted and this may be because of the efforts of states to comply with 
 
200 O Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless 
Society (1st edition, Cornell University Press, 1994) Ch.6. 
201 R Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter 
Terrorism, (1st Edition, Manchester University Press 2005); N White, ‘Preventative 
Counter Terrorism and International Law’ (2013) 18 (2) Journal of Conflict and 
Security Law 181. 
202 P Crail, ‘Implementing the UN Security Council Resolution 1540’ (2006) 13 Non-
Proliferation Review 355. 
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Resolution 1540.203 This might allow the claim that these problems are to some 
extent being addressed in an ongoing manner. This raises the question as to what 
would have happened with regard to these two threats had the UNSC not securitised 
them. A counter-factual reasoning process might provide some answers to this 
question, but it is beyond the scope of this project, requiring extensive 
methodological apparatus.204 Nonetheless this is a line of research that could be 
explored in the future. 
 
In regard to the Ebola outbreak, it is again impossible to say what would have 
happened had it not been securitised, but the evidence pre-and post-UNSC 
intervention does highlight its problem-solving potential. As was demonstrated 
earlier in this chapter, throughout 2014 the outbreak only worsened and despite the 
WHO and other organisations offering assistance through the ordinary modes of 
response, it was only when securitisation took place that the problem started to be 
addressed. The international community responded through the provision of 
resources directly to the states in question. Healthcare professionals and other 
related experts were deployed and the WHO received an influx of funding.205 This 
was inspired by a resolution that did not mandate action from the international 
community, indicating that the UNSC might offer problem-solving potential as part of 
its inherent character. Would this be reflected in the climate change context? It is 
hard to say because the problems are so distinct. But we do know that the Paris 
Agreement offers little problem-solving capacity, and this is reason enough to 
consider the potential of a complementary resolution to inspire greater international 
action.  
 
203 I Khripunov, ‘A Work in Progress: UN Security Council Resolution 1540’ (Arms 
Control Association, May 2014) <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2014_05/A-
Work-in-Progress-UN-Security-Resolution-1540-After-10-Years> accessed 10th 
September 2020. 
204 For a discussion on counter-factual reasoning method see: J Hovi, D Sprinz, A 
Underdal, ‘The Oslo-Potsdam Solution to Measuring Regime Effectiveness: Critique, 
Response and the Road Ahead’ (2003) 3 (3) Global Environmental Politics 74. 
205 See Section IV, Subsection B for a full run down of the response that followed 
Resolution 2177.  
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However, it must be remembered that the complementary response is not being 
advocated as a means to to override the Paris Agreement. Instead it is argued that a 
climate resolution could be used to provide an injection of impetus to the 
Agreement. By capitalising on the potential of the UNSC to generate a renewed 
momentum, a complementary climate resolution could be a means in which to 
encourage states to engage with the Paris Agreement in a way they have so far 
chosen not to do, and thus improve its problem-solving capacity. In 2020 we stand 
on the edge of a precipice, one that threatens to overhaul the way life on earth 
exists. The UNSC may not offer a silver bullet in terms of effectiveness, but it offers 
potential. Importantly, it is potential that has yet to be tested in regard to this 
catastrophic threat, unlike the ordinary realm of international law, which, on its own, 
is failing to solve the problem. Thus, there is every reason to pursue a 
complementary climate resolution in the hope that it might galvanise the 





















‘In conclusion, the last decade has shown an increased level of activity within the 
UNSC in the field of climate change.’1 
 
I. Thesis Findings  
 
This thesis has advanced six principal arguments. First, the theory of securitisation 
enables a switch in focus that removes the need to define Article 39 and instead 
allows us to examine how it is activated. By centralising the permanent members as 
the principle securitising actors on the UNSC it is possible to identify how they argue 
for the securitisation of threats and then use this knowledge as a way to consider if 
the same arguments relate to climate change.  
 
Second, the current mechanisms intended to mitigate climate change are failing. The 
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement comprise a framework that has 
cultivated discord and frustration, precluding any measure of meaningful mitigation 
where emissions are concerned. The latest addition to this framework, the Paris 
Agreement, sought to extinguish some of the inherent points of dispute by 
centralising discretion. It went too far, and the complete autonomy of states to set 
their own climate agendas through Nationally Determined Contributions has created 
a void between the 2°C objective and the actions undertaken to meet it.  
 
Third, through analysis of the UNSC’s historical use of Article 39 it is possible to draw 
distinctions within the nature of the threats engaged. By providing a definition to the 
words peace and security it was identified that early interventions fall more clearly 
under the heading of peace while contemporary threats exhibit international security 
at their core. As such international security can be recognised as a referent object for 
the purposes of securitisation theory. Climate change is of a nature more akin to 
 
1 F Sindico, ‘Climate Change and Security’ (2017) 3 Carbon and Climate Law Review 
187, 190. 
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international security than anything else, allowing comparisons to be drawn between 
it and these other contemporary threats engaged by the UNSC.  
 
Fourth, the narratives and their underpinning thresholds and triggers that lead the 
permanent members to activate Article 39 were analysed. It was argued that five 
interrelated narratives (magnitude, transnational scale, collective interest, 
insufficient response, and urgency) are routinely centralised by the permanent 
members. If the right conditions manifest across and between these five narratives 
the permanent members can become convinced of the need to securitise a threat 
within the meaning of Article 39.  
 
Fifth, applying these narratives to climate change revealed that only in certain 
instances could it be framed to prompt securitisation. Extreme weather events 
exacerbated by climate change were able to trigger all five narratives in a way that 
resonates with the reasoning of the permanent members. Those that seek the 
securitisation of climate change should frame their arguments accordingly if they 
wish to convince the permanent members of the need to intervene via Article 39. 
 
Six, despite the securitisation parallels between climate change and the activation of 
Article 39 there exist legitimate arguments against taking this step. Acknowledging 
those arguments against climate change on the UNSC’s agenda, and the particular 
perspectives of the permanent members, this thesis argued that a complementary 
response aimed at mitigation could realistically be centralised. A complementary 
response could offer an injection of vitality and may create an impetus that is 
currently absent from the realm of international climate law. Although it is not clear 
to what extent this will be effective at addressing the problem, there is room to 
believe there is at least potential for improvements, thus making it imperative to 
explore the securitisation of climate change before the UNSC while we still have the 
capacity to act.  
 
II. Going Forward 
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These findings do not mean that climate change will miraculously become part of the 
UNSC’s agenda. Rather, they offer a way in which proponents of climate security 
might seek to argue the transition of climate change into the remit of Article 39. The 
need for this shift is becoming more urgent with each day, and the status quo 
currently presiding must not be allowed to continue. While this research was coming 
to its conclusion COP25 took place and again the international community proved 
itself unable to move towards greater climate action.2 The conference was marred by 
disagreement and defeat, with the only real show of commitment coming from 
campaigners.3 It is this continual breakdown that legitimises the research undertaken 
here. If we cannot in 2020 trust states to take the required action independently, we 
must look for ways to incite greater commitment. The securitisation of climate 
change through Article 39 provides a potential means in which to achieve this, that, 
importantly, has yet to be tried. 
 
This thesis offers practical guidance for those that might seek to convince the UNSC 
of the need to intervene. In 2011 when Mr Steiner, then Director of UNEP, came 
before the UNSC to argue climate change as a threat he did so absent the knowledge 
cultivated here.4 His presentation was scientifically accurate but unable to draw upon 
the narratives that prompt intervention. He did not address the UNSC in response to 
a climatic emergency, and so his statement lacked a sense of urgency. The 
permanent members were unable to link the arguments made to visible harm, 
inadvertently reinforcing the idea that climate change was an abstract threat and not 
an immediately pending one. Mr Steiner’s opening remarks that he was addressing 
 
2 A Chandrasekhar, ‘The UN Climate Talks Ended in Deadlock. Is This Really The Best 
the World Can Manage?’ The Guardian (21st December 2019) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/dec/21/un-climate-talks-
deadlock-cop25> accessed 30th December 2019. 
3 Anonymous, ‘COP 25 Climate Talks Have “Failed the People” Activists Say’ The 
Japan Times (15th December 2019) 
<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/12/15/world/science-health-world/cop-
25-climate-talks-failed-people-activists-say/#.XgojTS2cYxg> accessed 29th December 
2019. 
4 UNSC Verbatim Record (20th July 2011) UN Doc S/PV/6587. 
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the UNSC from ‘the ‘perspective of the knowledge, the science and the expertise’ 
were far removed from arguments related to magnitude, transnational scale, 
indiscriminate harm and urgency. His sedate reference to ‘the significant and 
profound implications of climate change’ was unable to pierce through the veil of 
self-interest that presides over the UNSC.5  
 
If the UNEP, the WMO or the IPCC are able to come before the UNSC again they 
should do so in response to a climatic emergency that allows them to characterise 
the threat according to lives lost, scale of the harm, indiscriminate nature and the 
urgent need for collective responses. There is scope to believe that framing 
arguments accordingly can be successful in generating unity among the permanent 
members on the need for securitisation of a threat. In 2014 Dr Chan, then Director of 
the WHO, reasoned Ebola as a serious international security threat relying on 
arguments linked to lives lost, scale, wider impact, collective security and urgency. All 
of which were picked up by the permanent members and used to justify the 
activation of Article 39.6 There is no guarantee this will work in the climate context, 
but there is a desperate need to try. This thesis offers those fighting climate change a 
new approach to test in looking to advance the climate security agenda and the 
findings here will have most value when given practical application. 
 
In terms of future research this thesis has offered up some avenues of further 
exploration. First, the approach of focussing on the permanent members as the 
securitising actors was only one way to proceed. It is possible that specific actors 
could have been isolated, which, although methodologically beyond this project, 
might have offered a way to develop more discrete knowledge on the power balance 
of the UNSC, and specifically between the permanent members. We already know 
 
5 Ibid., 3; Reference to past natural disasters, such as Hurricane Mitch, were made 
but the impact these examples had on the UNSC was limited because of their 
existence in the past. 
6 UNSC Verbatim Record (18th September 2014) UN Doc S/PV/7268. 
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that there exists a hierarchy between them;7 it would be useful to understand how 
this transfers into tangible action in the pursuit of a securitising agenda. A second 
and similar line of further investigation, this thesis has only analysed one half of the 
securitisation process. The acceptance of a securitising move by the non-permanent 
members was again beyond the methodological remit of this project, but it would be 
extremely useful to understand why they choose to acquiesce to the securitisation of 
a subject and whether or not they are able to exert some form of influence over the 
permanent members. This dynamic between the two groups on the UNSC could be 
explored in greater detail to understand how progress on particular matters is 
achieved. Both cases of further research seek to employ securitisation theory in 
slightly different ways to provide greater understanding on the working practices of 
the UNSC, which may in the long run help the climate security agenda to progress.  
 
A last and more abstract line of thinking that has stemmed from this research is how 
the principles of administrative law might be useful to help advance the legitimacy of 
the UNSC. Its political motivations are able to produce absurd results, whereby two 
similar situations are not subject to the same level of intervention.8 This lack of 
consistency would not be acceptable in the context of administrative principles at 
the domestic level. Research already exists on the application of some such principles 
beyond the domestic realm to the UN,9 but in the quest to further legitimise the 
UNSC and enhance the achievement of its mandate a discrete application of the 
consistency principle might be useful. The narratives that lead to intervention 
 
7 S Scott, ‘The Attitude of the P5 Towards a Climate Change Role for the Council’ in S 
Scott, C Ku (eds) Climate Change and the UN Security Council (1st edition, EE 2018) 
209. 
8 D A Mahapatra, ‘The Mandate and the (In)Effectiveness of the United Nations 
Security Council and International Peace and Security: The Contexts of Syria and 
Mali’ (2016) 21 Geopolitics 43. 
9 I Hurd, ‘The UN Security Council and the International Rule of Law’ (2014) 7 The 
Chinese Journal of International Politics 361; J Alvarez, ‘International Organisations 
and the Rule of Law’ (2003) 14 NZPIL 3; D Forsythe, ‘The UN Security Council and 
Response to Atrocities: International Criminal Law and the P-5’ (2012) 34 Human 
Rights Quarterly 840. 
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analysed here inadvertently attempt to address this deficit in consistency through 
the unintentional endeavour to hold the permanent members to their own standards 
of reasoning. This line of thinking reflects the administrative principles that are 
required to uphold the rule of law, something that should be explored further in 
regard to the UNSC. An explicit research agenda would be necessary to link the 
narratives here to the principle of consistency and usefully take this idea further. 
 
III. Climatic Catastrophe 
 
Sindico is correct in his assertion that the UNSC has been increasingly examined in 
recent years by those seeking to further the climate security agenda.10 Moreover, its 
own ventures into the realm of climate change have increased. This nexus must not 
be allowed to fade, and the research community should continue to build 
momentum and search for more ways to link the UNSC with climate mitigation. This 
research has endeavoured to traverse this pathway by offering a practical approach 
that might be useful to those seeking to further the securitisation of climate change. 
 
It is possible that anyone reading this thesis may adopt the critique that it is encased 
in too much hope and aspiration; that there are too many obstacles which will 
prevent the UNSC positively intervening in climate change. While it is perfectly 
acceptable to identify these potential challenges, they should be matched against the 
very certain realities that are currently leading humanity ever closer to the climatic 
cliff edge. International climate law is routinely and consistently paralysed. The UNSC 
could respond to this problem with the positivity it has conjured in the past, where it 
has been able to lead on problematic subjects. There is no reason to believe it cannot 




10 F Sindico, ‘Climate Change and Security’ (2017) 3 Carbon and Climate Law Review 
187. 
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The prospect of climatic tipping points like the complete melting of the polar ice caps 
or the destruction of the Amazon Rainforest are becoming less remote with each day 
that passes.11 As climate destruction exacerbates, the chance of a ‘global cascade of 
tipping points’ becomes more probable, posing ‘an existential threat to civilization’.12 
It should also be clear that scientific analysis until fairly recently has been cautious, 
avoiding hyperbole and dramatization.13 Even the IPCC, which has been instrumental 
in contextualising and justifying the research here, has come in for criticism because 
of its tendency towards ‘reticence and caution, erring on the side of least drama’.14 
These guarded findings are only the tip of the iceberg and it is now becoming clearer 
that we face a crisis that may turn the earth into a ‘less hospitable, hothouse’.15  
 
The Australian wildfires of 2020 encapsulate this argument with terrifying clarity.16 
The extent of the current spread is unprecedented and at the time of writing 24 
people have died, 2000-plus homes have been destroyed and an immeasurable 
number of plants and animals have perished.17 Some merchants of doubt are 
downplaying these fires and casting scepticism on the impact climate change has had 
 
11 T Lenton et al., ‘Climate Tipping Points – Too Risky to Bet Against’ (2019) 575 
Nature 592. 
12 Ibid., 594, 595. 
13 D Spratt, I Dunlop, ‘What Lies Beneath’ (National Centre for Climate Restoration 
2018). 
14 Ibid., 40. 
15 T Lenton et al., ‘Climate Tipping Points – Too Risky to Bet Against’ (2019) 575 
Nature 592, 594. 
16 D Marr, ‘Australia is Becoming a Nation of Dread – and the World Looks on With 
Pity and Scorn’ The Guardian (1st January 2020) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/jan/01/australia-is-becoming-
a-nation-of-dread-and-the-world-looks-on-with-pity-and-scorn> accessed 7th January 
2020. 
17 N Kommenda, J Holder, ‘Bushfires Have Swept Large Parts of Australia Since 
October, Leaving More Than 20 People Dead, Destroying Thousands of Homes and 
Devastating Wildlife’ The Guardian (7th January 2020) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2020/jan/07/visual-guide-see-how-
australias-bushfires-are-raging-across-the-country> accessed 7th January 2020. 
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on this event.18 The scientific community, on the other hand, points out that 
Australia has experienced its ten hottest years on record since 2005, and these 
higher intensity fires are just one consequence of this hotter, drier Australia, with 
experts predicting more of the same to follow.19  
 
The Australian wildfires are just one example among many climatic impacts 
devastating lives.20 Climate change is an overwhelming threat that no state can 
escape irrespective of development.21 Those in positions of authority in and outside 
the UNSC must be convinced of the need to respond globally and with an 
earnestness that is currently absent throughout much of ICL. It is against this 
backdrop that this thesis was crafted, and the extreme possibility of an Article 39 
intervention centralised as a reasonable and necessary step in the climate response 
movement. 
 
In an ideal world it would not be necessary to call upon the UNSC to further the 
climate response. Part of the reason for recognising the arguments against this move 
in Chapter Six was to highlight that it is not universally positive. However, the link 
 
18 G Henderson, ‘Unhappy New Year but Fires Aren’t the End of the World’ The 
Australian (4th January 2020) 
<https://www.theaustralian.com.au/commentary/unhappy-new-year-but-fires-
arent-end-of-the-world/news-story/2ef3423d389d2ef6be3bbbbbe47e9151> 
accessed 7th January 2020. 
19 WMO, ‘Australia Suffers Devasting Bushfires’ (WMO, 7th January 2020) 
<https://public.wmo.int/en/media/news/australia-suffers-devastating-bushfires> 
accessed 7th January 2020; S Gibbens, ‘Intense “Firestorms” Forming From Australia’s 
Deadly Wildfires’ National Geographic (6th January 2020) 
<https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/01/australian-wildfires-cause-
firestorms/> accessed 7th January 2020. 
20 WMO, ‘State of the Climate 2018 Shows Accelerating Climate Change Impacts’ 
(WMO, 28th March 2019) <https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/state-of-
climate-2018-shows-accelerating-climate-change-impacts> accessed 5th January 
2019. 
21 D Dunne et al., ‘In-depth Q&A: The IPCC’s Special Report on Climate Change and 
Land’ (The Carbon Brief, 8th August 2019) <https://www.carbonbrief.org/in-depth-
qa-the-ipccs-special-report-on-climate-change-and-land> accessed 5th January 2020.  
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between climate change and the UNSC has continued to advance because of the 
ineffectiveness of international climate law in comparison to the advancing threat. 
Through UNSC intervention we might have a chance of generating global momentum 
and securing the stabilisation of emissions in time to stave off climate change, which 
has intensified without faulter over the last decades and will certainly continue on 
until irreversible catastrophes become the norm.22 As Geoffrey Palmer said, we must 
find ways to reach ‘international agreement which will remove the peril of climate 
change’.23 To that end, it is hoped this thesis has some value in progressing the 
climate security agenda before we lose control of the situation and experience a 


















22 WMO, ‘2019 Concludes a Decade of Exceptional Global Heat and High-impact 
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